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ABSTRACT 
The Pharmaceutical Industry is important both socially and 
economically; however, the market structure and conduct which distinguish it 
have brought it under the critical eye of both the regulatory authorities and the 
public. This thesis describes the market structure and conduct of the industry 
beginning with an historical description of its development and the market 
theories behind it. It is from these theories that a number of characteristics and 
behavioural traits have been identified as contrary to the interests of society. 
As an oligopolistic multinational the pharmaceutical industry has been 
identified with high prices and profits, a lack of price competition and heavy 
product differentiation leading to high concentration ratios. Consumer 
exploitation is possible via these continuously high prices and the possibilities of 
ineffective, unsafe and poor quality pharmaceuticals. These outcomes emerge 
from the distinct organisation of various aspects of the industry, viz. research 
and development, promotional activities, pricing and profits, which are 
examined. Concerns over possible consumer exploitation have led governments 
throughout the world to impose increasingly stringent regulations on all of these 
aspects. Such regulations have significantly changed the market structure and 
conduct of the industry world-wide. 
Having established the market structure of the industry the thesis 
continues with an in-depth look at brand loyalty. Analysis was conducted on the 
strength of brand loyalty in the face of generic competition and the attitude of 
doctors to company promotional material. While brand loyalty continues to 
have an impact on prescribing its strength appears to be diminishing. 
The market structure and conduct of the pharmaceutical industry is 
dynamic, with the present industrial climate increasingly competitive for all 
those concerned. Nevertheless, while the future of the industry will be difficult, 
evidence of its previous flexibility and strength suggests it will adapt and will 
continue to be successful. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The importance of the pharmaceutical industry lies not only in its social 
impact but in its economic strength. Accompanying the advances made in medical 
knowledge, hygiene and sanitation, pharmaceuticals have helped reduce mortality 
and morbidity rates substantially over the past century, adding to the potential 
productive life span of the world population and improving the quality of life for 
many. Furthermore, the industry is a powerful economic asset, reducing health 
costs by lessening the need for extended care, while generating substantial revenue 
and employment for the world economy. This industry therefore has an important 
function, both socially and economically, in modern society. In addition, the 
pharmaceutical industry is of interest from an historical view point as it is a 
relatively young and extremely successful industry which can be traced from 
inception to the present day. It is possible to study the progress of the dominant 
companies and their reactions to changes in their operational environment. Interest 
is further heightened by the many controversies that have arisen concerning the 
market structure and conduct of the industry. 
To look at the market structure and conduct of the pharmaceutical industry 
it is best to begin with an historical description of the industry from its real 
beginning in the 1930's. While the roots of the industry can be traced further back, 
the 1930's heralded the real beginning of the modern pharmaceutical industry. With 
the advent of the sulphonamides, interest in the possibilities of radical new cures 
and treatments for many diseases was heightened. The Second World War (1939 - 
1945) acted as a catalyst for the pharmaceutical industry, stimulating a frenzy of 
research activity in anticipation of the huge numbers of casualties that the war 
would bring. The urgency for medical treatments stimulated the development of not 
only the pharmaceutical industry to provide drugs for the treatment and cure of 
illness but also the development of general medical knowledge and better medical 
equipment. The post-war decades experienced unprecedented success in medical 
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science advances, especially in drug related developments., Treatments and cures 
for an ever-increasing array of illnesses were developed with increasing speed and 
proficiency. 
During the post war decades the industry evolved, discovering and 
developing more cures and treatments while taking on, a more international 
character to match the global demand it faced. Simultaneously, certain 
characteristics developed that were to prove a source of controversy over the 
forthcoming years, viz. the pharmaceutical industry developed into an oligopolistic 
structure with the individual firms who dominated the market taking on an 
increasingly multinational character. 
The theories relating to these market structures associated with the 
pharmaceutical industry are described in detail in chapter 3. Briefly, the theory of 
oligopoly developed in the 19th Century out of curiosity into the types of market 
between the polar extremes of perfect competition and monopoly. Perfect 
competition was seen as the most desirable market form for society, whereby a large 
number of buyers and sellers existed in the market with no barriers to entry or exit, 
no government intervention, perfect mobility of factors of production, perfect 
knowledge and homogeneous products. The individual firm was therefore a price- 
taker and in the long-run the maximum profit level (equating marginal revenue to 
marginal cost) coincided with the optimal level of output and plant utilisation, while 
price equalled the marginal cost of production. For firms in this situation normal 
profits were made which covered costs, the rate of return on capital and the 
remuneration for the risk-bearing function of the entrepreneur (Koutsoyiannis 
1979). A further definition of the normal or reasonable profit rate is that which is 
sufficiently large to call forth the resources to produce the goods and services which 
consumers want, in the quantities and quality they prefer and at prices they are 
prepared to pay (Reekie & Weber 1979). Monopoly was the alternative to this 
market structure whereby one manufacturer supplied the market and could set 
whatever price or output levels maximised profits. This resulted in high prices and 
profits for the firm (price set above the marginal cost of production and profit above 
the normal rate). In the long-run there was no guarantee that the firm would operate 
at the optimal level making monopoly the worst scenario for society. 
Oligopoly was believed to exist between these two polar extremes and was 
defined as a market dominated by a small number of large firms who recognise their 
interdependence and behaved accordingly. The most recognised form of oligopoly, 
the differentiated oligopoly, was therefore characterised by non-price competition 
leading to high prices, high profits and unsatisfied demand. While competition did 
exist, it was via product competition and product differentiation. These types of 
competition merely added to the cost burden of the consumer, as the increased 
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expenses of the firm to undertake such competition were merely passed onto the 
consumer via higher prices. The social optimum was not satisfied in the oligopoly 
model as prices were higher than the competitive level and demand was unfulfilled. 
To further the controversy over the structure of pharmaceuticals, the 
dominant companies developed into a multinational presence. As demand for 
pharmaceutical products is global and the costs involved in the research and 
development (R&D) for such products considerable, international marketing has 
become the only viable option for many of the products developed. By becoming 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), these companies can take advantage of the global 
market, economies of scale from size, variations in national resource allocations, 
and the spread of risk, to name but a few. These MNEs have however, been the 
target of considerable criticism based on their sheer size and power, which in some 
instances can be damaging to both the host and home economies. The application 
of such market structures in the pharmaceutical industry is described in chapter 4. ", 
Within the pharmaceutical industry it is the very nature of the products that 
encourages the development of the above market structures. Demand for these 
pharmaceutical products is almost completely price inelastic, i. e. price having little 
effect on the quantity demanded. For most people the restoration and maintenance 
of good health is a prime goal in life and high costs will be met to achieve this. This 
inelastic demand therefore allows manufacturers to set high prices and maximise 
profit levels without fear of loosing market share. A further enhancement of this 
inelasticity is the therapeutic subdivisions of drugs. Drug products can be used for 
only a very limited range of treatments which implies a very low substitutability 
between different drug products. It is possible that there will be only one effective 
treatment on the market for a particular illness at any one time. This again gives the 
manufacturer significant potential market power to become a monopoly supplier. 
However, supply in the market is not restricted and as production costs are not a 
significant deterrent to entry, it is possible for imitation to take place with ease., 
A high level of imitation could have an adverse effect on investment in the 
research-based pharmaceutical industry. Imitators do not incur the high R&D costs 
of the pioneer and can therefore charge substantially lower prices to compete. This 
low-priced competition can eat away at the profits of the pioneer making the R&D 
investment unprofitable and leading to a reduction in future levels of research 
because of insufficient returns. The patent system has therefore been adopted'to 
grant the developer of a particular product a temporary monopoly and so ensure a 
sufficient return to investment is made, encouraging future R&D to be undertaken. 
This temporary monopoly provides the pioneer manufacturer with exclusivity of 
supply to the market, unless they decide to license production rights out to others. 
For a specified period of time the pioneer is therefore the sole supplier and can 
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charge that price necessary to recover costs and earn a sufficient rate of return to his 
investment. After this period of protection has expired, any manufacturer may 
produce this product, and price competition may ensue. The patent system therefore 
restricts the entry of further manufacturers onto particular markets for a specified 
period of time. If a patent system was not granted there would be a considerable 
loss to society as over 90% of all medical drug treatments have originated from the 
private investments of the pharmaceutical industry (Abrahams 1993c). 
Such protection for innovations has allowed those firms with the financial 
and technical resources for innovation to dominate the market with their 
developments. Even after the patent expiry, these firms have arguably maintained 
their markets positions due to the extent of their product differentiation which has 
led to strong brand loyalty. When a product is developed and patented, it is given a 
brand-name by the manufacturer before being launched onto the market. This 
brand-name is chosen to be short and euphonic in comparison to the long, complex 
generic and chemical names of products. It is the brand name of a product which is 
extensively promoted by the' company, based on the therapeutic novelty of the 
product, its ease of compliance or the novelty of its application. Such promotional 
claims are aimed at cultivating brand loyalty among the prescribers such that when 
generic or similar therapeutic competition does enter the market, its effect is limited, 
despite the possible price advantage it holds. In many instances it is only product 
competition from a new major therapeutic advance that will have a significant effect 
on the prescribing of brand names products. Furthermore, the brand-name becomes 
associated with quality and consistency enhancing the ability of the company to 
nurture brand loyalty and so maintain market power. 
. 
The pharmaceutical industry is therefore one which is identified with two 
types of market structure which have both been criticised as detrimental to society. 
As the industry is important to society due to the social and economic impact it 
might have, it is unacceptable to many that it should be characterised by potentially 
detrimental structures. It has therefore been under attack for a number of years. As 
an oligopolistic industry it has been characterised by high prices and high profits at 
the expense of the consumer. As the consumer in this case is a patient, the industry 
is seen as profiteering out of the misery of others with the whole area becoming 
highly emotive. As demand for treatments and cures will be sought at almost any 
price, the establishment of very high prices will not deter purchase. Admittedly 
prices higher than the cost of production are'necessary to cover the costs and risks 
incurred from the R&D investment, however, it has been found that such prices are 
maintained for what is considered to be an overly long time. This has resulted in the 
pharmaceutical industry becoming one of the most profitable in society, even in the 
recent climate of recession. Chapter 5 looks in more detail at the characteristics of 
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R&D, extensive promotional activity, pricing and profits with some industry 
comparisons. 
R&D activity has already been mentioned as the heart of the pharmaceutical 
industry and its continuing success is essential for the continued growth of the 
industry. Such R&D is estimated to cost $230m per New Chemical Entity (NCE) 
launched onto the market, taking on average 10 - 12 years from inception to 
marketing (Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals 1991). The money and time involved is to 
ensure that knowledge of the product is complete before it is marketed. r This 
knowledge refers to the understanding of possible side-effects, absorption rate, 
efficacy, and all other possible effects the drug may have on the human body. R&D 
is therefore a substantial investment and one which is subject to enormous risks. It 
is for this reason that the industry requires a patent system to ensure such costs are 
recovered and future R&D is maintained. 
With regards to R&D and promotion, the industry has been consistently 
found lacking in moral standards of quality, safety and appropriateness. Evidence 
has been found to support the view that given the opportunity, many of the 
companies involved in this industry would not ensure the safety and quality of their 
products before marketing them to the public. There have been cases of unsafe 
products, products of poor quality, cover-ups of side-effects, and the promotion of 
drug products for unapproved indications, to name but a few examples. In the worst 
cases death and permanent disability have resulted. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that unscrupulous marketing and promotional activities of these companies have 
directly been a cause of irrational prescribing on the part of the doctor. Rational 
prescribing is that which is safe, efficacious, of high quality and economical with all 
the alternatives being considered. Many instances have however arisen when at 
least one of these criteria have not been fulfilled and mis-prescribing or irrational 
prescribing has resulted. For example a drug may be prescribed when it is not 
appropriate or necessary, or an expensive brand-name product prescribed in 
preference to an equivalent cheaper generic due to brand loyalty. The promotional 
activities of the pharmaceutical industry are important for the provision of 
information, but they also embody a persuasive influence over the decision-maker 
and the patient which is not primarily designed to be of optimal benefit to the 
consumer. 
These aspects of the industry coupled with the claims of maintained high 
prices and consistently high profits, especially after industry comparisons, have led 
to the intervention of governments to protect the public. This extends to a 
protection from the possible economic exploitation of the public due to the high 
prices charged by the industry, to protection from potentially fatal and irreversible 
effects from unregulated production and marketing. 
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These weaknesses in the industry have been increasingly recognised and 
have resulted in progressively stringent regulations with regards to all aspects of the 
industry's research, development, production and marketing. In an already turbulent 
market where innovation is the main source of growth and competition leading to 
the rapid rise but also displacement of products and their manufacturers, the 
intervention of the government has enhanced the difficulties faced still further. 
Compulsory testing and approval from regulatory bodies during development and 
before the marketing of new drug products has increased both the cost and time 
required for development. This has eroded the effective period of patent protection 
and consequently that time left for companies to recover costs and earn a profit. 
Restrictions on methods of marketing and promotion will also soon limit the 
persuasive influence of these strategies in maintaining market power even after 
patent expiry. Furthermore, the pressure put on the prescriber by governments and 
third party purchasers (insurance companies) for cost containment has heightened 
competition with the increased use of generic alternatives. Many major 
governments have acknowledged that innovative companies must earn an adequate 
return to their investment to ensure future R&D and subsequently have extended the 
possible patent period; however they have simultaneously eased the way for generic 
competitors to enter the market and, by increasing public awareness of prices, 
encouraged generic competition. Meanwhile price and profit controls have been 
imposed in many markets as governments attempt to slow down the growth of their 
health care costs. Even in what is considered to be the last free pricing market for 
pharmaceuticals, the US, prices have been noted as substantially higher than 
elsewhere as companies try to compensate for the lost revenue in those markets with 
controls. ý Such divergences have led to a public outcry and cries for price controls. 
If such price restraints are imposed, substantial negative effects on profitability and 
future R&D levels may be seen. At present the industry is, frantically arguing its 
case against enforced price controls, claiming that voluntary price restraints would 
be more appropriate. 
Chapter 6 continues the analysis of the industry by taking a look at some of 
the continuing controversies in the industry, viz. the role of the pharmaceutical 
industry in developing countries, the changing environment of Europe and the 
growing competitive strength of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. The 
Developing Countries (DCs) not only exhibit the usual problems found in other 
developed countries, but have problems peculiar to their own economies. These 
nations are faced with the one common characteristic of overwhelming poverty. 
This poverty alone has resulted in huge problems for governments in controlling 
disease., Living standards are low and the incidence of disease high, yet there are 
few, if any, funds available to establish an efficient health care system or to 
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purchase those products which will help alleviate the situation., Coupled with this 
there is evidence of inappropriate operations by the multinational and domestic 
pharmaceutical companies operating in these countries. There have been cases of 
inappropriately sold drugs, drugs that do little to alleviate conditions and merely 
waste already scarce resources, drugs being sold which have passed their expiry 
date or are of poor quality, drugs promoted for unapproved indications or drugs sold 
with no warnings of side-effects. With the poor organisational structure of the 
governments in many of these countries and the lack of regulations or enforcement 
of regulations, such practices have been widespread. It has only been in recent 
years that the developing countries have made a protest and some progress has been 
made to improve activities. Possible policy options for developing countries which 
would alleviate conditions are therefore reviewed. 
The turmoil of a changing environment in Europe is also analysed, with 
emphasis on the developments made by the European Community (EC) towards a 
single integrated market. The establishment of this community has brought about 
significant changes for those pharmaceutical companies operating within the bounds 
of the EC and for those originating outside the Community, in particular the US and 
the growing Japanese industries. Furthermore, the recent political turmoil of 
Eastern Europe and the opening up of their markets to the Western world has meant 
considerable changes and opportunities for the pharmaceutical industry of the 
developed world. 
Finally all those companies currently dominating the pharmaceutical 
industry are becoming increasingly aware of the growing Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry. Previously the domestic market and licensing-out agreements were 
sufficient to sustain - the Japanese pharmaceutical companies, hence their direct 
international presence was negligible. However in recent years, international 
competition coupled with price regulation imposed by government has led many of 
the leading Japanese companies to look abroad to maintain and expand their 
activities. They have updated their technology and established a basic international 
network of operations via joint ventures and acquisitions. Furthermore, new non- 
pharmaceutical based Japanese firms have moved into the arena as a means of 
diversification. These new pharmaceutical companies are also looking to expand 
their reach. While the Japanese pharmaceutical industry at present is not a major 
competitive threat, this is likely to change by the beginning of the next century. 
The pharmaceutical industry is one characterised by rapid change which has 
been enhanced by the involvement of government actions throughout the world, 
either directly or indirectly. The first section of this thesis is therefore aimed at 
establishing the characteristics of the industry in the present day, the basis of the 
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arguments for and against the : industry, the competitive position of the market 
leaders and the future prospects for the industry. 
The last section of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of a particular aspect 
of the pharmaceutical industry, viz. the strength of the company promotional 
strategies in cultivating brand loyalty. The use of marketing and promotional 
activity has already been introduced as extending the market power of the company 
beyond the patent protection period. Provided no major new therapeutic advance is 
made which renders the existing product useless, such activity prolongs the 
profitable life of a product even in the face of cheaper generic or similar 
competition. Chapter 7 undertakes an empirical study of brand loyalty and 
prescribing based on data obtained for twelve products in one practice over the 
period 1985 - 1989. This study aimed to determine the pattern of brand-name drug 
prescribing once a generic form of the product became available on the market. It 
was expected that the proportion of brand prescribing would fall with the entry of a 
generic competitor, but this fall would not be particularly substantial in the first few 
years, illustrating the brand loyalty that had been established by the marketing and 
promotional activities of the pharmaceutical companies. 
Chapter 8 continues this stream of thought by analysing the results of a 
questionnaire sent out to a number of doctors concerning their attitudes to 
prescribing and the pharmaceutical industry. It was expected that while most 
doctors believed their prescribing choice to be based on rational, scientific 
influences and sources of information this was not true in practice. Previous studies 
of a similar nature (Avorn et al. 1982; Orlowski & Wateska 1992) found that 
doctors either did not like to admit or were simply unaware, of the persuasive 
influences the promotional activities of pharmaceutical companies could have on 
their prescribing. As a further study on the available data, a study of the 
attitudes and prescribing habits of doctors of different ages was investigated in 
Chapter 9. It was speculated that significant differences may be found in the 
approaches to prescribing of doctors of differing age-groups. These differences 
were expected to be found in relation to overall prescribing levels and the use of 
generics, as well as attitudes towards the pharmaceutical industry and promotion. 
Possible reasons for the existence of such differences may be due to changes in 
training approaches and changes in attitudes in relation to the age of the doctor and 
the experience gained. 
This thesis therefore establishes the historical development of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the theories that lie behind its structure and the present day 
position with which it is faced. It also looks in detail at some of the effects of 
company promotional activities and brand loyalty to determine whether such 
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activities do have a significant effect on prescribing and whether this effect changes 
with the age of the doctor. 
I 
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Chapter 2: A Brief Historical Introduction to the World 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
2.1: Introduction 
The demand for pharmaceutical products has probably existed for as long as 
man has, yet the industry as it exists today is still relatively young. Throughout 
history various remedies and potions have been available to treat illness and disease, 
relying mostly on folk-lore or the occasionally observed beneficial effect for their 
justification as a medicine. It was not until the 19th Century that the three main 
founding blocks of the industry viz. pharmacy, chemistry and microbiology, 
embraced more scientific methodologies. The developments made in these sciences 
resulted in notable advances in the field of medicine and specifically, drugs. By 
defining science as the development of hypotheses to prove theories this period was 
characterised as one when such hypotheses began to be considered. Nevertheless, 
by the beginning of the 20th Century, the treatments used still had little scientific 
basis, while thoughts of an actual cure for a disease were inconceivable (Wardell 
1978). 
The developments of the 19th Century and early 20th Century established 
new approaches to medicine which eventually led to the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry. In the 1930's, technology and medical knowledge 
flourished and led to advances in drug application. Those firms with established 
chemical interests began to apply their technology to the discovery and development 
of new drugs, attracted by the potential profits awarded by the patent system. From 
1940 to 1960 a phenomenal number of new chemical entities were discovered and 
their development into appropriate, effective drugs is often seen as miraculous. 
Within twenty years the industry grew from virtually nothing into a million dollar 
multinational industry. 
The basic structure of the modern pharmaceutical industry remains the same. 
However, a number of significant changes have altered its operations and behaviour 
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since the height of its success in the post-war period. Governments soon realised 
the social and economic importance of the pharmaceutical industry and began 
imposing strict regulations to oversee the safety, quality and efficacy- of 
pharmaceuticals and to protect the public from possible market exploitation. 
Competition also increased considerably when the high profit rates attracted many 
new firms into the market producing 'me-too' drugs. In more recent years there has 
also been a rise in generic competition encouraged by increasingly cost-conscious 
governments. Today the industry-is still one of the most profitable in the world 
economy but it is under increasing pressure from all directions. As a relatively new 
industry it has perhaps experienced a honeymoon period and must now settle down. 
2.2: The Foundation Stones of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Simple herbal remedies and other more gruesome treatments have 
historically been used against illness and disease. The justifications for -such 
remedies were not however scientifically based, as little was known about the 
causes or progression of diseases in the human body. Consequently little was 
known about prevention, treatment or cure. However, the development of three 
branches of science, viz. pharmacy, chemistry and microbiology, - led to the 
transformation of this state of ignorance. The gradual advances made in these 
sciences changed the approach to illness and disease, with subsequent developments 
becoming the basis for the future pharmaceutical industry. 
The eldest of these sciences, pharmacy, has only recently been recognised as 
a science rather than an art. It was this science that provided some elementary 
knowledge on the therapeutically, beneficial effects of certain plants. At the 
beginning of the 19th Century pharmacy combined with chemistry and the result 
was the isolation of morphine from opium in 1806. This development encouraged 
German and French scientists to extract alkaloids from natural substances leading to 
the isolation of emetine, quinine, and codeine etc. By 1829 chemistry progressed 
still further with the successful synthesis of an organic compound, urea, from 
ammonium chloride and silver cyanate, inorganic materials. This new challenge of 
creating unique substances rather than simply extracting and purifying natural 
substances led to a flurry of activity. 
With the growth of physiology and pharmacology, a greater understanding 
was gained of how the body actually worked and how known drugs acted within it. 
Further developments in pathology and experimental science also contributed to the 
changing approach to science, and in particular illness and disease. Folk-lore 
remedies such as placing a chestnut in ones pocket to ward off rheumatism or 
sniffing dried pig excrement for gout were soon viewed with increasing scepticism. 
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In 1856 A. W. Hofman and his pupil W. H. Perkin provided the link 
between chemistry and microbiology using their coal tar dye for staining bacteria. 
Their discovery of coal tar dye led to the development of the chemical dye industry 
which in future years was to become the parent of many pharmaceutical companies, 
but more importantly at this time, it led to the discovery of various salts for medical 
use. In 1883 Hoechst produced antipyrine for fever and in 1888 Bayer introduced 
phenacetin for fever and pain. In the 1890's Felix Hoffmann at Bayer also 
developed aspirin, a commonly used drug even today. These developments 
provided some sort of symptomatic relief from fever or pain but curative measures 
were still beyond the technology and science of the period. 
It was not until the early 20th Century that the first cure for a specific illness 
was found by Paul Ehrlich. In 1905 while working on dyestuffs and histological 
specimens Ehrlich noted how different cells and specific parts of certain cells 
showed a selective staining effect which occasionally killed the bacteria being 
stained. He tried to manipulate the molecular structure of some of these dyes and so 
enhance their ability to kill. After over 600 manipulations he discovered Salvarsan 
(arsphenamine) which attacked the spirochete of syphilis within the body without 
harming the host. This was the first of the 'magic bullets' to be discovered, but 
unfortunately also the last for 23 years until in 1928 Sir Alexander Fleming 
discovered penicillin. Even then, penicillin was not recognised as the potentially 
vital compound it later proved to be and was consequently shelved for 10 years. 
Until the 1930's only small advances were made, with medical knowledge 
remaining basic and remedies still concerned mainly with treatment rather than cure. 
Nevertheless, the importance of this period in changing the approach of scientific 
methods, theories and attitudes towards medicine must be acknowledged. 
These advances also had profound effects on the demand and marketing of 
drug products. Previously, drugs were supplied by pharmacists, dry-goods 
merchants and the physician, with mixtures and tablets being prepared by hand in 
the back of shops. The simplicity of the drugs used permitted this small scale of 
production and distribution, but as drugs became more complex, new methods were 
required. Many people already preferred consulting the pharmacist rather than the 
physician with self-dosing proving less expense. This stimulated the increased use 
of patents as the trade in finished products expanded. Also, as knowledge became 
more widespread, demand for the new complex drugs being developed also grew, 
leaving the traditional methods of production obsolete. The chemists and druggists 
soon became wholesalers and manufacturers undertaking the mass production of 
patented preparations. Some of the better known pharmaceutical companies of 
today can trace their roots back to this period of changing demand and manufacture. 
Merck, the current number one company world-wide, began as a pharmacy in 
13 
Darmstadt in 1668 under Frederick Jacob Merck. In 1824 the family set up a small 
chemical laboratory and then in 1827 a factory producing alkaloids in quantity and 
quality. By the mid 19th Century the Merck chemical company was known world- 
wide and in 1887 established operations in New York. By 1914 they were selling 
chemicals worth almost $4m a year and continued to branch out into 
pharmaceuticals with enormous success. Schering AG, Searle, the subsidiaries of 
Glaxo viz. Allen & Hanbury and Duncan Flockhart, Abbott, Eli Lilly, and Warner 
Lambert's Parke-Davis are just a few of the other pharmaceutical companies with 
similar beginnings. With the production developments made in the chemical 
industry it was relatively easy for these companies to transfer knowledge to the 
large-scale manufacture of drugs. 
All of these medical and technical developments before 1935 established the 
'building blocks' of the future pharmaceutical industry. Those discoveries that were 
made stemmed from developments in other new sciences and from pot-luck 
experiments. After Salvarsan, hopes for the 'magic bullet' were unfulfilled and by 
the 1920's only six drugs, either singly or combined made up 60% of all British 
prescriptions. In 1932 the British Pharmacopoeia included only 36 synthetic drugs 
mostly developed before the turn of the century (Wells 1980). 
The importance of this new industry can easily be gauged by the lack of 
regulations implemented to police it. The first regulations relating to the new drugs 
market came in the US with the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act and merely 
eliminated patent secret remedies and required truthful labelling. In Britain, events 
went even slower with the industry only recognised in the census of production in 
1924 and the first regulations implemented in 1925 (Robson & Liebenau 1991). 
This Therapeutic Substances Act introduced testing on selected categories of 
preparations by the Board of Trade, but these categories were very limited i. e. 
hormones, vitamins, insulin etc. There was as yet very little industry to regulate! 
2.3: The Golden Era 
The introduction of the, sulphonamide antibacterial in 1935 heralded the 
beginning of the modem pharmaceutical industry, with its competitive global 
structure based on-intensive research and development (R&D) and marketing. 
Before this, several developments in various branches of related sciences had led to 
some significant discoveries, but the knowledge and technology base of the period 
had not been sufficiently advanced to permit further developments. Medicine at that 
time was largely concerned with providing symptomatic relief rather than cures. 
The change came about when Domagk, a German scientist at Bayer working 
on the screening of anti microbial products, combined sulfamyl with an azo dye in 
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the hope it would bind to the protein of a germ cell and so destroy it. The resulting 
substance was shown to protect mice against a lethal innoculum of haemolytic 
streptococci encouraging further research. This new substance named 'Prontosil' 
was patented in 1932 and announced to the public in 1935, when it was evident that 
it was effective against streptococcal infections, pneumonia, erysipelas, scarlet 
fever, urinary infections caused by colon bacilli, childbed fever and many other 
illnesses. 
This discovery did not, however, prove to be a simple matter of 
development, patent and marketing for Bayer. Farbenindustrie, Bayer's parent 
company who sent the original dye samples, claimed the patent rights to the 
substance. Meanwhile French scientists at the Pasteur Institute discovered that the 
real active ingredient was not the dye but its component para-amino-benzene- 
sulphonamide. This substance had first been identified in 1908 by Paul Gelmo, but 
had remained undeveloped and its patent therefore lay in public hands. This opened 
up opportunities for research to be undertaken by other firms, one of which was 
May & Baker who took up the research challenge and after 693 alterations of the 
chemical structure of the substance found sulfrapyradine, M&B 693. This new 
substance proved to have enhanced effectiveness and reduced toxicity, making it a 
reasonably safe compound with outstanding effects on pneumococcal pneumonia. 
This first major discovery was a significant medical advance, stimulating the 
pharmaceutical industry into a frenzy of research activity. More importantly it 
dispelled the belief of many medical men that drugs could not be used to destroy 
germs within the living host, bringing about a further revolution in attitudes towards 
pharmaceuticals. The result was increased interest, research and developments. 
Clymer (1975) noted that in the 1930's the pharmaceutical industry was primarily a 
commodity business with the cost of goods representing up to 75% of sales and 
administration up to 25%, leaving very little for profit and nothing for R&D. This 
changed dramatically in the next few decades. 
The renewed interest in drugs then led to the isolation of penicillin, 
previously shelved since its initial discovery by Sir Alexander Fleming in 1928. 
Originally Fleming, who was studying a staphylococcal variant, noted that one of 
his petri dishes was contaminated with a fungus which destroyed the surrounding 
bacterial colonies. It was ten years before Sir Ernst Chain and Lord Florey took up 
this research with a systematic study of antibacterial substances produced by moulds 
and bacteria eventually isolating penicillin. This substance was discovered to have 
a high antibacterial activity which proved non-toxic in mice, making it of clear 
interest for human usage. 
In 1941 Chain and Florey undertook the first human trials on a policeman 
critically ill with septicaemia. Where the sulphonamides had no effect, penicillin 
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brought about almost immediate improvements, but unfortunately insufficient 
supplies of the drug meant a relapse and death for the patient. Despite this, the 
medical importance of the drug was proved and the next step was to develop a 
method of mass production. 
At this point external events exerted a strong influence on developments 
with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. The war meant huge numbers 
of casualties, making the need for a universal antibiotic crucial. Research was 
accelerated and in America an amalgamation of companies was formed to develop a 
technique of mass production. The speed of development is clear when one 
considers that in 1941 there was not enough penicillin in the US to treat a single 
case, but by 1943 the US drug industry was supplying the demand of its own 
military forces and those of its military allies. 
Prontosil and penicillin were the first of the many major discoveries of this 
characteristic period of creative outburst, alongside which developed the methods of 
mass production to satisfy demand. The 1940's became the period of antibiotics, 
with the international R&D race to develop new chemical compounds and patent 
them beginning with vengeance. Some of the achievements in infectious diseases 
were almost unbelievable. For example, in 1944 Merck & Squibb ý isolated 
streptomycin, a substance shown to have a powerful chemotherapeutic effect on 
gram-negative bacilli, especially tubercle bacillus. As a major cause of death at the 
time this discovery had enormous potential. In 1946 it was found that para-amino 
salicylic acid (PAS) also had a marked effect against TB and combined, these 
substances were not only very effective, but resulted in the slower development of 
drug resistance. Looking at the British mortality rate for TB between 1900 and 
1945 it lay at 31% per year, but by 1945 - 1955 had dropped to 15% per year and by 
1960 was virtually negligible (Wells 1980). Other major innovations of the 1940's 
included Chloramphenicol antibiotic 1947 (Parke-Davis), Cyanocobalamin 1948 
(Glaxo and Merck), the steroid cortisone was successfully produced in 1948 
although first isolated in 1935, and in 1949 Oxytetracycline antibiotic (Pfizer) 
(Redwood 1988). 
Table 2.1 illustrates mortality rates for children in England and Wales for 
pneumonia, tuberculosis, diphtheria and measles over the period 1931 to 1990. The 
mortality rates for these four diseases fell dramatically by 1951 illustrating the 
speed with which effective developments were made. In this table the most 
dramatic example of the developments made is illustrated by the falling mortality of 
diphtheria which by the period 1951- 55 was less than 1% of its 1931 - 35 figure. 
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Table 2.1: Childhood Mortality in England and Wales, per million living. 
931-35 1941-45 1951-55 1970 1980 1990 
Pneumonia 561 220 6 1 5 
Tuberculosis 332 25 38 2 - - 
Diphtheria 30 160 2 - - - Measles 241 4 33 2 - 
Source: OPCS Mortality Statistics in ABPI 1992 Pharma Facts & Figures 
The 1940's was a decade of knowledge breakthrough in readiness for the 
explosion of the 1950's when psychotropic medicines in particular came to the fore- 
front. Some of the major discoveries of the 1950's were (Redwood 1988): 
1953 Tetracycline antibiotic (Pfizer) 
1955 Salk Polio Vaccine 
1956 Tolbutamide oral antidiabetic (Hoechst) 
1957 Propoxyphene analgesic (Lilly) 
Oral contraception introduced into the US 
Penicillin 6-aminopenicillanic acid was isolated (the basic core of 
penicillin) 
1958 Chlordiazepoxide tranquilliser (Roche)' 
1959 Diazepam (Roche) 
Such new discoveries were accompanied by the realised potential of 
previously discovered chemicals which had lain dormant. As a consequence, the 
number of new chemical entities (NCE's) introduced onto the market more than 
doubled. Just looking at the US market, the number of NCE introductions during 
the 1940's was 192 but by the 1950's this had risen to 453 (Redwood 1988). 
Over these two decades, as medical achievements accelerated, production 
techniques also developed. It was obvious that the demand for medical cures was 
global and the potential monopoly profits from the acquisition of a patent could be 
considerable. Companies previously based in chemicals or related fields began to 
develop pharmaceutical divisions, with highly trained scientific researchers to give 
them the best advantage in the newly emerging innovative race. R&D budgets 
escalated, marketing divisions took on a new strength and the industrial structure of 
the industry became one of intensive research and marketing. The period was one 
of rapid development in all aspects of science and technology, leading to the 
continual upgrading of methods of research and production. Members of this new 
industry aimed to be first in the R&D race and exploit the temporary monopoly 
awarded by the patent. By extensive marketing they also attempted to establish 
17 
strong brand loyalty to prolong their market strength even after patent expiry. The 
aim was to turn a legal monopoly into a commercially unassailable position. 
Table 2.2 shows the increase in British pharmaceutical R&D expenditure 
from 1953 to 1990 and how it increased as a percentage of gross output. It can be 
seen that between 1953 and 1960 R&D expenditure in the UK increased by over 
250%, while as a percentage of gross output R&D expenditure increased by over 
50%. 
Table 2.2: British Pharmaceutical R&D Expenditure 1953 -1990 
Year 
- 
R&D expend. £) 
- 
R&D % gross oFtput 
19537 2.4 
1960 8 3.8 
15 12 4.2 
1970 30 6.6 
1975 79 7.5 
1980 251 10.3 
1981 296 11.2 
1982 359 11.8 
1983 431 137 
1984 483 13.2 
1985 550 13.7 
1986 612 13.8 
1987 668 13.3 
1988 848 14.9 
1989 977 15.4 
1990e 1082 16.1 
e= estimated figures. 
At 1990 prices including capital expenditure 
Sources: CSO, CMR and ABPI in ABPI Pharma Facts and Figures 1992 
This trend was typical of the pharmaceutical industry throughout the world. 
The new treatments and cures led to dramatic increases in demand and as the 
progress made in technology was paralleling that of medical science the industry 
grew, devoting ever increasing funds to R&D. ' The period 1940 - 1960 was one of 
unequalled success. 
2.4: After the Golden Era 
The pharmaceutical industry is also noted for its dynamic nature which by 
1960 was leading it towards considerable difficulties. Many firms were 'jumping on 
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the bandwagon' and rather than researching new chemicals were producing 
substances with minor molecular modifications from already patented products. By 
doing this the company could market an almost identical product without breaking 
the patent rights of the original producer. The competitive advantage of this 'me- 
too' product lay in its relatively cheap price in comparison to the original patented 
product. This new breed of manufacture did not encounter the full force of R&D 
expenses but only the marginal costs of modification. The 1960's therefore became 
known as the period of 'me-too' drugs. 
Companies were continually identifying the potential within the 
pharmaceutical market which meant original research on drugs continued along side 
this molecular modifications. As the volume and monetary value of the market 
increased, the significance of the industry was recognised by government. It was 
noted that the public were potentially vulnerable to unscrupulous members of the 
industry, via unsafe products and what they considered excessively high pricing. 
The first therapeutic discovery of Sulphanilamide was also associated with 
the first modem drugs disaster. An American company searching for a liquid form 
of the product for children, dissolved it in ethylene glycol (antifreeze), resulting in 
over 100 deaths. This led to the US Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 which 
introduced the need for pre-market approval via a New Drug Application (NDA), 
which was to be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Such 
regulations were not, however, sufficient for the increasingly numerous and 
complex drugs which were being produced. In the early 1960's the Thalidomide 
disaster struck and provoked new investigations into the pharmaceutical industry. 
In 1958 a Germany company, Grunenthal, launched a new sleeping tablet, 
thalidomide, onto the German market under the brand name Contergan. All the 
promotional information claimed it was 'astonishingly safe and fully harmless'. In 
December 1958 reports were filtering back to the company of peripheral neuritis, 
which was a serious medical condition leading to severe muscular cramp, 
weakening of the limbs and a lack of co-ordination, all of which were irreversible. 
In November 1961 after numerous cases of birth deformities the drug was 
withdrawn from the market, but it had, since its first date of marketing, resulted in 
at least 8,000 children in 46 countries being born without arms, legs, ears, partially 
sighted or completely blind, with an equal number estimated to have died at birth. It 
became obvious that the company had ignored the possible side-effects of this drug 
and purposefully told the marketing agencies to withhold any information which 
might cause any suspicions over drug safety. Although the drug had never been 
1See Table 2.2: UK Pharmaceutical R&D Expenditure in section 2.3, page 8. for further illustrations 
of rising R&D expenditure in the UK during this period. 
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approved in the US, Richardson-Merrell, a licensed company, distributed 2.5 
million tablets to over 1200 doctors as part of a clinical testing programme. The 
1938 Regulations did not require drugs to be submitted for approval before clinical 
trials hence this practise was not illegal. 
The resulting horror and investigations were voiced in the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments of 1962, which introduced the need for an Investigational New Drug 
(IND) requirement. This stipulated that before a chemical could proceed to clinical 
studies a IND approval must be obtained from the FDA. This episode also 
increased awareness of the potential abuses of monopoly power which could result 
from the patent system. 
These new restrictions on research and marketing caused a fall in the 
numbers of NCE's introduced onto the US market by almost a half (in the 1960's 
only 236 NCE's were introduced onto the market - Redwood 1988). Similar 
regulatory restrictions were also gradually being implemented throughout the world, 
although more slowly. In 1968 Britain passed the Medicines Act which made 
statutory the voluntary arrangements of 1964, while in 1970 the Committee on 
Safety of Medicines was established. In Germany it was not until 1976 that the 
Medicines Reform Act brought controls up to the level of the other European 
countries. Such increasingly restrictive regulations led to increased R&D costs due 
to the number of new tests to be completed and data collections required. This also 
increased the development time necessary as the new requirements took 
considerably longer to satisfy, while the government process of approval being 
more thorough, also took longer. The result was an erosion of the effective period 
of patent protection for drug products which ate away at the potential profitability of 
the industry. 
'Regulations were also necessary because of the cases of market exploitation 
which had already occurred throughout the world. For example, in 1952 Pfizer 
discovered the molecular structure of tetracycline and filed a patent, which was 
awarded to them despite similar patent claims from other companies. By 1955 
Pfizer had licensed five other producers and although this would imply the 
introduction of price competition, between 1955 - 1959 all 5 companies offered 
exactly the same average annual price, which was high. In 1961 the US government 
started proceedings against Pfizer, Cyanamid and Bristol-Myers for conspiracy to 
monopolise and restrain trade. They were found guilty in 1967, but an appeal 
reversed the convictions and in a new trial in 1973, this verdict was upheld because 
the government had only circumstantial evidence. As similar cases of monopoly 
and over pricing were happening world-wide and especially in the Developing 
World, a period of suspicion and open aggressiveness toward the industry began. 
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The next difficulty encountered was the return of the generic product onto 
the drugs market. World production and consumption of pharmaceutical products 
grew annually during the 1960's and 1970's at approximately 13%, with most of this 
growth being in ethical products (brand-name products). With the speed and 
ferocity of drug development and the patent system, generic drugs, after the Second 
World War, took a back seat in the pharmaceutical market. They were all but 
eliminated because of the intensive marketing and promotional activities of the 
ethical pharmaceutical drug companies. In 1948 in the US 40% of all prescriptions 
were written generically but by 1965 this had dropped to 5% (Redwood 1988). 
Another factor which restricted the use of generic drug products during the 1950's 
was the use of anti-substitution laws in over 40 US states. This constrained the use 
of generic drugs by prohibiting the pharmacist to substitute a generic for a brand, 
unless it was stipulated by the doctor. 
This trend began to change in the late 1970's and especially in the 1980's 
when progressive patent expiry gave plenty of opportunity for generic products to 
enter the market and compete via price. Repeal of the anti-substitution laws and 
legalised substitution has also aided this recovery. The generic market has now 
become important and a competitor which the research-based pharmaceutical 
companies see as a future danger to profitability. In recent years increased concern 
from many governments across the world over high health care costs have led to the 
encouragement of generic use whenever available. In 1984 the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (DTC-PTR Act) of the US introduced 
important new opportunities for the generic industry, such that in 1984 commodity 
generic sales were estimated at $700m, but by 1988 they were expected to reach 
$2.5bn (Johnstone 1985). In Britain the share of prescriptions dispensed in generic 
form has risen from 18% in 1980 to 39% in 1990 (ABPI Pharma Facts & Figures 
1992), causing pharmaceutical companies to review their policies for future success. 
Many of the problems faced in the recent history of the pharmaceutical 
industry can be traced back to the intervention of governments in the organisation of 
the industry. Increased regulations to ensure public safety have resulted in 
increased R&D costs and longer development times, which have in turn reduced the 
effective life of patents and increased competition. This has led to increasing 
pressure on profitability. In some countries, e. g. Australia, it is now necessary to 
prove drug safety, quality, efficacy and cost-effectiveness before public 
reimbursement is permitted. Although these regulations have inhibited the free 
operations of the industry, it must be acknowledged they are necessary in some 
form at least, as the industry has not proved itself capable of satisfactory self- 
regulation. 
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The increased competition caused by the above factors is complicated still 
further by the ever changing world economy which brings a high degree of 
uncertainty into the formula. The continuing attempts to establish some form of 
European economic unity and all the new regulations associated with 
harmonisation, have caused uncertainty over pricing, market approval and various 
other aspects of the industrial organisation. Increased competition from the 
Japanese manufacturers and the turmoil of Eastern Europe have also caused shifts in 
future market considerations, which will no doubt continue to alter. Furthermore, 
restrictions on company operations in many of the : Developing Countries have 
curtailed activities and put added pressure on profits. Nevertheless, the market is 
continually developing with new medical advances in new areas. In the years to 
come it will be the degenerative and chronic diseases which will become the 
forefront of attack for the R&D of the industry. The ' world's population is 
continually getting older and the demand for treatments and cures for these ageing 
diseases is continually growing. For example, in the US arthritis affects one in 
seven of the population, representing almost 40 million people (Wyles 1992). 
Profit is the reason behind this industry as in many others, and the increasing 
pressure on this has led the research-based company to rationalise policies and 
activities. Some companies are themselves looking to produce generic versions of 
their own products on patent expiry, in order to capture as much of the market as 
possible before other competitors step in, self-competition. The market has become 
increasingly competitive and under scrutiny from both government and public, 
making it a much more difficult climate to operate in. Nevertheless, the companies 
that do succeed tend to remain very profitable and if a balance of lucrative 
innovation and marketing can be maintained within the confines of regulations, it is 
likely their future will continue to be profitable. 
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Chapter 3: The Market Structure of the Pharmaceuticals: 
The Theories (I) 
3.1: An Introduction to Oligopoly and the Multinational Enterprise 
The efficiency of resource allocation and the distribution of economic 
welfare are strongly influenced by the structure of the markets in which firms buy 
and sell goods and services (Dunning 1974). It is for this reason the structure of the 
pharmaceutical industry needs to be explained before it is possible to analyse and 
evaluate its characteristics and behaviour. The market structure of this industry 
tends to be identified with oligopoly and the multinational enterprise. 
In an oligopoly there are a small number of large firms who dominate the 
industry and while recognising their inter-dependence, they do not collude. Any 
one of these larger firms can affect the market shares and profitability of its 
competitors by its own decisions and actions, therefore the need to consider possible 
reactions of competing sellers in making decisions about pricing and other 
marketing tactics is a distinguishing feature, the conjectural variation (Henry & 
Haynes 1978). This type of market structure is often associated with non-price 
competition, particularly product differentiation, which leads to brand loyalty and 
the ability of firms to charge above high prices and earn above normal profits. The 
resulting level of welfare is not the socially optimal hence the industries who adopt 
this structure are the target of a great deal of criticism. 
Most industries with an oligopolistic structure can be identified among the 
worlds' multinational enterprises (MNEs). The simplest definition of such an 
enterprise is literally a firm which operates in more than one country, undertaking 
direct foreign investment (FDI). A more comprehensive definition is: 
'Any enterprise that carries out transactions in or between at least two 
sovereign states, operating under a system of decision making that 
permits influence over resources and capabilities, where the 
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transactions are subject to influence by factors exogenous to the home 
country environment of the enterprise' (Sundaram & Black 1992). 
As these market structures affect resource allocation and economic welfare 
in a sub-optimal way, a great deal of interest, debate and criticism has arisen. For 
the pharmaceutical industry as an oligopolistic MNE, such criticism and controversy 
has followed its development. Before looking at the characteristic of this industry 
itself, it would therefore be beneficial to explain the theories that lie behind it. 
3.2: Oligopoly: Fundamental Theories on Structure and Behaviour 
The theories of oligopoly are themselves relatively new, beginning with the 
Cournot Duopoly Model of the early 19th Century. 
3.2.1: Cournot's Duopoly Model 
In 1838 the French economist Augustin Cournot attempted to construct a 
model of the market structures, which existed between monopoly and perfect 
competition. He assumed only two firms existed in a market with homogeneous 
products and cost structures (identical). He also assumed there was no entry onto 
the market hence each firm would choose to market that quantity'of output that 
maximised his own profits, assuming the rival firm kept his output constant, zero 
conjectural variation. 
In this initial study Cournot used the market for mineral water where sellers 
had zero costs and the demand curve was a straight line. The total quantity (Q) 
produced was therefore the summation of the outputs of firm 1 (ql) and firm 2 (q2). 
Q=qi+q2 
Figure 3.1 shows the market demand and quantities supplied in the Cournot 
Model. If firm 1 assumes firm 2 will hold its output constant, say at Q2, firm l will 
use the residual demand curve (the market demand curve minus the quantity 
assumed to be produced by firm 2) to maximise profits, equating marginal revenue 
to marginal cost (MR = MC). The perfectly competitive level associated with MC = 
MR is the level of output that ensures sufficient returns to the companies ensuring 
their continued operations in the market, but that are not so high as to attract other 
manufacturers in. It is also associated with the social optimum level of output and 
pricing. By doing this, firm 1 will produce Ql which its demand curve dictates will 
be sold at P 1. 
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Figure 3.1: Market Demand and Quantities Supplied in the Cournot Model 
Price 
1I\ MDC 
RDC 
P1 
MDC = Market Demand Curve 
RDC = Residual Demand Curve 
RMR = Residual Marginal Revenue Curve 
MC = Marginal Cost 
P= Price 
Q= Quantity 
MC 
RMR 
Ql Output 1 Q2 
This is not yet an equilibrium position for the market as firm 2 has not been 
considered. Firm 2 assumes its rival will keep output constant at Q1 and so sets 
output accordingly to maximise profits. An action-reaction process continues 
towards the equilibrium level. To show this route towards equilibrium, 
Stackleberg's indifference curve theory is used. This introduces the concept of the 
isoprofit curve and the reaction curve as shown in Figure 3.2 for our two firms. 
Figure 3.2: Isoprofit and Reaction Curves 
RC = Reaction Curve 
I= Isoprofit Curve 
Q2 
RC1 
Q1 
Q2 
RC2 
Q1 
The isoprofit curve (I) represents the locus of points defined by different 
levels of output for firms 1 and 2 which yield the same level of profit. They are 
concave to the axis along which the measure of output of a rival firm for substitute 
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commodities is made. The further from this axis the curve is the lower the profit. 
By joining the highest points of the isoprofit curves the reaction curve (RC) of each 
firm can be found. This is the locus of points of highest profits that firm 1 can attain 
given the level of output of firm 2. Putting these reaction curves onto the same 
graph allows us to illustrate the path towards equilibrium (Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium in the Cournot Model 
Output 2 Qc = Competitive Quantity 
QC Qm = Monopoly Quantity 
RC = Reaction Curves 
E= Equilibrium 
Qm Q* = Equilibrium output 
Q* E 
RM RC2 
Qal Qbl Q* Qm QC 
Output 1 
If firm 2 produces at the competitive level (Qj, firm 1 would not produce 
anything, its RDC would be pushed so far to the left there would be no demand left 
for it to satisfy. Suppose firm 1 believes firm 2 is producing at Qmm, it would set its 
output at Qal. Firm 2 then assumes firm 1's output is at Qal and using its reaction 
curve sets its output at Qb2. Firm 1 then assumes its rivals output is constant at Qb2 
and from the reaction curve sets output at Qb 1. This action-reaction process 
continues until a stable equilibrium is reached at the intersection of the two reaction 
curves (point E, with each firm producing Q*). Here there is no incentive for either 
firm to alter its behaviour and a stable equilibrium is reached. 
This equilibrium outcome leaves each firm producing one-third of the 
market, maximising individual profits, but not industry profits. Industry profits 
would be maximised if firm dependency was recognised and collusion resulted. 
The Cournot Duopoly Model is sub-optimal as the quantities produced are below 
the perfectly competitive level, while the price is above the perfectly competitive 
price. 
This model can be developed to include more firms so that each will provide 
1/(n+l) of the market and the industry output will equal 1/(n+1)*n (n = the number 
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of firms). The larger the number of competitors in the market the closer output and 
price comes to the optimal competitive level. 
For the duopoly with zero conjectural variation over output, the market 
outcome is sub-optimal. In this instance the simple assumption is made that as the 
number of firms in the model increases competition within the market also 
increases, pushing prices down and production up. The consumer is therefore faced 
with more choice at lower prices. While this implies a movement towards the 
socially optimum position there are a number of important weaknesses within the 
model. It deals with only a single period of time while the assumptions of 
competitor constancy and the inability of firms to learn from past experiences are 
simplistic. 
3.2.2: Bertrand's Duopoly Model 
In 1883 Bertrand designed the first critique of Cournot's model arguing that 
firms set price rather than quantity. Assuming that all consumers have perfect 
knowledge and that firms 1 and 2 predetermined prices such that a slight price cut 
could -capture -a rival's market, he assumed that a firm saw its rivals price as 
constant. The equilibrium in this model was at the socially optimum level. - Figure 
3.4 illustrates the path of the demand curve for funs in this model. 
Figure 3.4: Bertrand's Model 
Price 
P2 > P1 
P1 =P2 
t- 
- 
P2<P1 
Market Demand Curve 
Residual Demand Curve Firm 2 
Quantity 
The RDC facing firm 2 is zero if P2 > P1, if however P2< Pl firm 2 will face 
the total market demand curve. When both firms charge the same price the RDC is 
horizontal at Pl = P2 and the total market demand is split equally (Q1= Q2). The 
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equilibrium point in Bertrand's model is P1 = P2 and P= MC. There are therefore 
no abnormally high profits and all demand is satisfied at the competitive price. 
This model shows the possibilities of a socially optimal solution even when 
there is zero conjectural variation in a model, but it also is subject to criticism. In 
particular its assumptions of zero conjectural variation and no collusion are naive. 
The failure to deal with entry onto the model or to consider variables such as 
advertising, locational factors, product differentiation are further weaknesses while 
there is also no indication of the length of the adjustment process. Using the 
Edgeworth model it was recognised that limited capacity restricts the fulfilment of 
demand, therefore if firm 1 cut its price but could not satisfy the total market 
demand, some frustrated consumers would buy from firm 2 whose RDC is then 
positive and who can then act as a monopoly. V 
3.2.3: Stackleberg's Model 
In 1934 Stackleberg developed these theories further by assuming one firm 
acted as a leader and another the follower. The leader realises the 'follower' firm 
has a Cournot (zero) conjectural variation, hence it will set its output according to 
what it believes the leader's output to be. The leader can then calculate the total 
production corresponding to any output level it chooses. By subtracting the 
followers output from total demand the leader can calculate its RDC and pick the 
quantity where MR = MC. Stackleberg industry profits and price are therefore 
lower than in the Cournot model although still above the perfectly competitive level 
(as in Bertrand's Model). Figure 3.5 demonstrates these different outcomes. 
In Bertrand's model the economic rent for each firm is zero (the profit is 
sufficient to keep existing firms in the market but not high enough to attract in 
others). For the Stackleberg equilibrium some economic rent is made, but not as 
much as in the Cournot equilibrium which nears the frontier representing monopoly. 
Obviously the different behaviour patterns in these three models leads to very 
different outcomes for the market. 
These models make different assumptions about firm expectations of rivals 
behaviour and so predict different firm and industry outputs, prices, profits and 
consumer surplus levels. They give some indication of the possible market 
situations which can arise with, specific behaviour and firm numbers. They do 
however neglect some very important factors such as barriers to entry and 
recognised interdependency of firms which lead onto the theory of oligopoly. 
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Figure 3.5: Profit Possibility Frontier 
B =Bertrand Point 
Profit S= Stackleberg Point 
Firm C= Cournot Point 
, PP = Profit Possibility Frontier 
S 
PP 
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Profit Firm 2 
3.3: Oligopoly and Associated Characteristics 
The variations in output, prices, profits and consumer surpluses possible 
from the models in section 3.2 show how different firm behaviour has very different 
outcomes on the market. As they neglect some important consideration and make 
some naive assumptions, their conclusions act as merely `an introduction to 
oligopoly theory. Firstly the assumption of zero conjectural variation must be 
dropped as it is unlikely a firm will believe a rival's strategies to remain constant in 
the face of changes to its own strategies. Firms do recognise their interdependency. 
The need to consider possible reactions of competing sellers in making 
decisions about pricing and other market tactics is the distinguishing 
feature of oligopoly structure. ' (Henry and Haynes 1978). 
Furthermore, these theories do not consider possible barriers to entry and 
exit which affect market conditions and behaviour by restricting the number and 
size of firms that exist in a market. In the above theories as the number of firms 
increased the markets approached the perfectly competitive level (with the 
exception of Bertrand's model which was already at that position). However taking 
into account possible restrictions, firm numbers may be limited with a small number 
of large companies dominating a large number of small companies. The result is 
oligopoly, associated with high profit rates; stable high prices, non-price 
competition and high concentration ratios. 
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There are two specific forms of oligopoly. The first is pure oligopoly, when 
products are assumed standardised or homogeneous and entry is possible. The 
Bertrand equilibrium would therefore seem a viable outcome, except for possible 
geographical and locational factors which allow oligopoly to exist.. , Perhaps the 
market is not large enough to support many firms or to encourage firms from other 
areas to incur the large transportation costs involved in marketing in that region. 
The subsequent result is market domination by a small number of firms. 
The other form of oligopoly is the differentiated oligopoly market structure, 
found in the pharmaceutical industry. In the differentiated oligopoly products are 
heterogeneous, although they may be identical in purpose they are differentiated 
from one another. By offering, particular design features, packaging, after-sales 
services and promotion, each firm tries to build up brand loyalty (Henry & Haynes 
1978). Each product therefore faces a downward sloping demand curve with 
successful differentiation leading to market power. 
The important features to look at in this market structure are the entry and 
exit conditions. In a normal situation firms would enter a market when profits were 
above the normal rate or positive and correspondingly exit when profits were below 
the normal rate or negative. If we consider Baumol's theory of contestability 
(1982), firms enter when profits are positive and so compete profits down until 
perfect competition (P = MC). At this point no other firms are attracted into the 
market as profits are no longer above the normal rate. The threat of such entry may 
act as an incentive for existing companies to maintain prices and profits at-this 
competitive level. This theory relies on the fact that there are zero sunk costs 
involved in entry and exit, e. g. there are no large capital expenditures necessary 
before production can begin nor any large capital losses when exit is undertaken. It 
is therefore possible for 'hit-and-run' strategies to be. undertaken. There are, 
however, certain barriers that may arise to prevent this process of entry, exit and the 
attainment of perfect competition. 
3.3.1: Barriers to Entry- 
Barriers to entry are derived from the entry conditions in a market and 
literally embrace anything that prevents instantaneous entry and so competition. 
The long-run consequences of such barriers are particularly important as it is 
possible for a firm to earn long-run above normal profits without inducing entry. In 
most cases this involves the entrant facing possible costs the incumbent firm has not 
had to bear or does not currently bear. Bain (1956) identified three main barriers to 
entry: 
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1. Absolute cost advantage - In some situations the threat of strategic behaviour 
from the incumbent firm is enough to prevent entry, e. g. predatory pricing. In this 
strategy the incumbent has sufficient funds to lower market price to a level where 
potential entrants cannot recoup entry costs nor compete efficiently. If the 
incumbent is willing and able to do this there is little incentive for new entrants. It 
is argued that this strategy is not a good long-run strategy as the incumbent will 
never recover the losses made during this period. Also if the potential entrant does 
enter the market and withstands the strategy, the incumbent firm may eventually 
have to relinquish and share the market. Nevertheless, the more willing the 
incumbent is seen to respond to a threat of entry by such measures the less entry 
will be contemplated and attempted. --- 
2. Economies of Scale - When the scale of production changes there may be 
important repercussions on the unit costs involved for a firm or industry. Most 
notably increasing returns to scale or economies of scale may occur whereby the 
unit costs of output decline with increased output (Sawyer 1981). Koutsoyiannis 
(1979) noted the difference between pecuniary economies of scale which are 
realised from paying lower prices for the factors used in production and distribution, 
and real economies associated with a reduction in the physical quantity of inputs, 
raw materials, types of labour and capital. Pecuniary economies may be found with 
bulk purchases involving special discounts with larger orders, possibly lower 
financing costs as banks offer larger firms lower interest rates and other favourable 
terms on loans, lower advertising prices awarded for large scale, advertising 
campaigns etc. With reference to real economies these can be found in production, 
marketing, managerial, and transport and storage areas. 
With regards to production economies of scale can be found from the 
specialisation of labour and machinery. There are also economies possible from the 
relationship between the volume and input of particular equipment such as storage 
tanks and reaction chambers used in 'process' industries such as petroleum refining 
and the chemical industry. The material and labour costs of constructing such 
plants are proportional to the surface area that they occupy but the volume capacity 
(which determines the level of output) of a plant increases more than 
proportionately as the area increases (Koutsoyiannis 1979). The reserve-capacity 
requirement may also provide economies -of scale. For example, to avoid the 
disruption of production flow due to a breakdown of machinery a small firm using 
one machine will need a second machine in reserve. A larger firm using several 
machines can attain the required 'security' from breakdowns by holding only a 
proportion of their total numbers as reserve capacity (Koutsoyiannis 1979). 
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In advertising it is recognised that costs per unit of output fall with scale as 
do transportation and storage costs. Economies can also be found in the 
specialisation of managerial skills and in the ability of the firm to undertake higher 
risks. Such economies of scale cause the long-run average cost curve of the firm to 
slope downwards. For a potential entrant without access to these economies entry 
may be deterred for a number of reasons. Firstly, it may be more expensive for the 
entrant to obtain financing both from the negotiating costs and the interest payments 
required, especially in view that the larger firms may face lower interest rates as 
they are perceived as less risky due to their reputation, lower rates of bankruptcy or 
failure, lower variability of profits etc. (Sawyer 1981). Potential entrants may 
therefore by unable to get sufficient funding to enter the market, nor compete as 
efficiently once on the market because of the higher unit costs they face. 
Furthermore, the possibility of failure might involve considerable losses and high 
exit costs discouraging entry. 
Such economies of scale and barriers to entry may` be achieved through 
vertical and horizontal integration. Vertical integration can be either forward or 
backwards. Forward vertical integration involves the acquisition of marketing and 
retail outlets for relevant products. For a potential entrant this may restrict access to 
the market both physically and via cost, so deterring entry. Backward vertical 
integration refers to the acquisition of raw material sources. Again for the potential 
entrant this may restrict access to required materials while making production more 
expensive and so uncompetitive. Horizontal integration is the acquisition of firms 
in the same field and stage of production. This can bring many of the economies 
described above while also reducing existing competition. By such measures firms 
may take advantage of various economies of scale, making the production costs 
incurred by a potential entrant uncompetitive and so deter entry. 
3. Product Differentiation - It has been acknowledge that there is a decisive 'first- 
mover advantage' in most markets. The first firm to produce a particular product is 
always more-readily identified with that product, even when further competition 
enters. The patent system which allows an innovator a temporary monopoly aids 
this identification process still further. During the period of patent protection the 
firm promotes its product heavily, cultivating a strong brand loyalty among its 
customers. They identify and differentiate product characteristics leaving potential 
entrants the task of overcoming a well established product, which would usually 
involve very heavy expenditures on advertising. Carlton & Perloff (1990) noted 
that Schumpeter (1950) had found a positive relationship between innovation and 
market power. High innovation expenditures are usually associated with the race 
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for products of unique value. When first on the market these products receive more 
coverage and become more readily identified giving them potential market power. 
Another factor which aids this process is the use of trademarks to identify 
products in the face of competition. Trademarks become associated with particular 
standards and quality which the customer automatically links to a particular product 
i. e. when thinking of Cornflakes most people think of Kellogg's Cornflakes. 
When products can be differentiated and consumers view brands in an 
industry as imperfect substitutes, the firm can raise the price above rivals without 
losing any or all of its customers. New entrants increase the choice of products but 
do not necessarily lower prices if brand loyalty is strong and consumers believe 
similar products differ in quality, even when they are physically identical. They 
have spurious product differentiation, e. g. the over-the-counter (otc) drugs market. 
Brand-name products are often thought superior to their generic equivalents by the 
paying consumer who is influenced by company advertisements. 
In a market with undifferentiated products the residual demand facing a 
particular firm depends only on the total supply of its rival as shown by: 
Q=q1+q2+q3+ .................... +qn 
In an industry with differentiated products the residual demand depends on 
the supply of each of its competitors separately. The inverse of the residual demand 
curve is: 
P1= D(Qj ........................ Qn) 
Pl = the price firm 1 may charge depending on the quantity of its brand sold and the 
quantities of all other (n-1) firms. 
If consumers see two products as imperfect substitutes, firm 1's demand 
curve may be: 
P1= a- b1Q1- b2Q2; a>O: bl>b2>0. 
An increase in firm l's output has a greater effect on its price than an 
increase in firm 2's output. The more a firm succeeds in differentiating its products, 
the more insulated its demand is from the actions of other firms (Carlton & Perloff 
1990). 
This can be seen by the popularity of national brands compared to house 
brands or generics. National brands are more familiar, recognised and perhaps 
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trusted, hence they tend to be more expensive. Companies have the financial 
backing to promote their name extensively, becoming well-known in comparison 
with the other small firms on the market. Such a market is said to consist of an 
oligopoly with a competitive fringe. For example, the market may be able to 
maintain only a small number of large firms yet a number of small niche areas exist 
and are satisfied by smaller competitors, as found in the pharmaceutical industry. 
3.3.2: Strategic Options for the Oligopolistic Firm 
There are various options open to companies that are operating in an 
oligopolistic atmosphere, ranging from extreme pricing behaviour to collusion. 
1. Kinked Demand - Sometimes a competitor believes that its rivals will not 
follow any price increases it makes but will match price cuts, resulting in a kinked 
demand curve and'sticky prices' (Sweezy 1939; Hall and Hitch 1939). The basis of 
this theory is the assumption that if a firm increases its prices, its rivals will not 
follow in the hope that they will capture some of the market share of that firm. 
Likewise if the firm cut its prices, rivals would lose their market share if they did 
not quickly follow. The result is a kink in the demand curve and a discontinuity in 
the marginal revenue curve (see Figure 3.6). 
Figure 3.6: Kinked Demand Curve 
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Q1 ' MR Quantity/unit of time 
The kink in the demand curve due to the perceptions of each firm results in a 
discontinuity in the marginal revenue curve between a-b. Firms with different 
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marginal costs curve can therefore exist in this market charging the same price (P1) 
provided their MC curves cut the discontinuity of the MR curve somewhere 
between a-b (MR = MC). Any shift in the cost curve moving it within the range of 
the discontinuity (a - b) does not necessitate a change in price, therefore we have 
'sticky' prices. 
This strategy is only a short-run model explaining the stickiness of prices at 
a given level. It does not, however, show how an industry reaches this level or how 
it moves to another. 
2. Price Leadership - Using this kinked demand curve theory it is also possible to 
consider the strategy of price leadership within the market. Within a given range, 
rivals may follow price increases allowing the initial seller to act as a monopolist, 
selecting the price and output to maximise own profits with the belief rivals will 
follow later. This option only holds if other large firms perceive their own demand 
curves as rekinked at the new price and estimate their MC function in the new 
discontinuity gap. If the new MC passed through the lower section of the MR curve 
(below b on the MR curve) the rival would initiate a price reduction which others 
would then follow. 
Effective price leadership is associated with infrequent price changes, 
announcements of prospective changes so rivals can make preparations and the 
compromise of the leaders with regards to the new price. 
3. Collusion - When there is very little differentiation in a market it may be 
recognised that short-run and long-run interests may be better served by the co- 
ordination of industry pricing. By working together it is possible for companies to 
act as a monopoly and so maximise industry total profits. There are however many 
difficulties with this option. Firstly, in many countries such activity is seen as 
against the public interest and so illegal. The very basis of this relationship is 
therefore unstable as attempts at collusion are often secret and therefore extremely 
hard to enforce. It is possible for one firm to be tempted to undercut its rivals in the 
belief that it will attract more of the market without the others noticing. There is 
always an incentive to cheat. Consequently there are very few cases of successful 
collusion. 
4. Price Wars - It is possible that rivalry between firms leads them to undercut 
each others prices until they reach the competitive level and neither firm makes any 
economic profit. This is likely in a situation of excess capacity where there is a 
large build-up of inventory needing to be moved. By cutting prices the firms hope 
to capture more of the market. However, the final outcome is usually unfavourable 
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for all those involved, except perhaps the consumer in the short-term. Such policies 
as predatory pricing as mentioned in 3.3.1, are regarded as misguided policies 
because the losses made can never be recovered. 
5. Non-Price Competition - If pricing policies are not regarded as a suitable 
means of competition product competition is the next strategy. As mentioned in 
section 3.3.1 product differentiation aims to distinguish products by way of quality 
improvements, packaging, after-sales services etc., the intention of which is to build 
up brand loyalty and ensure high volume sales without price reductions. The huge 
expenditures put into promotional activity itself acts as a barrier to entry, in addition 
to the brand loyalty it creates. Promotional activity shifts the demand curve for a 
firm's product to the right, giving it more security in the face of competition, even 
when such competition is cheaper (see Figure 3.7). 
The demand curve facing a company which undertakes extensive and 
successful promotional campaigns for its products, shifts to the right. This means 
that at price Pa it can now sell quantity Qb rather than Qa or it could sell the same 
quantity as before (Qa) but at a higher price. This type of competition is most often 
seen in advanced technology-based industries, where R&D and promotional 
expenditures are substantial, as in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Figure 3.7: The Effect of Promotional Activity on the Demand Curve of a Firm 
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6. Price Discrimination - It is sometimes possible for a market to be sub-divided 
into separate smaller sub-markets dependent on buyer preference, income, location 
and the ease of availability of substitutes. If this is possible the demand curves in 
each of these different sectors of the market will have different price elasticities and 
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if the company can effectively, separate these sub-markets it will realise higher 
overall profits by taking advantage of the conditions in each separate sub-market. 
Long-run barriers to entry and the above strategies of companies can prevent 
profits and prices from falling to perfectly competitive levels by restricting 
competition and so allowing an oligopoly to be created. This oligopoly is 
characterised by high concentration ratios, high stable prices, high profit rates and 
non-price competition. 
3.4: The Multinational Enterprise: History and Theory 
3.4.1: The History of the Multinational Enterprise 
The MNE dates back to the Mercantilist period (16th and 17th Centuries) 
when companies like the East India Co., the Hudson Bay Co., and the Royal African 
Co. were organised to conduct long distance trade with America, Africa and Asia. 
Imperialist policies of the time led to the direct expansion of political sovereignty, 
mass population outflow and colonialism. At the same time a declining profit rate 
and under-consumption in home countries led companies to look abroad for trade 
and the maintenance of essential raw material supplies. These companies were the 
first organisations to be founded on the idea of international trade. 
The format of this international organisation shifted from trade to 
manufacturing with the evolution of the 19th Century corporate form in the US. 
Before the American Civil War (1861 - 1865) industrial structures consisted of 
small, often family owned businesses controlled by the single entrepreneur (Guru 
1978), but a wave of technological advances - led to new types of industries 
producing new types of products e. g. branded consumer goods, mass-produced 
metal products and standardised heavy machinery, tropical agricultural products and 
capital (Dunning 1988). This new technology was expensive to produce but not to 
reproduce, making a patent system necessary and 'mass production possible. 
Meanwhile the new products emerging needed large standardised markets to cover 
costs. Consequently new organisational structures for efficient production and 
marketing were essential. 
To cater for these changes in technology and products a spate of mergers 
began, with the small family business soon becoming regional, then national. The 
next progression was the vertical division of labour presided over by the Head 
Office, to co-ordinate, appraise and plan for the survival and growth of the 
organisation as a whole (Guru 1978). The national firm then became international. 
This progression towards the multinational enterprise (MNE) structure was 
accelerated by a number of external events. The First World War (1914 - 1918) had 
37 
dramatic effects on the relative wealth of European nations and resulted in huge war 
debts and reconstruction requirements. By 1918 Europe had become a net debtor 
(Hood & Young 1979), with money flowing out of the US into Europe. The 
depression of the 1930's slowed this investment down until the outbreak of the 
Second World War (1939 - 1945) which saw a crucial shift in the international 
investment climate. The Europe of 1945 was in desperate need of investment to 
rebuild its economy. Marshall Aid 1948, the formation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) 1958, the convertibility of the US dollar 1946, the International 
Monetary Fund 1946 and the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) 1948, all facilitated the growth of the MNE with heavy US 
involvement in European and international economic reconstruction. Regulatory 
barriers to overseas investment diminished while the international capital market 
grew, driving the multinational forward. 
A further accelerator was the rapid advance made in technology, especially 
transportation and communications, which removed many of the barriers to 
transnational production. The new markets in capital, technology, information and 
management did not provide for an efficient transfer of resources, therefore direct 
foreign investment (FDI), incorporating a package of resources transferred within 
the same firm rather than externally through the market, became a significant mode 
of resource transfer. With the specialised needs of modern technology and the 
increasing advantages of large-scale production, the concentration of capital and 
knowledge increased significantly, such that the more complex the technology, the 
larger and more diversified the firm became (Stopford et al. 1980). 
By 1968 US MNEs were forming an average of three affiliates every year 
(Hood & Young 1979) and by 1971 their dominance was evident, with American 
Corporations holding 52% of the total world stock of FDI, followed by Great 
Britain with 14.5%, France 5%, Federal Republic Germany 4.4% and Japan 2.4% 
(Guru 1978). 
A shift also took place in the character of the FDI. Before the Second World 
War the bulk of activity for the MNE was in resource-based investment, but this 
shifted to import-substituting investment after the war. The advances made in 
technology and the opportunities this provided led to a shift toward manufacturing 
investment. After 1970 this shifted again to rationalised investment, geared to 
exploiting the advantages of product or process specialisation, scale and scope 
economies and economies of synergy (Stopford et al. 1980). By 1974 almost 47% 
of the stock of FDI of five of the principal source countries was accounted for by 
manufacturing, 28% by services and 25% by extractive industries (Hood & Young 
1979). 
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The international climate towards MNEs changed in the 1970's when 
initially welcoming hands were replaced with hostility, especially in the Developing 
Countries. Changing economic conditions viz., inflation, economic depression and 
protectionism, led to a decline in investment overseas. The size, diversity, 
concentration in high technological areas and profitability of the MNEs were not 
always seen as beneficial for the countries involved. They challenged the 
established international order and threatening the sovereignty of the smaller states. 
In 1980 the MNEs employed 25 million people, almost a quarter ' of all 
manufacturing employment in some economies, with liquid financial assets 
exceeding total global assets of gold and foreign exchange (Kaplinsky 1991). The 
type of control used by the MNEs over their affiliates, especially when they 
operated a regional or global strategy, occasionally clashed with host governments' 
objectives. 
This hostility has recently Subsided as international production theory 
matures and a better appreciation of the nature and advantages of the MNE evolves. 
MNEs'are no longer seen as a major threat to sovereignty nor as Raymond Vernon 
observed in 1977 (The Economist 1993b); 
"the embodiment of almost anything disconcerting about modern 
industrial society. " 
Experience of industrialisation in the developing world, their growing 
capability to negotiate with MNEs and a decline in the ideological underpinnings of 
the more extreme criticisms of MNEs all contributed. Most authorities now realise 
that market failures cannot be left untreated hence their attitudes towards MNEs are 
changing. Previously actions were specifically targeted at MNEs, ignoring the 
wider ramifications on political strategies, but the growing importance of MNE 
investment changed this. It has been recognised that the use of foreign and 
domestic resources in FDI inevitably affects the efficacy and flexibility of 
government actions. Governments now look at the competitive advantage of the 
resources-under their jurisdiction as a national economic objective in its own right. 
Greater liberalisation and more efficient controls are expected to emerge (Lall 
1991). 
3.4.2: Advantages of the MNE 
The explanation of why certain industries have developed into oligopolistic 
MN structures lies in the advantages that they offer. Firstly, there is the advantage 
of trade capability. In a closed economy with perfectly competitive conditions each 
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firm would maximise its technical and price efficiency, and in the absence of any 
barriers to entry, resources would be optimally distributed between firms. However, 
in reality the firm is faced with an open economy where each country has a different 
pattern of resource endowment, e. g. one may be endowed with capital while another 
is labour abundant. Neo-classical trade theory suggests that each country could 
improve its economic well-being by reallocating its resources until the comparative 
advantage of each was adjusted appropriately. Perhaps the labour abundant country 
would specialise in labour intensive industries, while the capital abundant country 
specialises in technology based industries. With trade, both could improve their 
economic well-being. 
FDI aids this process in two ways. Firstly,, it provides the host country with 
capital and technology to develop indigenous (and immobile) resources. Secondly, 
it helps release capacity in the home country which can then be concentrated in the 
resources for which thai country has the comparative advantage (Dunning 1988). 
Trade and FDI are therefore associated with attaining the social optimum with 
regards to the various resource endowments of countries. The possibility of 
relocating resources to their optimal use infers optimality for the firm. FDI is also a 
means to avoid leakage hazards which might occur from licensing. Williamson 
(1992) noted that once knowledge is licensed out the independence of the licensee 
becomes a major problem as the licenser has no control over the knowledge, its uses 
or dissemination. Licensing may only be an option if the licensee can be made 
dependent or alternatively FDI may be undertaken so that the company maintains 
control. 
Three other major advantages of a MNE structure were also identified, viz. 
ownership specific advantages, location specific advantages and advantages from 
globalisation. 
1. Ownership Specific Advantages -A MNE can take advantage of the possible 
economies of scale from size and the savings from the reduction in transaction costs 
previously incurred via tariffs and import restrictions. Overheads can be spread 
between the corporation as a whole, which is a considerable benefit when one 
considers the costs involved in R&D and promotional campaigns for these mainly 
high technology-based industries. FDI is a product of an imperfect market which 
allows the MNE to acquire a monopoly advantage in its domestic market and 
exploit it internationally by product differentiation, brand names, special marketing 
skills and perhaps collusion. There is also the possibility that excess managerial, 
entrepreneurial and technological capacity can be utilised elsewhere. 
On the negative side the size of the MNE may eventually bring with it 
diseconomies of scale. While economies of scale may result from increased labour 
40 
specialisation in production and management there may at some point, be some loss 
of control if the enterprise gets too bigger. As a firm expands it increases the 
number of hierarchical levels which may lead to a higher proportion of inefficient 
information transfers from the top hierarchies to the bottom levels and vice versa. 
Simple serial reproduction distortions occur in communicating across successive 
hierarchical levels (Williamson 1967). 
2. Location Specific Advantages - By operating on a MNE basis, companies may 
gain exclusive access to essential raw materials, while also benefiting from different 
factor endowments in the countries of operation. For example, a company may 
transfer all its labour intensive production to a country with lower labour costs and 
less restrictive legal structures concerning working conditions etc. Furthermore, 
some authorities in different countries have more welcoming policies with regards 
to MNEs. For example, they may be tax havens or encourage MNE production by 
creating incentives. Local production also allows the company to provide a better 
after-sales service, undertake product adaptation and spot marketing to increase 
market share in the particular area/country. 
3. Globalisation - The MNE is in the best position to gain from many different 
sources of information and because of its spread it can reduce the affects of 
macroeconomic events in its home country and in other countries, it can spread its 
risk factors. Also, the fact that these industries are often technology-based, with 
high R&D and promotional expenses, necessitate a global market to recover costs. 
Globalisation also provides for wider access to financing from the undistributed 
profits of the company, from banks and from the governments of both the home and 
host countries. 
With the cultural, legal, institutional and linguistic differences that face the 
MNE, the company must decide whether these advantages are worth the risks 
involved in becoming a MN. The company faces the choice of selling its products 
in its home market or in a number of countries, considering the size of the foreign 
market and the height of trade barriers between the countries concerned. Sundaram 
& Black (1992) identified two aspects of the environment facing a MNE, viz. the 
multiple sources of external authority (MA) and the multiple denominations of 
value involved (MV). 
A multinational transaction involves the flow of not just products, but 
capital, people, knowledge and technology across borders, exposing the company to 
a number of often conflicting sources of authority. The company must consider the 
number of geographical locations of its operations, the variance of the environments 
and the lack of a superstructure to oversee any disagreements which might arise. 
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These aspects make operations increasingly complex - and add to the element of 
uncertainty. There are also variations in the value of operations between countries, 
with problems of hedging known or anticipated cash flow against future exchange 
rate shifts, and the impact of unanticipated changes in the real exchange rates on the 
firms competitive position. Considering these Sundaram & Black identified eight 
possible strategies for firms: 
1. As MA increases firms will favour exports and contractual modes of entry over 
FDI as they are more at risk from government interventions. - 
2. As MA increases it is associated with more concentrated and undifferentiated 
configurations of activities, as there is a greater potential risk involved. 
3. Increasing MA is associated with a higher use of socialisation, a moderate use of 
formalisation and a lower use of centralisation defined by Sundaram & Black as: 
Centralisation - control of the parent over the subsidiary through 
centralisation of crucial strategic decisions in the parent firm because of the 
subsidiary's relative dependence on the parent. 
Formalisation - the routinisation of decision making by relying on formal 
records and procedures. 
Socialisation - creation of shared goals and values as a means of controlling 
behaviour and decision making. 
4. Increasing MA gives more incentive for a company to pursue value-based rather 
than price-based strategies in countries of foreign operation. With the value-based 
strategies they create types of barriers to entry and compete via non-price factors i. e. 
R&D, brand names, trademarks. With the price or cost-based strategies the 
company is looking for efficiency in order to compete primarily on the basis of 
price which is likely to give lower per unit profit margins. 
5. As MV increases companies will favour FDI as a mode of entry as it spreads 
risks. 
6. Increasing MV is associated with more dispersed, undifferentiated configuration 
of value-chain activities. 
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7. Increased MV is associated with more socialisation as a means of control. 
8. Increasing MV gives the company more incentive for adopting value-based or 
cost-based competitive strategies. 0 
Taking these considerations, Sundaram & Black identified a number of 
propositions shown in Table 3.1. What is obvious is that international trade allows 
countries to reach a better standard of well-being by taking advantage of the 
different factor endowments of various countries. By expanding operations into 
foreign countries a company can avoid or reduce the consequences of 
macroeconomic events i. e. inflation in the home country which reduces the 
country's overall competitiveness. It can also escape the consequences of long-run 
changes in home county factor prices i. e. wage increases, while increasing its' 
market and exploiting economies of scale. The MNE must, however, consider the 
political stability of the countries it is interested in, the attitude of the national 
administration, incentives provided, traditional ties of trade, sentiment, language 
and the scientific and technological capacities of the countries. 
Table 3.1: Matrix of Multiple Sources of Authority and Denominations of 
Value 
Entry: Primarily export, some contract, Entry: Primarily contract, some export, 
low FDI low FDI 
Configuration: Primarily concentrated Configuration: Primarily dispersed and 
and undifferentiated undifferentiated 
HI Control: Primarily formalisation, some Control: Primarily socialisation, low 
socialisation, low centralisation. formalisation, low centralisation. 
Strategy: Value-based and some Strategy: Value-based strategies 
value/cost-based strategies 
MA Entry: Primarily export, some contract, Entry: Primarily FDI, some contract. 
low FDI low export. 
Configuration: Primarily concentrated Configuration: Primarily'dispersed and 
and differentiated differentiated 
LO Control: Primarily centralisation, some Control: Primarily formalisation, some 
formalisation, low socialisation. socialisation, low socialisation. 
Strategy: Primarily cost-based strategies Strate : Primarily value-based strategies 
LO HI 
MV 
3.4.3: Characteristics of the Modern MNEs 
Advances in technology and knowledge provided companies with the 
opportunities to- take advantage of economies of scale, cost advantages, 
globalisation of markets and other competitive aspects. The resulting MNEs tend to 
be oligopolistic in nature, with barriers to entry and competitive strategies to reduce 
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competition a common focus. They are therefore characterised by a number of 
specific features as identified by Hood & Young 1979: 
1. Size - It is not a prerequisite that a MNE must be a giant, but evidence suggests 
that the more successful enterprises are enormous. These companies are 
concentrated in technically advanced manufacturing areas requiring extensive R&D 
and marketing expenditures with access to extensive funds. This requirement and 
the possibility of considerable economies of scale gives the gigantic firms more 
opportunity to benefit from their size and so compete more efficiently. 
2. Ownership - FDI has been dominated by the US since the First World War and 
especially so after the Second World War, however this dominance has been slowly 
eroded by the UK, FDR, Japan and Switzerland. In 1976 these countries, including 
the US, accounted for almost 4/5th's of direct investment stocks. Within these 
sources FDI is concentrated still further in the hands of a small number of 
enterprises, e. g. in the US 300 firms accounted for 70% of FDI, in the UK 165 firms 
accounted for 80% of FDI and in the FDR 82 firms accounted for 70% of FDI 
(Hood & Young 1979). 
Table 3.2 shows the number of parent companies and their affiliates in 1977 
with their countries of origin. The current estimate from the UN is of 35,000 MN's 
in existence with 170,000 affiliates (The Economist 1993b). It is clearly seen that 
the developed countries' MNEs dominate, although in recent years some developing 
countries viz. Brazil, Mexico and India, have begun to develop their own MNEs 
trading mainly with other developing countries. 
Table 3.2: Distribution of Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates, by 
Country, 1977. 
Parent Companies Total Affiliates 
Home Country Number % of Total Number % of Total 
us. 2,826 26.3 26,884 32.6 
UK. 1,706 15.9 21,80 26.5 
FDR 1,450 13.5 6,812 8.3 
Switzerland 871 8.1 3,698 4.5 
Netherlands 622 5.8 3,951 4.8 
France 599 5.6 4,103 5.0 
Canada 452 4.2 2,450 3.0 
Japan 382 3.6 2,407 3.0 
Others 1,819 17.0 10.158 12.5 
Total 10,727 100.0 82,266 100.0 
Source: The World Directory of Multinational Enterprises John M. Stopford, John 
H. Dunning & Klaus 0. Haberich (1980). 
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The actual geographical spread of the affiliates depends greatly on historical 
ties. Continental Europe and the UK were major host countries for US MNEs, with 
Canada and the Far East also becoming significant after 1960. Most of the 
investment in Europe tended to be intra-European, based on traditional links, 
especially with the formation of the EEC and EFTA. 
3. Growth - Post 1945 was a remarkable growth period for the MNEs, aided by 
technological advances and financially favourable climates. Between 1945 and 
1965 growth exceeded the Gross National Product (GNP) of some national 
economies, but then slowed down as the economic climate changed and a global 
recession began. 
4. Locational Spread - The more MN a company the better it is situated to take 
advantage of any changes in the international economic order. There are 
possibilities of integrated production and marketing on a global basis, expanding the 
market, and taking advantage of different government policies, e. g. tax havens. The 
risks are diluted, costs spread and economies of scale from internationalisation 
possible. The locational spread of the world MNEs is therefore great. 
5. Host Country Distribution - The US, UK, FDR, Switzerland and Japan are the 
dominating sources of FDI and also the most important recipients, with the 
exception of Japan. In 1975 the US, UK, FDR and Canada were hosts to 41% of the 
total stock of investment in developed countries. Investment was becoming more of 
a two-way interchange between the developed countries. Only when developing 
countries offer advantages such as lower labour costs giving 'pseudo' economies of 
scale (beneficial for the company but not necessarily for society) is investment 
likely to take place. 
6. Divestment - This is the withdrawal of activity or the sale or liquidation of assets 
if adequate returns are not obtained. This action is a major fear for host countries, 
especially developing country hosts, where the MNE investment usually represents 
a considerable source of employment, technology and finance they can ill afford to 
lose. The Harvard Project which looked at the exit rates of MNEs found that 
between 1951 - 1965 for 180 MNEs the exit rate was 10 - 12%, for the period 1966 
- 1970 this had risen to 26.3%, while after 1970 it was 42% (Hood & Young 1979). 
The changing economic climate and changed government attitudes to the MNE's 
have had their affect on the exit rates experienced. 
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7. Entry and Ownership Patterns - Host countries would tend to prefer that 
MNE's enter by means of a 'greenfield' venture, increasing the number of companies 
in the market and so competition. This venture is the establishment of a new 
company; however, most MNEs prefer to enter a market by way, of a merger or 
acquisition. Such a strategy automatically ensures them some share of the market 
and knowledge about market conditions. They may also take over what would have 
been their leading competitor to reduce the competition in the market. 
8. Industry Diversification - Before 1945, MNEs were predominantly found in the 
extractive industries, however this changed with the rapid advances in technology 
after 1945. There was a switch to manufacturing in high technology areas 
characterised by high R&D and marketing expenditures. To compensate for these 
high costs, companies looked at the global market to spread costs, while also 
undertaking vertical integration, both forward and backward, to secure market 
outlets and raw materials supplies. Such activities require access to operational 
branches overseas and large sources of finance, therefore international investment 
becomes a likely strategy of the MNE. This diversification also spreads the risks of 
operation. 
9. Penetration into Host Country Industries - MNEs can hold considerable 
economic power in host countries, e. g. in Canada US firms manufactured 52% of 
total output in 1970 (Hood & Young 1979). This problem of sovereignty is a matter 
of sensitivity for many host countries, especially for the weaker developing 
countries. 
10. Financing - The MNE is able to tap a wide variety of sources of financing, 
from their own undistributed profits to the banks and governments of any of the 
countries in which they operate in. 
Oligopolistic market structure is associated with high concentration ratios, 
high stable prices, non-price competition and above normal profits. It is a market 
structure which is often found in the modem MNE where many industries have a 
small number of firms dominating the global market. These firms are able to 
compete at such a level that they can charge above competitive prices and earn 
above-competitive profits. Their size allows them to exploit economies of scale 
while their competitive advantages permit them to limit competition. As the size 
and influence of the MNE has spread, the consequences of their operations have 
become the subject of considerable controversy. 
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3.4.4: Consequences of MNE Involvement for the Home and Host Countries 
The power and spread of the MNEs allow them to influence, directly and 
indirectly, the policies and actions of both the home and host countries operated in. 
The consequences of this influence are, varied, with some being beneficial while 
others are not. 
1. Home Country - FDI has both short-run and long-run effects on the home 
country economy and government actions. In the short-run, the Balance of 
Payments is adversely effected by the outflow of funds, while there is a possible 
displacement of employment as production jobs are shifted to lower labour cost 
countries, creating unemployment in the home country which then requires capital 
for their readjustment. Furthermore, the capital and technological advantage of the 
home country is eroded by the MNE exporting it to other countries which will soon 
be able to compete on the same level. In addition, the MNE may undertake tax 
evasion by transfer pricing. This occurs when a company sells products, to its 
subsidiaries in another country at a price other than the arms-length price in order to 
transfer funds to countries where perhaps the tax rates on profits are lower. Such 
action culminates in an increase in the overall profit level for the company as a 
whole. MNE strategies can therefore effect monetary, fiscal and trade policies. 
In the long-run there are however some potential benefits from this MNE 
activity. There are possible gains from higher returns on capital or technology 
which has been exported. This may prove considerable once the multiplier effect is 
taken into account. Repatriated profits and royalties from affiliates may also 
increase government revenue, while the reallocation of labour may improve 
productivity in those areas were it is more suited. 
In the US, there has been a negative effect from the extensive FDI that has 
been undertaken by MNEs, with a small loss of output due to the redistributional 
shift in domestic income away from labour to capital. Cheaper production 
possibilities abroad encouraged the American MNE's to export labour intensive 
production facilities and maintain only highly specialised operations in the US. The 
advantages and disadvantages of MNEs therefore depend on the extent of their 
operations and the government policies towards them. 
2. Host Countries - There is often more written about the consequences of MNE 
activity on host countries as these can be much more severe, especially for 
developing countries. Singh (1988) noted a discernible increase in FDI in most 
developing countries, particularly the newly industrialising middle income 
countries, which are richly endowed with natural resources. Between 1970 and 
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1981 the net FDI in these countries grew 14% per year, with much increased MNE 
penetration. The question is whether such MNE activity is beneficial to the host 
country. FDI provides the recipient country with a 'package' of knowledge, capital 
and entrepreneurship with a variety of benefits to economic growth and 
development, but it can also bring some harsh adverse effects. 'Hood & Young 
(1979) identified four specific categories where MN activity may have an effect: 
1. Resource Transfer Effects - There are three main areas, of concern in this 
category. 
Capital - Capital may be in short supply in host countries, especially for developing 
countries, therefore the initial provision of capital included in the FDI package may 
help fill the resource gap in the economy between the desired level of investment 
and domestic savings. It may also stimulate the flow of official aid and mobilise 
domestic savings in the host economy; however, there are important possible 
adverse effects. It is more likely the capital flow will be small and only a 'first and 
last time contribution' to the affiliate. After this initial investment further growth 
may be financed by reinvested profits and local savings, savings which may 
diverted away from local firms, starving them of funds. This would not contribute 
to the economic growth and development of the host country. 
Technology - It is argued that, technology is one of the main engines of 
development, and so by using advanced imported technology it is possible to 
eliminate the need for the direct development of such technology. This is especially 
important in the Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs), where domestic production of 
technology is not a feasible solution. There are, however, possible adverse effects 
from this technology import, via the terms of transferral and the suitability of the 
technology to the host country. The marginal cost of using or selling technology 
which has already been developed is zero for the owner, i. e. the MNE, but not for 
the purchaser. However, the marginal cost of developing an alternative technology 
may be considerable, making the bought technology more attractive but setting the 
host country at an automatic disadvantage for negotiations. '' There are also direct 
and indirect costs to be considered. The parent company may charge the affiliate 
royalties and license fees, as well as costs stemming from tie-in clauses and 
restrictive practice clauses. Such clauses may require the affiliate to purchase 
second hand machinery from the parent, or to use home nationals in top positions in 
the affiliate. Very few, if any of these conditions, will be of any benefit to the host 
country. 
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There have therefore been numerous calls of exploitation aimed at the large 
multinational firms investing in developing countries. This transferred technology 
should be appropriate to the relative factor endowments of the particular country, 
hence if capital intensive technology is imported to developing countries it is not 
appropriate in aiding the problems of underemployment, with only limited labour 
absorption. This may also have the effect of increasing income inequalities and 
having a 'demonstrative effect', encouraging local firms to adopt similar 
inappropriate capital intensive technologies. However, it is possible that no other 
technology exists which would suit the LDC. 
There is also the fact that in most developing host countries the market is 
small and so does not give much incentive for the adaptation of technology. At the 
same time skilled labour will be in scarce supply making the capital intensive 
technology a more sensible choice, reducing the requirement for skilled labour, 
while allowing the MNE to find favourable conditions for its capital requirements in 
the international market. 
Finally, there is an argument over the suitability of products. There tends to 
be a bias towards sophisticated high technology consumer products which are 
heavily promoted and differentiated but no benefit to the LDC which requires the 
basic necessities of life rather than the luxuries. Another factor which will not aid 
the host country in any way is the possibility that the technology will not be diffused 
throughout the economy, but 'guarded' within the multinational affiliate and "so 
hinder the development of the local market. 
Management - Managerial skills may be scarce in the host country and so the 
inflow improves the balance of the local economy and has spin-off effects with the 
training of personnel and demonstration effects. Again however, a high proportion 
of the top position jobs may be reserved for home country nationals, while there is 
also the possibility that the training in the MNE will not be of any use outside its 
structure. 
2. Trade and Balance of Payments Effects - Shortages of foreign exchange may 
constrain growth as does a deficiency of savings (the double gap theory), so that 
even if there is sufficient savings, investment goods from abroad can still not be 
purchased, with a possible foreign exchange bottleneck resulting. The sources of 
possible relief for such a situation come from increased foreign aid, import 
substitution policies and more FDI. Therefore once the affiliate is established, the 
capital account of the Balance of Payments benefits from the initial inflow of 
capital. However there are adverse effects with the payment of dividends, interest, 
royalties etc. 
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There is also the possibility of transfer pricing which operates against the 
interests of the host country. This takes advantage of possible inter-country 
differences in tax rates, tariffs and subsidies, to shift profits which are undeclared 
into more favourable conditions. By doing this the MNE can get around any 
government regulations on the remission of profits abroad, avoid its responsibility 
to local shareholders, take advantage of exchange rate instabilities and avoid 
political pressures, e. g. with lower declared profits it may not be pushed for wage 
increases. 
3. Competitive and Anti. Competitive Effects - The foreign affiliate is an 
extension of oligopoly power and so it possesses greater economic power than the 
indigenous firm. In the developing countries there is very little effective 
competition, therefore the potential monopoly impact is great, with the realisation of 
higher profits for the affiliate but lower efficiency, higher costs and barriers to entry 
for the indigenous firms. 
It is argued that the entry of an affiliate into a developed country enhances 
world co-operation and may break up an existing oligopolistic market structure, 
stimulating competition, especially if it is a 'greenfield entry'. For a developing 
country however, the story may be quite different. With a 'greenfield entry' the 
number of firms in the market increases and competition is stimulated. However, in 
practice there has been an increase in the use of acquisitions. Take-overs of small, 
inefficiently operating units in a non-competitive industry may be beneficial, 
however, as has been indicated previously, MNEs tend to be concentrated in the key 
industries of the economy, therefore a take-over may simply enhance oligopolistic 
structures. By the introduction of higher wages and shorter working hours income 
inequalities may be worsened, stimulating inflation and generally hindering 
economic development. The results depend greatly on the strength of the host 
governments' anti-trust legislation. 
4. Sovereignty and Autonomy Effects - These effects are a cost no matter which 
way they are considered. Even if the foreign firm stimulates the local economy it 
involves some loss of economic independence. In the developed countries the 
emphasis is on the technological dependence, resulting from centralisation and the 
co-ordination of R&D in the home countries, however this is not a major problem. 
Much of the FDI which occurs is between the major countries, and so of a more 
even flow into and out of each of the major contributors. In the LDCs however the 
impact is more serious. The more FDI undertaken in a country, the more reliant that 
country becomes on the external decision making of the MNE, and on allocated 
rather than self-generated growth. There is a danger of the 'footloose' MNE with its 
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strong bargaining position, allowing it to dictate its own terms of entry on a 'take it 
or leave it' basis. 
3.5: Evaluation 
It is not possible to make a conclusive evaluation of the MNE as there are 
too many controversial issues and contrasting views. All it is really possible to say 
is that there may or may not be a net positive effect on growth, development, 
employment, prices and the Balance of Payments, while there will almost definitely 
be an adverse effect on income distribution and of course on economic 
independence. 
The MNE is characterised by its oligopolistic nature, which tends to dictate 
its existence in advanced technological industries such as pharmaceuticals. It is 
characterised by product differentiation, high R&D expenditures, high promotional 
activities associated with barriers to entry and marked specialisation in such fields 
as marketing and management. Such factors allow it to exploit its size and expand 
to the full potential in a global setting, with high prices and high profit rates 
resulting. It is not possible to determine whether in attempting to maximise its own 
welfare the MNE is advancing the welfare of the world economy. That is a matter 
of personal discretion depending on the weight given to each argument for and its 
counter-argument against the MNE, the actual organisation, and the home and host 
countries involved. 
Nevertheless, it is easy to see why there is so much controversy surrounding 
these market structures and hence the pharmaceutical industry with its enhanced 
human interest aspect. 
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Chapter 4: The Market Structure of the Pharmaceuticals: 
The Practice (II) 
4.1: Introduction 
The pharmaceutical industry has an important role to play in society which 
some would argue is out of proportion to its size (Steele 1962; Smith 1991). Its 
importance stems from its joint responsibility with the medical profession for the 
maintenance of health, which in itself is a valuable asset, as well as being an 
important determinant of the productivity of human resources in the economy 
(Steele 1962-64). 
Specifically, the industry is expected to discover and develop new drugs, 
which it then converts into useful therapeutic products as rapidly and safely as 
possible, products it then undertakes to manufacture and distribute. Within this 
function there are opportunities for industry members to exploit the market due to 
information imperfections and some of the unique characteristics of the market. 
These characteristics have resulted in accusations of soliciting unreasonably high 
prices and profits, monopolistic restrictions on supply, abuses of patent privileges 
and potentially serious misallocation of resources and social cost. 
Smith (1991) argues that organisations are creatures determined by their 
environment, therefore it is logical to look at just what characterises the 
pharmaceutical market, making it special and the subject of intense debate. 
4.2: Demand 
The demand for drug products can be separated into those products which 
can be bought directly by the patient over-the-counter (otc) and those which must be 
prescribed by a doctor. It is the latter of these which is by far the most important 
sector of the market and for whom the market is particularly distinct. Within this 
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sector there is again a division between the intra-mural market (hospital) and the 
extra-mural market (consumption at home). The extra-mural market is significantly 
larger and of interest in this instance. 
One of the most striking features of the demand function for prescription 
pharmaceuticals is the separation of the consumer and the decision maker. 
Imperfect information for the patient (the consumer) means their knowledge of the 
therapeutic and other properties of drug products is inadequate for judging what 
treatment is required, what drugs are needed and in what form and dosage. The 
patient therefore approaches the doctor who acts as an agent, an expert with the 
desired knowledge. It is the doctor who decides which product is necessary for each 
case. 
The demand for pharmaceutical products is therefore a derived or directed 
demand, as the patient has no choice 'but to take the prescribed drug or none at all. 
As drugs are often a necessity, it means the patient's demand for products is almost 
perfectly price inelastic up to levels of prohibitively high prices. In simpler terms a 
price increase will not chase many customers out of the market, while a price 
decrease will not attract customers into the market. 
The reasoning for -this is that very few pharmaceutical products are 
appropriate for the treatment of more than a limited range of medical conditions, i. e. 
they are disease specific with limited possibilities for substitution. The 
pharmaceutical market therefore consists of a large number of separate sub-markets 
which are often constricted in size. The potential demand for a drug or group of 
related drugs consists of the total need for medication for the particular illnesses 
they can treat. Total effective demand at given drug prices may, however, be lower 
than the total physical need if patients have no access to welfare or sufficient 
resources with which to obtain drugs. Alternatively, total effective demand may 
exceed total physical need if individuals are prescribed such products when they are 
not appropriate or necessary (irrational prescribing). The actual relevant market 
comprises of the total effective demand for medication from patients who have 
consulted a doctor and who are inflicted by the disorder for which the doctor may be 
inclined or persuaded to prescribe the particular drug (Steele 1962). 
Such price inelasticity is reinforced by the isolation of the doctors in this 
market. When making a decision the doctor is concerned with efficacy, safety and 
quality. As the decision-maker and not the purchaser the doctor is not primarily 
concerned with prices. In a market where a number of identical drug products may 
be present and offered at very different prices, the doctor will choose that which is 
regarded as the best, regardless of -price. Due to the cost and time-consuming 
aspects for doctors to keep abreast of all the latest developments in products, 
indications, formulations and dosages, they rely on various sources of information, 
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one of which is the pharmaceutical industry. The companies therefore promote 
literature and material endorsing the 'superior' qualities of their own products. As 
the doctor puts efficacy, safety and quality first these promotional efforts may shift 
the doctor's demand curve from one product to another, without any reference to 
price. The doctor has no motivation towards prescribing the lowest priced product 
available on the market nor is he or she formally required to even be aware of the 
prices charged (Steele 1962-64). 
A further reinforcement to this unique demand function, especially in the 
industrialised countries of the world, is the separation of the consumer and the 
purchaser. In most instances the majority of the population are covered by medical 
insurance or have access to some form of welfare which provides full or partial 
payment for drug products by a third party, such as the government or insurers., 
Consequently, neither the consumer nor the decision-maker has an interest in prices. 
Markets work efficiently because buyers and sellers have incentives to 
insure resources are allocated to their highest valued uses. Prices signal the 
consumer's willingness to pay and reflect the comparative values they place on 
different items, while sellers seek the highest value output. Market performance 
therefore depends on the presence of such accurate information without which 
market prices no longer reflect the value consumers place on items (Wiggins 1985). ' 
A weakening of this price sensitivity hinders the market process and can lead to a 
potentially serious misallocation of resources (Steele 1962; Wiggins 1985; Lindsay 
1978; Cocks 1975; Comanor 1986). The nature of demand in the prescription drugs 
market distinguishes it from virtually all other markets. Imperfect information has 
resulted in an absence of price consciousness for the decision-makers (the doctor), 
directed demand and a separation of the purchaser, the decision-maker and the 
consumer. This all leads to inelastic price demand curves conducive with prices in 
excess of the marginal costs of production and a misallocation of resources. 
4.3: Supply and Competition 
Although demand in the pharmaceutical industry is price inelastic it does not 
necessarily follow that a monopoly will result. Drugs are not generally expensive to 
manufacture with no production economies of scale present (Wiggins 1985: Steele 
1962-64; Reekie 1975: Reekie & Wells 1988). With the exception of possible 
economies with regards to undertaking more and higher risk projects economies of 
scale are no real barrier to entry and full competition seems a plausible and desirable 
possibility despite the inelastic price demand. A perfectly elastic supply curve 
would compensate for the demand imperfections of the industry with the possibility 
of a highly competitive situation developing with small firms competing with large 
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firms on a price basis (Steele 1962; Steele -1962-64). Such competition would, 
however, have dramatic consequence for innovation, the major factor in economic 
growth for the pharmaceutical industry. 
If prices were kept close to manufacturing costs the return to the R&D 
investment by innovative companies would be negligible. While one company 
might invest millions on research and development another may enter the market, 
copy existing products at a marginal cost and sell them at much lower prices. If this 
occurred there would be no incentive for innovative companies to undertake the 
expensive and time-consuming R&D that stimulates the industry. Obviously 
society would suffer as new drug treatments would not be forthcoming, with the 
exception of discoveries made by academia or government research bodies. These 
facilities tend to be severely limited by a lack of financial resources, hence the 
number of discoveries would probably fall dramatically while development times 
increase significantly. Looking at the R&D in the centrally planned economies of 
the old Soviet Union, their record of discoveries and development is very poor 
compared to the private R&D of the Western pharmaceutical companies. For the 
benefit of society some system of protection for innovation is necessary to ensure 
sufficient returns. 
The patent system is therefore used by the innovative pharmaceutical 
industry to ensure competitive returns and to encourage continued R&D. A patent 
confers on the owner the specific right to exclude others from using the protected 
know-how for commercial purposes (H. Th. van Asselt 1990). It gives the company 
with a new innovation a temporary monopoly over the supply of a product or 
process. This is a temporary privilege as otherwise serious inefficiencies from 
continuous monopoly pricing could occur. There is a very delicate dividing line 
concerning the length of patent protection. If the privilege is permitted for too long 
inefficiencies from monopoly pricing would result, however, if the protection period 
is too short there will be inefficiencies from inadequate innovation. 
This patent privilege introduces a barrier to entry and so restricts 
competition on'the supply-side for the drug market. Nevertheless, competition can 
still be fierce if there is a rapid turn-over of drug products. R&D is a major 
determinant of competitive behaviour as it establishes the potential market power of 
a company, but also sets in motion the forces that may result in price competitive 
behaviour in the future (Cocks 1975). The demand for a drug product could be 
readily described as 'quicksilver', there one day and gone the next. Companies 
compete with one another to become the first to discover new therapeutic advances 
in drug products which may earn significant returns once patented and marketed. 
Yet it is found that successful new drugs may only hold a commanding position for 
approximately 5 years, after which it will be replaced by a presumably better rival 
iy, 
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(Telser 1975a). When one company finds a new compound which becomes a new 
major product others will intensify their research in the same areas, perhaps 
improving on the original product until it is'competed out' of the market. 
This competitive research can have benefits to society by increasing the 
chances of significant discoveries, however, there are possible drawbacks from 
duplicative R&D. In the 1950's research uncovered some major innovations and 
drug developments, but by the 1960's the possible returns to such research or, more 
precisely, from the marketing of believed major therapeutic innovations was 
realised. The result was widespread duplicative research and molecular 
manipulation of products to bypass patent restrictions. There was an increase in 
'me-too' drugs with either slightly different processes of manufacture or slightly 
different chemical content but with the same therapeutic effect. Although this 
increased competition on the market some of the benefit was questionable as 
resources were withdrawn from useful basic R&D to finance such manipulations. 
Competition is further restricted by the creation of artificial barriers to entry 
by the existing companies in the market. As production costs are not prohibitive 
and the cross elasticity of supply is high - any pharmaceutical company or even 
chemical company could branch out into a wide range of products without 
encountering significant costs, there are few effective natural barriers to entry and 
competition. To compensate for this, existing companies devote significant 
resources into developing artificial barriers mainly through acquiring patent 
protection, as mentioned above, and product differentiation. 
The demand for pharmaceuticals is sensitive to quality differences therefore 
a high degree of product differentiation is found. The aim of such differentiation is 
to cement brand loyalties and establish a secure market share for the product and the 
company. This is done by the use of trademarks and marketing strategies designed 
to exploit the imperfect information of the market to the best advantage of the 
company. Trademarks are legally protected and allow firms to single out their 
products in an attempt to extend the effects of a patent privilege position beyond the 
date of expiry. Patel (1979) noted that one sixth of all trademarks in the developing 
world were held by pharmaceuticals. 
The doctor as the decision-maker becomes the target of company marketing 
activity. They are confronted with drug products that have in effect three names: 
Chemical name - this gives the chemical structure of the molecule i. e. 
4-(dimethylamino)-1,4,4a, 5,5a, 6,11,12a-octa-3,6,10,12,12a- 
pentahydroxy-6, methyl-1,11 dixo-2 naphthacene-carboxamide. 
i; ýýiü f 
Generic name - is a common, established non-proprietary name i. e. '- 
tetracycline. 
Brand name - the name given to a product from the manufacturing 
company which is usually short and euphonic i. e. Achromycin 
By intensively promoting the brand name of a product and the company 
trademark, especially while the product' is under patent, the company hopes to 
secure the doctor's trust. By cultivating such a relationship it is, hoped that the 
doctor will continue to prescribe the product and other company products in the 
future - an easy habit to form if the product is the only one on the market. It is 
hoped that with such brand loyalty the market share of the product will be 
maintained in the face of increasing competition. A secondary aim of this 
promotional activity is to confuse the normal flows of rival information, preventing 
the doctor learning of other lower-priced sellers or lower-priced equivalents, whilst 
also raising suspicions over the quality of alternatives (Steele 1962-64). 
As a drug matures commercially and substitutes enter the market there is a 
shift towards perfect competition. Product differentiation is designed to delay this 
rapid erosion of market share for the company. R&D is a particularly haphazard 
process and it is believed it encounters economies of scale only up to a certain size 
(Lall 1974), however it is usually the larger firms who undertake extensive R&D 
and hold the greater proportion of patented products on the market as they are better 
able to handle the risks involved. It is therefore in their interests to extend the life 
of their products for as long as possible by product differentiation. It is here that the 
larger firms can take advantage of economies of scale in marketing. 
Competitors, especially generic competitors, tend to be smaller than the 
innovative companies and have fewer resources to devote to marketing. In amongst 
the glossy promotional material of these large innovative firms it is exceedingly 
hard for such companies to be heard. Their main competitive tactic is lower prices, 
however in a market where neither the decision-maker nor consumer are particularly 
price conscious, this may not be sufficient. Such marketing tactics of the larger 
firms therefore successfully create artificial barriers to entry. Bleidt (1992) noted 
from a 1991 FDC Report that $9bn was spent by the pharmaceutical manufacturers 
on R&D but $10bn on marketing. This type of money would not be spent if it was 
not considered to be successful. 
The barriers to entry created by the patent system and product differentiation 
successfully place restrictions on the number and size of market suppliers and 
therefore on the extent of price competition. Prices can therefore be set at levels 
much higher than the marginal cost of production, with high profits being earned by 
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the dominating firms. Such consequences are associated with the market structure 
of oligopoly and the potential misallocation of resources. 
4.4: Structure, 
Due to the cost structure of high R&D expenses and - marketing, 
large 
financial resources are required for successful operations in the pharmaceutical 
industry. - Smaller companies may innovate successfully, as many major discoveries 
have, in the past, been found accidentally; however, in the current competitive 
climate such small companies do not have the funds to develop and market their 
discoveries rapidly. They have therefore undertaken a considerable number of joint 
ventures and licensing out agreements with larger firms. These larger firms then 
dominate the market becoming multinational in the process. As the demand for 
pharmaceuticals is global and the costs involved considerable it is in the interests of 
the companies to take advantage of this huge market potential and develop an 
international character. As with most companies that develop into multinationals 
there are certain common explanations (Burstall, Dunning & Lake 1981): 
1. To overcome the constraints of the international environment i. e. 
tariffs, import quotas and local consumer preferences., 
2. Oligopolistic, structure - as the company has grown 'to fulfil its 
potential in the domestic market it expands into the international 
market. 
3. To take advantage of the inequalities of production costs, e. g. in 
the pharmaceutical industry it may be cheaper to research and develop 
away from the home country. if the regulations on such activities are 
more slack and so involve considerably less cost. 
4. To take advantage of fluctuations in currency values and spread 
risks. 
5. To exploit technology advantages, e. g. the educational system in 
some countries may traditionally produce better scientists therefore 
research in such areas may be more productive. 
The international character of the leading world pharmaceutical companies 
is shown by the percentage of total sales accounted for by foreign sales as found in 
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Table 4.1. All of these top companies have a significant share of their sales abroad, 
with the exception of Takeda, the Japanese pharmaceutical company. - This 
company and, to a degree, the American companies rely on their foreign sales less 
due to their extensive domestic market. Also the figures for the leading Japanese 
pharmaceutical companies hides the extent of their involvement in the international 
market via licensing agreements with other top world companies. Looking at the 
European firms considerably more of their total sales are accounted for overseas. 
This is because their domestic markets are smaller, while they also have a tradition 
of intra-European trade. This international character is especially true of the Swiss 
pharmaceutical companies, for whom foreign sales almost equal total sales (Ciba 
Geigy; Sandoz; Roche). 
Table 4.1: Foreign Sales of the Top 20 World Companies 1989 
Company Foreign ales as % Total ales 
Merck 46.8 
Glaxo 
' 
77.9 
Bristol-Myers Squibb uibb 29.5 
Bayer 79.1 
Hoechst 77.2 
Eastman-Kodak 44.0 
Ciba-Geigy 98.2 
SmithKline Beecham 43.8 
Sandoz 95.9 
A. H. P's 28.3 
Takeda 6.2 
Lilly 36.3 
Abbott 35.3 
Warner-Lambert 46.4 
Pfizer 45.4 
Roche 96.9 
J&J 49.9 
Schering-Plough 37.1 
Upjohn 38.3 
Rhone-Poulenc 74.8 
Source: Derived from the Annual Reports of each Company 1989 
Another factor leading on from the international structure of the industry is 
the fact that the bulk of production and R&D is undertaken in the industrialised 
world, which also account for most of the consumption. Table 4.2 shows the 
leading pharmaceutical markets world-wide in 1989. It can clearly be seen that 80% 
of the world market is accounted for by Europe, the United States and Canada 
alone. However, while the world market is dominated by only a few countries both 
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for production and consumption, the actual industry figures do not indicate the 
dominance of a small number of companies as suggested by the previous oligopoly 
theories. While prices and profits for the leading world companies are high, 
consistent with oligopoly theory, the leading companies in the industry do not 
dominate as found by the five firm concentration ratio for pharmaceuticals 
Table 4.2: Leading Pharmaceutical Markets World-wide 1989 
Area Market value (£m)e % of World Market 
United Sates 23000 29 
Japan -16000 20 West Germany 6400 8 
France 5800 7 
Italy 5500 7 
United Kingdom 2500 3 
Spain 2100 3 
Canada 2000 
South Korea 1200 2 
Rest of the world 15100 18 
e= estimate by Glaxo 
Source: Glaxo Annual Report 1990 
With the 1990 world market worth $181,000m (SmithKline Beecham 
Annual Report 1991) and taking the sales figures for the leading 5 pharmaceutical 
companies in 1990, Table 4.3 shows the 5 firm concentration ratio for the industry. 
A numerate definition of oligopoly is when the leading four companies control over 
40% of the total market (Scherer 1970; Henry & Haynes 1978). Considering this 
definition the world pharmaceutical industry can not be regarded as oligopolistic. . 
Table 4.3: World Market Share of the Top 5 Pharmaceutical Companies 1990 
Company Market hare o 
Merck 3.52 
Glaxo 3.11 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2.91 
Hoechst 2.77 
Bayer 2.75 
Total 5. 
Source: Calculated from figures taken from the Annual Reports of the companies. 
60 
From this concentration estimate the leading five world pharmaceutical 
companies in 1990 represented only 15% of the world market. Comparisons of this 
concentration figure with those of some other industries, for example the car 
industry illustrates very clearly how it is possible to argue that the pharmaceutical 
industry must be competitive. Table 4.4. shows the concentration figures for the 
leading four car companies with regards new car registrations in Europe 1991. 
Table 4.4: Western European Car Industry, the percentage of new car 
registrations Jan. - June 1991 
Company Market hare (o 
Volkswagen 16.5 
Fiat 13.3 
General Motors 12.7 M 
Ford 12.2 
Total 54.7 
Source: Financial Times, September 11th, 1991 
Over 50% of the market for new car registrations in Europe was catered for 
by only four companies clearly indicating an oligopoly as defined previously. This 
comparison makes the pharmaceutical industry look highly competitive which is 
substantiated by evidence of high market instabilities. Table 4.5 illustrates the 
market positions of the top 20 companies in 1990 compared to 1982. It can clearly 
be seen that within a matter of years companies can better or worsen their world 
market positions substantially. Glaxo in 1982 was positioned eighteenth on the 
world market share but by 1990 was the second largest company, while Pfizer had 
slipped from sixth to fifteenth position. 
With the demand for pharmaceutical products being 'quicksilver' due to the 
intensive product competition, the fate of a company can be precarious. This is 
especially so as many companies are vulnerable, relying on the sales of only a few 
products for a substantial portion of their revenue. Once these products begin to 
lose market share under pressure from generics or better products, 'company sales 
also plummet unless new products are introduced to compensate for the lost sales. 
Looking at a number of the top companies in the world pharmaceutical 
market it can be seen that a significant share of their sales come from only 5 
products (Table 4.6). In some cases over 50% of sales in the pharmaceutical 
divisions were accounted for by only 5 products (Ciba-Geigy; Pfizer, SmithKline 
Beecham; Lilly; MMD). In some cases only one product may represent a 
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frighteningly large share of the company sales and profit, e. g. in 1990 Zantac 
(ranitidine - the leading anti-ulcer drug) represented almost 50% of Glaxo's sales. 
Table 4.5: Top Pharmaceutical Companies 1982 & 1990: Market Positions 
Company 99 1982 
Merck 1 3 
Glaxo 2 18 
Bristol-Myers S uibbl 3 1u- 
Bayer 4 2 
Hoechst 5 1 
Eastman-Kodak 6 N/R 
Ciba Geigy 7 5 
SmithKline Beecham2 8 11 
Sandoz 9 
A. H. P's 1 4 
Takeda 11 13 
Eli Lilly 12 7 
Abbott 13 12 
Warner Lambert 14 14 
Pfizer 15 6 
Roche 16 8 
J&J 17 17 
Schering-Plough 18 N/R 
Upjohn 19 16 
Rhone-Poulenc 20 20 
N/R = no ranking in the top 20 world companies 
1 In 1982 this was still Bristol Myers 
2 In 1982 this was still SmithKline 
Source: Scrip Pharmaceutical Company Yearbooks, 1982 and 1990. 
Table 4.6: Five Product Concentration Ratios (%) 1989. 
Company % Total sales % Pharma sales 
Merck 44.9 48.5 1 
BMS 21.4 44.2 
Hoechst 5.1 29. 
Ciba Gei 15.0 50.1 
Pfizer 26.9 56.8 
SB 29.1 62.7 
Lilly 40.2 57.3 
Warner-Lambert 14.0 21.9 
Schering-Plough 23.0 29.8 
MMD2 65.0 65.1 
1-5 leading products of the human and animal health division 
2- World position in 1989 Marion 46; Dow 35 - merger 
Source: Derived from Company Annual Reports 1989 
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Considering the evidently competitive concentration ratio and the obvious 
market instabilities, it seems strange that this industry has been associated with 
oligopoly and so been the target of so much criticism. However, this analysis of the 
industry must not be considered complete. One of the main features that the above 
statistics neglect to take into account is the heterogeneous nature of drug products. 
There are therefore a number of very-separate drug sub-markets with low cross 
elasticities of demand. It is within these sub-markets that the true nature of the 
pharmaceutical industry emerges. Looking at the Anti-ulcer market between 1986 
and 1990 (Table 4.7) it is easy to see how a few products can dominate the market 
leading to high concentration ratios within each therapeutic sub-market. This ability 
of a small number of products and their manufacturers to dominate certain 
therapeutic categories enables them to set high prices (above the marginal cost of 
production) and consequently earn what are considered to be high profits. 
Table 4.7: The Anti-Ulcer market ($m) 1986 -1990 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total Mkt. 2639.3 456. 556 .9 6205 99 735.5 Zantac 1029.3 1410.0 1960.0 2350.0 2828.9 
Cimetidine 92T8- 1132.0 1020.0 900.0 1212.4 
Famotidine 52.8 163.0 285.0 380.0 875.6 
Omeprazole - - - - 202.1 
Nizatidine - 30.0 115.0 140.0 135.0 
Total % 6 6 61 78 
Source: Scrip Yearbook 1990 & 1991 
It must be noted that very few of the leading pharmaceutical companies deal 
solely in pharmaceuticals; many are also large chemical and consumer product 
manufacturers, amongst other things. The net income for these companies is not 
therefore startlingly high; however, when the operating profit of the pharmaceutical 
divisions are isolated, a sizeable difference can be noted. Table 4.8 gives an 
indication of these figures of profitability. 
From Table 4.8 there is an average difference over the period 1982 - 1990 of 
8.8% between the average pharmaceutical operating profit as a percentage of sales 
and the overall company operating profit as a percentage of sales. What becomes 
the key question in all of this discussion is what is an appropriate profit rate for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Reekie (1980) noted that the rate of return for the 
pharmaceutical industry in 1967 was 29% and in 1975 21%, while the average 
profit rate for all industry in 1967 - 75 was 13%, a considerable difference from that 
of the pharmaceutical industry. 
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Table 4.8: Average Income of the Top 20 World Pharmaceutical Companies 
1982 -1990 
Year 
0 
Net Income 
0 
Operating Profit 
% Pharmaceutical 
Operating Profit 
1990 11.5 18.4 25. 
- - 1989 11.0 19.2 23 .7 988 12.1 19.2 2 .0 17 10.9 19. 27.4 
1986 12. 16.5 28.3 
1985 9.1 17.5 29.8 
1982 7.3 14.9 25.4 
Source: Calculated from Company Annual Reports 1982 - 1990 
Looking at more recent figures for a number, of other industries the 
differences in profit can again be observed (Table 4.9). 
Table 4.9: Industry Profit* Comparisons (%) 1988 - 1990. 
1 
All 
Industry 
Manu. 
Industry 
Chemical 
Man-Made 
Fibres 
Electrical 
Electronic 
Engineering 
Oil 
If' 
T- 199-8 12.7 12. .3 1 13.4 11.7 1989 12.6 12.6 13.2 13.4 1 13.3 
1990 11.8 11.8 16.4 13.2 12.0 
* Gross trading profit as a percentage of turnover 
Source: CSO Business Monitor: Company Finance, MA3 (23 Issue) 1992. 
Although the pharmaceutical industry is not isolated in this table it comes 
within the bounds of the chemical and man-made fibres category which experienced 
considerably higher profit rates than the other categories in the table. It is easy to 
see where the accusations of excessively high profits have stemmed from, however, 
it must be considered that what may be a'normal' profit rate for one industry may be 
insufficient to ensure the continued success of another depending on the particular 
characteristics of each industry. This will be expanded on later. 
Considering the apparent high profits and high concentration ratios within 
therapeutic categories a lack of competition is suggested, but in the traditional sense 
of price competition. Modem industry is characterised more by its rapid pace of 
innovation and heavy differentiation, so much so that the traditional approach to 
price competition is perhaps inappropriate. There is now more call for a price and 
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performance competitive approach, taking into account a range of activities such as 
innovation, promotional activities, quality, safety and anticipated market factors 
(Comanor 1979). Also in more recent years, it has been recognised that price 
competition is growing within the industry along with increased generic availability 
and use. The consensus is now more of a dynamic oligopoly with substantial 
competition. 
Reekie (1978) conducted a study on the New Chemical Entities (NCE's) 
introduced onto the US market between 1958 and 1975. Of 171 of these NCE's, 
over 40% were introduced at lower prices than their leading available substitutes. 
Innovations with major therapeutic gains tended to be priced higher, while a NCE of 
duplicate value or only marginal difference needed a price advantage in order to 
compete. Price variations -were therefore associated with the quality of the 
innovations relating to existing substitutes and anticipated competition. Contrary to 
the price stability which had previously been believed, price flexibility and a 
downward trend in overall prices was found. 
Pricing strategies such as skimming and penetration pricing became evident 
on the market. Skimming pricing occurred when a drug is initially priced high but 
as competition enters the market the price falls accordingly in an attempt to 
maintain market share. Penetration pricing occurs when an initially low price is 
adopted to try and discourage competitive entry. Examples of both of these types of 
pricing strategies were found i. e. the market for tetracycline showed signs of 
skimming pricing, while Roche adopted a penetration strategy for their products 
Librium and Valium. For those products with a high therapeutic value it was found 
that price would fall at a slower rate in part due to the brand loyalty their companies 
created for them as major innovations. It was nevertheless evident that price 
competition did exist before and after patent expiry (Reekie 1978). 
Such price competition is likely to increase in the years to come as those 
providing health care to the majority of. the industrialised world, i. e. the 
governments and insurers, have come increasingly under pressure from rising health 
care costs. The easiest target for making savings has been the drugs bill hence 
increasingly stronger campaigns have been launched to raise price awareness among 
decision-makers and encourage the use of generic competition. 
4.5: Conclusion 
The pharmaceutical industry is an interesting industry to study because of 
the peculiarities of its market, viz. the inelastic price demand and the information 
imperfections which lead to potentially monopolistic conditions. Although this 
inelastic price demand could be adequately compensated for by the possibility of 
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elastic supply, the necessity of a patent system to encourage R&D introduces a 
barrier to entry and restricts price competition, even if it is only temporarily. 
Artificial barriers such as product differentiation have also developed to strengthen 
this barrier. The resulting constraints on price competition coupled with the unique 
demand conditions have led to many accusations of high prices, high profits and a 
misallocation of resources (Steele 1962-64). 
There are however, other factors to be considered. The pharmaceutical 
industry while showing all the signs of oligopoly and multinational structure, does 
experience vigorous competition, especially evident in recent years (Comanor 1979; 
Reekie 1978). The concentration ratios for the sub-markets are high, with high 
prices charged and high profit rates earned. A small number of large, multinational 
companies dominate the markets, using product competition and differentiation as 
their main strategies of attack, taking into account rivals competitive positions and 
reactions, current and potential. Nevertheless, considerable competition does take 
place making it essential to consider the industry within a dynamic context. 
Intensive product competition can shorten the life expectancy of a product 
by a number of years, reducing its potential revenue considerably, while product 
differentiation and rivalry has shifted the positions of companies one way and 
another. As the market begins to grow at a slower rate than ever before and 
discoveries into new areas of illness become less frequent, there is ever increasing 
competition for existing markets. The current atmosphere of cost-containment is 
also effecting the industry, with the growing entry of generics onto the market as the 
patents of many major drugs have expired or are nearing expiry. The industry 
seems to be a mass of contradictions. 
Taking a static approach there are high concentration ratios, high prices and 
profits, a small number of large companies dominating a large number of smaller 
companies and a considerable lack of price competition. However, with a dynamic 
approach the impression is one of cut-throat competition not only through product 
competition and differentiation, but through prices. Although concentration ratios 
remain high in the sub-markets the products that are at the top remain there for only 
a few years before generic competition makes an impression or another better 
product takes over. Considering this the companies are very vulnerable, with many 
relying on only a few products for a substantial part of their sales. The prices 
charged for the innovative patented products are high, but then so are the costs and 
risks involved in R&D. Furthermore, as the length of patent protection is 
effectively shorter than ever before the industry argues these prices are necessarily 
high to recover costs, with high profit rates necessary to fund future R&D. Wescoe 
(1984) argues that the transnational pharmaceutical industry is not monolithic, but 
perhaps one of the most highly competitive of all industries, especially due to its 
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research intensity. Obviously there are many aspects to consider when looking at 
this industry. Although it is not very competitive in a traditional approach of price 
competitiveness, there are other areas of significant competitiveness despite the 
rather unique conditions that characterise the industry. Essentially there is a 
dynamic oligopoly which will erode to a competitive or price-sensitive structure 
(Burstall & Senior 1985). 
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Chapter 5: Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
5.1: Research and Regulation 
5.1.1: Introduction 
Research and Development (R&D) is the cornerstone of the modern 
pharmaceutical industry. It provides society with the cures and treatments to 
diseases which would otherwise cause a great deal of suffering and death. In 
economic terms treatments which are swift and effective save society precious 
resources from caring for the sick. Therefore the products of the R&D process are 
valuable to society. Despite this social value most governments undertake very 
little of the funding for such R&D with the enormous costs and risk factors 
prohibiting them. In the US, the government is estimated to undertake only 1% of 
pharmaceutical R&D funding (Schnee & Caglarcan 1978b). Consequently R&D is 
predominantly funded by the pharmaceutical companies. using the incentive of 
potentially huge returns from the development and marketing of major therapeutic 
advances. As mentioned in the previous chapter. the market for pharmaceuticals is 
characterised by inelastic price demand, and therefore a firm who can develop a new 
major innovation can reap huge rewards. Unfortunately, there are few barriers to 
entry in the pharmaceutical industry and it would be easy for others to duplicate any 
such innovations and sell them at a much cheaper price. This is where the patent 
protection system is used to protect innovators from competition until such time as 
they have recovered the costs of their research and earned a sufficient return to 
encourage them to keep innovating. 
This seems simple enough: some firms innovate. take out a patent, market 
their innovation and recover their research costs and enough profit to encourage 
continued research. Once the patent has expired, price competition can then enter 
the market so that society benefits from continued new innovations and eventually 
cheaper products. However. nothing is ever this simple. 
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Pharmaceutical products are in such an emotive area that if any products that 
have not been adequately tested reach the market the outcome can be tragic. It is 
therefore necessary for governments to intervene and regulate the industry to protect 
the public from unscrupulous firne who might take short-cuts in their testing 
procedures which could result in deaths. Such regulations can have adverse effects 
on the R&D strategies of innovative firms by increasing their costs and the 
development times for new products. This erodes the effective patent life of 
products and so results in a decline in the potential returns to R&D. This section 
looks at the R&D process and how it has developed over the past decades, 
especially with regards to the increasing regulations that have been implemented, 
and the future that innovative companies may have. 
5.1.2: The Research and Development Process 
Schnee & Caglarcan (1978b) identified four types of new products, new 
chemical entities (NCE's) which are unique new products, duplicated products, 
compound products and finally alternative dosage forms of products. Of these 
Prentis et al. (1988) estimated over 80% of R&D expenditure was accounted for by 
NCE's. They are the most significant therapeutic and economic means of research. 
The development process for these NCE's is therefore an important aspect of 
pharmaceutical R&D. 
The actual research procedure follows the same pattern world-wide, being 
divided into two separate stages, those of discovery and those of development. The 
discovery phase or preclinical stage is concerned with the isolation of new 
compounds of potential therapeutic value. Numerous compounds are synthesised 
and screened for pharmacological activity and toxicity with extensive toxicology 
experimentation on animals taking place to detect teratologic and carcinogenic 
effects. The US system of approval has been an example for most other regulatory 
bodies, therefore it will be described in detail. If a compound is considered suitable 
for further development, an Investigational New Drug Application (IND) is filed 
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for authorisation to proceed to the 
clinical stage. The equivalent regulatory body in the UK is the Committee on 
Safety of Medicines. 
This clinical or human stage of development consists of three distinct 
phases. Phase I is undertaken on a small number of usually healthy volunteers to 
obtain information on toxicity and to determine the basic properties of the NCE, e. g. 
how it is absorbed into the body, its metabolic effect, its distribution in the body, the 
rate and manner in which it is eliminated from the body and if it does in fact have 
desirable therapeutic effects in humans. If the chemical is believed to be a possible 
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treatment for a serious disease or a disease with no existing effective therapy, phase 
I clinical trails may be permitted on patients. These trials also allow the researcher 
to determine the safe-dosing ranges possible in humans. If trials are successfully 
completed phase II can begin. 
Phase II clinical trials are undertaken on a larger number of individuals, 
usually a selected group of patients for whom the drug is intended for use. These 
tests are to gain more information on toxicity and evidence of efficacy. If sufficient 
therapeutic value is demonstrated without significant side-effects, the NCE is taken 
to phase III trials. 
This final phase is conducted on 'a large number of patients to gain further 
evidence of efficacy and to detect any previously unidentified adverse reactions 
which may not have shown in the smaller studies. It is designed to closely replicate 
the type of drug utilisation that would occur if the drug was available on the market. 
Conducted side by side with the clinical testing are long-term animal studies 
to assess the possible effects from prolonged usage, e. g. carcinogenicity or 
teratogenic effects. When the results from these animal studies and the clinical tests 
have been accumulated and assessed, the company may apply to the FDA with a 
New Drug Application (NDA) to gain approval for marketing. This NDA 
application must contain all the raw data from all the tests carried out on the 
substance which the FDA then reviews to decide whether the product is suitable for 
the market. It is necessary to prove the drug is safe and efficacious. Further tests 
may be requested by the FDA before they give their market approval. 
This description of the R&D process gives no indication of the risks and the 
time-span associated with innovation for a company, nor of the costs incurred from 
inception to completion. It has been estimated that of approximately 10,000 
preparations which may be synthesised and tested for therapeutic potential, only 20 
will enter the preclinical stage. Of these 20, only 10 will successfully complete this 
stage and pass the FDA review to enter clinical trials. From phase I trials, five 
compounds will pass through to phase II trials, of which only 2 will enter phase III 
trials. After all this, only one product will be put forward by the company for NDA 
approval and hopefully reach the market (Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals 1991). The 
proportion of NCE7s tested in each stage diminishes as the various characteristics of 
the tested compounds are discovered and abandoned due to adverse side-effects or 
other undesirable features. 
Not only is the probability of getting a new compound onto the market small 
for the companies. but the probability of that product becoming a success and 
recovering R&D costs is slim. Alossinghoff (1991) noted from industry estimates 
that there was aI in 4,000 chance of a compound investigated for biological activity 
ever becoming a marketed drug. a1 in 21,000 chance of the product entering the 
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market and becoming a moderate success, while there was only a1 in 60,000 chance 
of that product becoming highly successful. 
This risky process is also very time-consuming. The time from inception to 
marketing has been estimated by Ciba-Geigy (1991) to be 11 years, while other 
recent estimates have indicated a range of 10 - 12 years for the development time 
for a NCE (DiMlasi et al. 1991; Wright 1993). Looking only at the clinical stage of 
development for a NCE, the estimated length from IND to NDA is 98.9 months as 
shown in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1: Average Phase Lengths for NCE's tested in humans (months) 
can phase 
length (actual) 
A lean phase 
length (ad'usted)a 
Time from phase 
to start of approval 
Phase 15.5 16.2 98.9 
Phase 1l 4 5 82.7 
Phase 11 36.0 29.9 60.2 
Lone-term Animal 33.6 33.6 78.7 
Other Animal -7T7 
a- Weighted values were used in calculating the mean phase lengths as the sample 
deliberately oversampled successful NCEs and undersampled unsuccessful NCEs, 
therefore estimates were re-weighted to replicate the population. The variation 
between the actual and adjusted figures takes into account a small gap (0.7 months) 
between the end of phase I and the beginning of phase II, and an overlap of phase III 
and both phase 11 (1.8 months) and the NDA review phase (0.6 months). 
Source: J. A. DiM asi et al. (1991). 'Cost of Innovation in Pharmaceutical Industry; 
page 123. 
DiMasi ct al. (1991) conducted a study of self-originated NCE's of US 
owned firms which were first tested in humans between 1970 and 1982 to derive 
these figures. To complete the picture they estimated the mean length of the 
preclinical period for NCE's in the US to be 42.6 months. The total development 
time was therefore 141.5 months or just under 12 years to develop a NCE from the 
preclinical stage to market introduction. 
Considering the length of time it takes to get a product onto the market and 
the high risks of failure, it is easy to conceive how formidable the costs of R&D can 
be. These costs not only involve the direct costs of developing the one approved 
NCE. but also the costs involved in those projects which have been abandoned 
along the way, which considering the attrition rate estimates can be substantial. 
Furthermore; empirical work has suggested that there are economies of scale only 
up to a certain level of innovative expenditure. After this level is reached, research 
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productivity tends to decline, so that most of the bigger firms have research 
departments that have become much larger than the optimum size (Lall 1974). 
Schwartzman (1975) noted that larger firms discover relatively more new drugs than 
do small firms, however, this does not mean they are more efficient. Larger firms 
must also then contend with possible diseconomies of scale in R&D as well as the 
opportunity costs of R&D funds. Funds used to finance projects which are later 
abandoned may have been more beneficially invested elsewhere. 
This opportunity cost is best demonstrated when one considers that R&D 
expenditure is treated as a current expense in the accounting procedures of 
companies, when it is actually an investment which must be capitalised in order to 
accurately estimate the costs incurred. To determine if an R&D project is feasible, 
the possible returns may be compared to those expected from a bond investment 
conducted over the same period. The opportunity cost of the R&D investment is 
therefore the returns from other investments which may have proved more lucrative 
for the company in the long-term. 
Considering the capitalisation of R&D expenditure, it has been estimated 
that a NCE costs approximately $231m to develop in the current environment. The 
DiMasi et al. (1991) study of self-originated NCE's of US owned firms estimated 
the costs involved in each stage of development. Employing a real cost of capital of 
9% it was estimated that the capitalised cost per NCE tested in humans for the entire 
clinical period was $17.3m in 1987 dollars. Of that 36% was accounted for by 
interest costs. Assuming a clinical success rate of 23% and using the 9% discount 
rate, the capitalised clinical cost per approved NCE becomes $75m. Taking into 
account the preclinical trials it was assumed that in aggregate 66.1% of total self- 
originated NCE R&D expenditure was spent during the preclinical period. With a 
mean preclinical length of 42.6 months and assuming a lag of 5 years between 
preclinical and clinical expenditure, the capitalised costs of preclinical trials was 
estimated at $156m, with interest costs representing 58%. The total capitalised cost 
per approved NCE was therefore $230.8m. 
Considering these huge costs of R&D and the length of time it takes to get a 
product onto the market, one wonders if the returns to R&D are sufficient to sustain 
future levels of investment. In the 1930's. R&D was almost non-existent for most 
pharmaceutical companies with the opportunities for research as yet insignificant. 
With the introduction of the sulpanilamides and the escalation of discoveries 
associated with the promise of seductive returns, R&D expenditure rose 
significantly, however the costs today may be considered prohibitive, even acting as 
a barrier to entry and competition. 
Joglekar & Paterson (1986) assumed that a product had a sales life of 24 
years and studied 218 N'CE's introduced onto the US market between 1962 and 
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1977. The average NCE sales rose steadily, peaking at approximately $11.5m in 
year 15 and then declining steadily to approximately $4m in year 24. The average 
annual sales over the 24 years was estimated at $7.9m which gives a total return of 
$189.6m which they compared to a previously estimated cost of NCE development 
of $32m (1976 dollars). This gives the impression of substantial returns, however it 
is misleading as the distribution of sales per NCE is sharply skewed, with most 
performing much worse than this average. Although the average NCE has a 'cost 
recovery year' where returns shift from negative to positive (year 9), the median 
never recovers expected costs. Looking at a recent product, Flisonase, (fluticasone 
proprionate) a metered dose nasal aerosol, it was introduced onto the UK market in 
the summer of 1992 and already holds 17% of the market due to the heavy 
promotion by Glaxo. There is however, already competition from Astra's Rhinocort 
(Budesonide). The rapid introduction of new products can shorten the life span of 
existing products substantially. 
These R&D costs have not always been as substantial as in recent years. 
Looking back at Table 2.2 (Chapter 2, page 17), which showed the UK 
pharmaceutical industry expenditure since 1953 in cash terms and as a percentage of 
gross output, the growing importance of R&D expenditure for the firm is obvious. 
In 1953 R&D expenditure represented only 2.4% of industry gross output, but by 
1990 this had risen to an estimated 16.6% of gross output. 
Comparing pharmaceutical R&D expenditure as a percentage of 
pharmaceutical sales in the UK with that of the manufacturing industry as a whole 
and also the chemical industry, 1985 - 1989 the importance of R&D is again 
evident. Figure 5.1 illustrates the differences in the levels of R&D undertaken 
within these industries and how the pharmaceutical industry has assigned an 
increasingly larger share of sales to R&D compared with the manufacturing industry 
as a whole. The chemical industry has increased its level of R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of sales considerably over this period, but it by no means spends the 
same proportion of its sales on R&D as the pharmaceutical industry. In the US it 
has been estimated that no US industry outspends the pharmaceutical industry with 
regards to R&D expenditure as a percentage of net sales, except the electronic 
communications and computers industry (Atossinghoff 1991). 
The research undertaken in the pharmaceutical industry is its life-blood as 
suggested by the substantial amounts of money spent on it each year, however there 
are a number of hidden issues behind the ever increasing R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of sales. When one considers the number of NCE's that are introduced 
each year. using them as a proxy for R&D productivity, there has been either 
constancy or a decline in the numbers introduced in recent decades. Relating this to 
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the ever increasing costs of R&D evident, it can be speculated that R&D 
productivity is declining. 
Figure 5.1: Manufacturing. Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry R&D as a 
% of Sales in the UK 1985 - 1989. 
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From this diagram no significant trend in the numbers of NCE's per 
company is indicated The average number of NCE's hovered roughly just above 
one NCE per innovative firm for the entire period. Considering the rising 
expenditure on R&D, one would hope that an accompanying rise in the number of 
NCE introductions would have resulted, but this has not occurred. I 
To give a basic idea of the changing R&D environment, a simple calculation 
can be conducted of the cost of each NCE introduced into the UK market. 
Assuming that all R&D costs are accounted for by NCE introductions, the cash 
amounts spent on R&D by the UK pharmaceutical industry, as shown in Table 2.2, 
are dividing by the number of NCE's introduced in the equivalent year, as derived 
by the ABPI figures used to complete Figure 5.2. The following estimates in table 
5.2 can be derived. 
Table 5.2 Rough estimates of NCE cost in the UK 1970 -1990 
Year Cost INCE (fm) 
1970 1.36 
1975 4.16 
1980 9.30 
1985 50.00 
190 45.10 
This is by no means a realistic estimate of the true costs of UK NCE's during 
the period as it does not take into account the different sources of data nor the 
effects of inflation, however it gives some idea of the huge increases in R&D costs 
per NCE that have occurred. 
Considering these increases in NCE costs and their declining numbers, the 
question arises over what has been happening to company profit levels over this 
period. It could be speculated that as costs increase and NCE numbers decrease the 
returns to those firms still able to innovate will be higher, due to the reduction in 
competition. However the outcome on profit depends on the circumstances 
surrounding the changes in R&D costs and productivity, for which a number of 
reasons have been put forward (see Grabowski, Vernon & Thomas 1978): 
I. There has been a decline in the research opportunities available to firms as many 
of those diseases that can be cured or treated with our current medical knowledge 
have been. There has been shift of emphasis towards the chronic and degenerative 
diseases as new areas of intensive research. These markets have a huge commercial 
potential as these diseases become more prevalent with the ageing world population. 
However. our knowledge of these diseases is limited and the research typically takes 
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longer and uses more sophisticated testing. It is because of this that the number of 
NCE introductions have declined4 while the costs have increased. 
2. The decline in NCE's is illusionary as it is really a fall in the numbers of 
marginal and ineffective drugs that is occurring. The numbers of therapeutically 
important drugs introduced into the market has not declined. 
3. Advances in pharmacological science with more sophisticated and costly 
teratological and toxicological studies. have led to a more efficient elimination 
process. Similarly this has increased costs of R&D such that those NCE's which do 
get introduced4 although less in number are better. 
4. Grabowski. Vernon & Thomas also suggest that after the tragedies of 
thalidomide in the early 1960's. innovative drug companies have become more 
cautious and are therefore taking less risks with those drug products introduced onto 
the market. They are spending more money and taking more time to ensure 
products are safe and so maintain their reputations in the face of increasing public 
interest and concern in their actions. 
S. Finally, the changes in regulatory requirements have had a dramatic consequence 
on the cost and returns to drug company R&D. This explanation is the most 
commonly cited, especially with reference to the US. Increased regulations over the 
past decades have required more testing, which in turn increases the costs and 
lengthens the time involved for the development of a NCE. Not only are delays 
found within the company due to these requirements, but the increased stringency of 
the regulatory agencies leaves them with a heavier work load which again involves 
more delays and money on the side of the regulator. 
In all of these explanations the development time for NCE's has increased 
and consequently. the patent life of the approved NCE's has been eroded 
substantially. This has reduced the available profits for the firm and created a drug 
lag. delaying public access to new therapeutically beneficial drugs. There is also the 
possibility that some drugs which are therapeutically beneficial will no longer be 
developed for the market as they are no longer commercially viable after the lengthy 
and costly period of development. Whichever of these explanations holds. the fact 
remains that there are substantial financial and social costs resulting from the 
increased R&D costs and development times. \Vu (1980) states that innovation had 
two effects. The rust of these is an increase in net social benefit, while the second is 
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a decrease in brand prices and hence profits of the original companies. If less 
innovation is undertaken these benefits will come under threat. 
The next section will consider these possible explanations of the declining 
R&D productivity with emphasis on the controversy of regulation. 
5.13: Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Industry versus Other Explanations 
As has been the case with the R&D process, the US has been the foremost 
example of regulatory requirements for other countries with regards the 
pharmaceutical industry. Some of the requirements necessary in the R&D process 
have already been mentioned but the emphasis is now on what consequences such 
regulation has had on the pharmaceutical industry. 
Regulation began in the US in 1906 with the Food -& Drug Act which 
prohibited the adulteration and mislabelling of food and drugs sold in the interstate 
commerce. Even with the subsequent amendments of 1912, the regulations with 
regards to drugs were largely ineffective in relation to safety, so that when the first 
major drugs discovery was made with the sulphonamides, it was accompanied by 
the first major tragedy. An American company searching for a liquid form of the 
new drug for children dissolved it in ethylene glycol (antifreeze) resulting in over 
100 deaths. This motivated the approval of the 1938 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act 
which required innovative companies to submit a New Drug Application (NDA) 
designed to show the safety of a product to the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) before market introduction was initiated. The application was automatically 
approved in 60 days unless the Secretary of Agriculture determined that the drug 
had not undergone sufficient tests of safety. This act also provided the basis of 
FDA regulations that separated ethical pharmaceuticals from proprietary. 
If this new regulation had much effect on the R&D process of the firms, it 
was completely overshadowed by the events of the late 1950's and early 1960's. 
The thalidomide tragedy acted as a catalyst for further reforms of safety regulations 
for the pharmaceutical industry and heightened regulations throughout. There had 
already been speculation over the monopoly aspects of pricing and profits in the 
industry when the distribution of the thalidomide drug in the US, a drug which had 
not been approved for marketing but was distributed as part of the clinical trials, 
caused many infant deaths and deformities. The public outcry led to the inclusion 
of requirements in the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962, whereby proof of 
safety and efficacy were required before a drug product could be marketed. The 
NDA was no longer automatically approved after 60 days and was now preceded by 
an Investigational New Drug (IND) application, introduced to regulate those 
products which progressed to clinical trials in the hope of avoiding further tragedies. 
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The decision to approve the IND was based on the protection of human research 
subjects. the adequacy of animal studies already done, the scientific merits of the 
research plans and the qualifications of the investigators. The FDA shifted from an 
evaluator of evidence and research at the end of the R&D process, to an active 
participant in the process itself. 
The 1962 amendment also imposed controls on the advertising and 
promotion of prescription drugs so that both the generic name had to appear on all 
labels and manufacturers had to adhere to the standards of the Good Manufacturing 
Practice. The Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI) was also set in motion 
to review the efficacy of drugs already on the market, and if any did not meet the 
new standards they could be withdrawn by the FDA. 
It was these drug regulatory amendments that led to the initial protests from 
the industry that the rising costs of R&D would reduce R&D productivity and lead 
to a fall in profits, which in turn would jeopardise future R&D. For the 
pharmaceutical companies these amendments had a number of adverse effects on 
the R&D process. Firstly, there was a considerable increase in R&D expenditure in 
order to complete the increased number of tests required to satisfy the FDA's new 
approval procedures, now compulsory throughout the process. This increased cost 
emanated from the growing need for new staff and equipment to conduct the tests 
and to organise the paper work involved in the submission of the various 
applications to the FDA. There was also a cost arising from the increased 
development time required for NCE's due to the more stringent tests now required 
As these costs increased, the numbers of NCE introductions fell. Table 5.3 gives 
the estimates of Grabowski, Vernon & Thomas for NCE introductions in the US 
between 1957 and 1971. It can be seen that NCE introductions more than halved in 
the five years after the amendments to legislation, and by the period 1967 to 1971 
they were at just over 30% that of the pre-amendment period. 
Table 5.3: NCE Introductions 1957 - 1971 
Year No. NC E's 
1957- 961 
1962-1966 93 
1967-1971 76 
Source: Grabowski H. Q. Vernon, J. M. & Thomas L. G. (1978) 'Estimating the 
Effects of Regulation on Innovation: An International Comparative Analysis of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry'; p. 136. 
Adding to these cost and time increases for the company, was the inefficient 
organisation of the FDA in coping with the volume of work that was now required 
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of it. These new responsibilities required extra staff, and even then, the organisation 
could not cope with the volume of work. The time needed to review applications 
from the companies became longer and longer. Brownlee (1979b) noted Sam 
Pcltzman's estimate of the additional cost to the FDA in 1970 of $15m, while 
Grabowski & Vernon (1983) noted that in 1963 the average time it took the FDA to 
approve a drug for marketing was 14 months, compared to 1979 when it had risen to 
35 months. In the 1940's it was estimated to take only 2.3 years from discovery to 
marketing for a NCE, but by 1968 this had risen to 7 years (Clymer 1970). This all 
culminated in the erosion of the effective patent life of products, and so a reduction 
in the returns to investment in R&D. Figure 5.3 shows in diagrammatic form the 
decline in effective patent protection over this period. 
Figure 5.3: Effective Patent Life 1960 -1978 
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Source: Statman (1981), The Effect of Patent Expiration on the Market Position of 
Drugs'., fanagerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 2. No. 2: 61 - 66. 
The period of effective patent protection once a product reached the market 
fell from over 16 years in 1960 to less than 10 years in 1978 (Statman 1981), 
allowing the pharmaceutical companies significantly less time to recover R&D 
costs. 
A further adverse effect of the increased regulatory requirements was noted 
by William Wardell (1975) who observed a drug-lag between the introduction of 
new drug products in the US and UK markets. By a simple comparison of the 
introductory dates of various drugs he concluded that the regulatory system in the 
---ß- Effective Patent Life (Yrs) 
79 
UK was less restrictive, with the total number of NCE introductions being 334, 
compared to 279 in the US 1970 - 1988. Companies in the US encountered 
accelerated R&D costs and lengthening development times, which reduced their rate 
of return and created a much tougher competitive environment. This reduction also 
represented a loss to society through a delay in the introduction of new beneficial 
drugs. Obviously there is another side to this observation, as there were 
considerably fewer discontinuations in the US market than in the UK. Between 
1970 and 1988 there were 33 discontinuations in the UK compared to 19 in the US. 
The US public was exposed to fewer ineffective or dangerous drugs. However, this 
is a cost-benefit analysis where the delays in entry of some drugs may have more of 
an adverse effect than is compensated for by the introduction of fewer ineffective, 
unsafe products. 
A number of studies have been undertaken to quantify the actual effect of 
these amendments on the R&D process in the pharmaceutical industry. Schnee & 
Caglarcan (1978b) noted the results of Sam Peltzman in his study of the effects of 
the 1962 Amendment. Peltzman concluded that there was a substantial loss to 
society due to the amendment consisting of a loss of $300 - $400m in, missed 
benefits from the reduced flow of drugs, a gain of less than $100m from reduced 
waste of purchase on ineffective drugs and a loss of $50m from the reduced 
competition from new drugs. There was therefore, a net loss to society of $350m. 
Clymer (1975) estimated that the cost of development in 1971 of R&D was 
approximately 10 times its pre - 1962 cost, while the rate of introduction of new 
drugs had been cut by approximately 60%. This increased cost and development 
time had significant consequences on. the rate of return to pharmaceutical R&D 
which Schwartzman (1975) estimated to be 11.4% in 1960, but only 3.3% in 1974. 
Wiggins (1985) speculated that this reduced profitability due to regulation increases 
had lowered the level of research expenditure by 15 - 20%. 
Obviously other explanations were put forward to account for the changes in 
the structure of R&D and its falling returns. The FDA argued that the reduced 
number of NCE's introduced as a consequence of the increased regulation was 
largely concentrated in the marginal and ineffective drugs, hence the decline was 
illusionary. There was however, little if any empirical evidence to support this 
claim. Furthermore, it is doubtful as to whether such a reduction in marginal R&D 
would necessarily be good for society. Innovative chemical extensions (ICE's), as 
identified by Nicholas Wells (1988), are similar medicines with the same 
therapeutic effects. It is argued that although they increase competition they can 
also confuse the prescribing process, bring about an unwanted opportunity from 
sub-optimal expenditure, and add to costs due to the characteristic high prices of 
new medicines. Nevertheless, such ICE's account for a major share of innovative 
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company revenue, which then finances future R&D. Also, similar chemical 
structures may actually possess significantly different pharmacological and 
toxicological properties, which will only fully emerge during the course of 
extensive clinical usage. If only a restricted number of NCE's'were allowed into 
therapeutic categories, there would be no incentives to improve on existing products 
once the category was full. This would have considerable implications for the 
quality of disease management and patient care. Multiple research efforts in 
particular therapeutic areas can generate new and better medicines as well as 
helping to promote a better understanding of the process of disease. 
If the reduced rate of NCE introductions was due to an overall depletion of 
research opportunities, this would be evident world-wide. To determine this a 
number of comparative studies have been conducted. Such comparisons would also 
demonstrate whether the increased caution of firms due to previous tragedies and 
the technical advances in detecting adverse side-effects have a significant influence 
on the decline in NCE introductions, as these are also world-wide features. The 
comparative studies of Grabowski & Vernon 1977; Grabowski, Vernon & Thomas 
1978, have been noted for their analysis of the UK and US regulatory environments. 
In 1963 in the UK, the Committee on Safety of Drugs incorporated the basic 
pre-market safety reviews of the US, although proof of efficacy was not a 
requirement until the 1968 Medicines Act and was not implemented until 1971. 
Furthermore, IND's were voluntary until 1971, therefore it was assumed that the UK 
review procedures were similar to the US procedures up to the 1962 amendments. 
Any significant differences between the countries after 1962 could then be 
attributed to the changes in US regulations. Assuming that all R&D expenditure 
was accounted for by NCE discovery and that there was a5 year lag between the 
expenditure and introduction of NCE's, they found that both countries experienced 
significant increases in the total R&D expenditure per NCE, but the increase was 
relatively greater in the US, where the controls were more stringent. 
Further studies determined that from this time, there was an increasing 
proportion of US R&D being conducted abroad to avoid the higher costs and 
development times, manifested in the fact that many new drugs are first introduced 
into foreign markets. By doing this the company gained more knowledge of the 
product and how to satisfy the US regulatory requirements, with a minimum effort. 
It was also a means of realising some sales revenue while the product was still under 
review in the US. Lasagna & Wardell (1975) found that there was an increasing 
tendency for US firms to perform clinical trials in foreign locations. Before 1966 
virtually all the clinical testing of US owned-firms was done in the US, but by 1974 
almost a half was first tested abroad. With the inability to get adequate returns in 
the home market through new product introductions, firms were faced with two 
81 
choices. They -could undertake the redeployment of resources through 
diversification into other businesses or they could shift their emphasis. from 
domestic to foreign markets (Clymer 1975). By transferring R&D activities, the 
firms could exploit the differing scientific resources of other countries, adapt 
products to the needs of the local markets and perhaps, take advantage of other 
national administrations who offer special concessions in the hope of encouraging 
local R&D as a form of import substitution. In the UK, the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulatory Scheme (PPRS) allows higher profits the higher the percentage of R&D 
actually undertaken in the UK. 
With the reduced patent life of products and so the reduced potential returns, 
regulations had effectively helped to erect a set of financial and technological 
barriers, which increased with each new set of controls imposed (Barrie 1990). The 
spate of mergers and industry consolidation of the 1980's has been argued to be the 
result of these effects on costs and returns. The protests from the industry and the 
evidence presented by the many academic studies, have led to a recognition of the 
potential adverse effects of regulation. This recognition has been accompanied in 
recent years with some changes in regulation requirements, to rectify the damage 
done. Obviously, no regulation is without cost, but there is a need to balance the 
losses due to drug lags and lost drugs, with the benefits of safer and more effective 
drugs. The evidence seems to suggest that the stringent regulations of the 1960's got 
this balance wrong. 
In 1978, the Carter administration in the US proposed the Drug Reform Act, 
designed to reduce the emerging drug lag. In Wardell's study (1975) of the number 
of NCE's introduced into the US and the UK, it was found that twice as many drugs 
were first introduced into Britain, especially in such areas as cardiovascular, 
gastrointestinal, respiratory medicine, diuretic and anti-bacterial therapy. There was 
even a noticeable lack of US awareness of new and even not so new drugs, a fact 
which was unexpected and surprising. The main adverse effect was that Britain 
suffered more toxicity from new drugs than did the US, however, the size of the 
total burden of drug toxicity that was attributable to new drugs was very small. On 
balance, Britain appeared to have gained in comparison with the US, from its less 
restrictive policy toward the marketing of new drugs. 
This reform act was therefore aimed at eliminating the unnecessary and 
time-consuming barriers keeping effective drugs from the market by improving the 
internal organisation of the FDA. It was proposed that early experimentation of 
new compounds on humans should be facilitated; as such preliminary studies would 
free much of the time and cost of determining which compounds were worth further 
research. Also, by providing clearer guidelines of what the FDA required, the work 
of the companies would hopefully be reduced. A mechanism for resolving scientific 
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disputes between companies and the FDA was also proposed. For those drugs 
which were 'me-too' products, the FDA was faced with three alternatives. Firstly, it 
could elect not to require any FDA review, secondly it could require each firm to 
have a full NDA approved before marketing or thirdly, it could require a 
demonstration of quality through an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). 
This ANDA had been in use since 1970 but only for a limited class of products. It 
was equivalent to a full NDA except clinical and preclinical studies demonstrating 
safety and effectiveness of the drug were not required. 
Unfortunately, the proposed reforms did not gain enough support to secure 
complete implementation, however progress was made in 1984 with the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (the Waxman-Hatch Act). This act 
provided for the extension of effective patent life for a period equal to the sum of 
the time consumed by the FDA's drug application review process and half of the 
clinical testing period, a maximum extension of 5 years. However, with the ever 
increasing health care costs faced by government, certain actions to increase 
competition from cheaper generic products were also facilitated. Before 1984 
generic entry onto the market was limited by the costly requirements of the FDA, 
which necessitated the duplication of pioneer's tests. With the 1984 Act, there was a 
more widespread approval of the ANDA, where manufacturers had only to show 
generic bioequivalence before marketing approval was given. This act also saw the 
repeal of any remaining anti-substitution laws, which together with the easier 
market entry conditions, resulted in a considerable increase in generic entry and use. 
The 1984 Act has been considered the most important regulatory change since the 
1962 amendment, with the ultimate impact depending largely on the value of net 
revenues gained as a consequence of patent life extension, discounted by the 
accelerated loss of revenue to generic substitutes. Initial forecasts of net outcome 
suggest that the financial consequences to industry innovators is marginally 
positive, although the long run incentive to innovate may be diminished (Finch 
1989). 
A further development by President Bush in 1992 was the Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act, which dictated the fees companies had to pay the FDA. It was' 
concluded that the drug companies would pay $50,000 up front when filing a NDA 
and a further $50,000 when the FDA issued an action letter. All of these funds, 
which were projected to reach $327m over five years, were to go towards speeding 
up the drug approval process from 12 months to 6 months for break-through drugs, 
and from 20 months to 12 months for all other drugs (PBN 1993b). If such 
improvements can be made in the regulatory process innovative companies would 
benefit from the increased effective patent life while patients would benefit from the 
speedier access to new beneficial drugs. 
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For the more rare diseases that occur, provisions have also been passed to 
encourage company R&D. Before 1983 relatively few 'orphan drugs'. were 
developed because the market size was too small relative to the R&D expenses, 
there was a lack of product patents and product liability was too risky a prospect, as 
there was a higher risk of adverse reactions due to the limited clinical trials possible. 
The Orphan Drug Act (1983) therefore provided exclusivity for the manufacturer of 
seven years and tax credits for those companies who produced drug products for 
rare conditions or diseases that either affected 200,000 people or less in the US, or 
were not likely to recover development expenses. Certain drugs in this category 
have however, been very successful. For example, the orphan drugs erythropoietin 
(EPO, a human growth hormone) and aerosolised pentamidine, experienced sales of 
over $400m and $300m respectively in 1992 (McLaughlin & Meyers 1992). A 
1991 amendment proposed that a ceiling of $200m in cumulative sales for any 
single orphan drug be enforced, and if sales go beyond this level the exclusivity of 
the manufacturer would lapse. This proposal has resulted in a fall in the number of 
applications to the FDA for orphan drug status from 130 in 1990 to 84 in 1991, 
(McLaughlin & Meyers 1992). This is a clear example of the difficulty regulatory 
bodies have in establishing a balance between encouraging R&D and preventing 
exploitation. 
A similar story has unfolded in Britain with regards R&D and regulation. 
After the thalidomide tragedy, the Dunlop Committee was set up to assess safety 
procedures and although it had no legal power, it set in motion a voluntary 
registration system for clinical trial scrutiny and marketing and post-marketing 
surveillance. After the Sainsbury Report in 1967, the Medicines Act was passed in 
1968, creating the Medicines Committee and establishing a number of expert 
committees, viz. the Committee on Safety of Medicines and the Committee on the 
Review of Medicines. It also introduced a proof of efficacy requirement before 
marketing, although this was not implemented until 1971. It was estimated that 
these new regulations added an extra 2 years or, more onto development times, 
resulting in a decline in R&D expenditure conducted in the UK, with more R&D 
contracted outside. The cost to the industry was estimated at approximately £30m 
per year in 1981 prices (Hartley & Maynard 1982). 
Although the Patent Act of 1977 had extended patent life from 16 to 20 
years in Britain, bringing it more in line with Europe, by 1984 effective patent life 
was only 4 years, excluding the period of licenses of right2. The erosion of the 
effective, patent period and its possible consequences on the returns to R&D 
2 After three years anyone could apply for a compulsory license on the grounds that the patent 
invention was not being worked in the UK to the fullest extent that is reasonable practical 
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jeopardised future research, a fact eventually recognised within the European 
Community. From 1 January 1993, a revision of the patent laws has granted firms 
the possibility of applying for a Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC), which 
can extend the patent protection period for an extra 5 years. 
- Nevertheless, as in the US, government pressure for the containment of 
health care costs has led to the introduction of various measures, including a limited 
list. Products on this list are not to be prescribed often due to their cost as compared 
to equivalent drugs on the market. This list has been in action since 1985 for a 
selected number of products, but it is now proposed to extend it to include up to 600 
more products, representing approximately 20% of' NHS prescriptions. It is 
estimated that 200 of these products are still in the research pipeline and as a result 
possibly £450m of investment will be cut back, jeopardising 3,000-- 5,000 jobs 
(Sivell 1993b). Blair (1993) noted the words of Dr. John Griffin, director of the 
ABPI, who found that after the limited list was introduced in 1985, no new research 
was undertaken in Britain in the drug categories affected. 
This increasing pressure for governments to contain their health care costs 
has also resulted in the rise of health economics and the use of economic evaluation 
as one of the considerations for decision-making. The aim of the public health 
provider is to maximise community health with only limited resources. As 
Williams (1990) noted, not even the richest countries can now afford to undertake 
every health care activity that might conceivably do someone some good 
somewhere, sometime. Health providers are faced with the need to establish 
priorities in health care. To help this prioritization, the economic evaluation of 
many activities and the use of pharmaceuticals have become increasingly important. 
In previous years proof of safety and efficacy were sufficient for pharmaceuticals, 
but today cost-effectiveness is also looked for as an indication of value for money. 
Economic evaluation of pharmaceuticals involves selecting all the possible 
alternatives and assessing the costs and consequences of each. These costs include 
not only the monetary cost of purchasing the relevant drug, but also the costs of 
medical services and hospitalisation which may be required. The results are then 
presented in terms of the cost per cure, the cost per life year or perhaps, the cost per 
quality adjusted life year (QALY). These are calculated on an incremental basis 
allowing the extra unit of benefit gained relative to the extra cost to be compared to 
the alternatives. 
From such evaluations some treatments may be determined too expensive in 
relation to the benefit they bring to the patient and so withdrawn from the NHS 
drugs list or the reimbursement lists of other countries. Other products may 
however, be seen as very good value for money, bringing substantially more benefit 
than alternatives. For example, Birch et al. (1990) looked at the use of Flumazenil 
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to reverse the postoperative sedation effects of sedoanalgesia in day-case surgery. 
In their study the control group took over one hour to achieve, full subjective 
awakening while 83% of those treated with flumazenil were ready for. potential 
discharge within 15 minutes of surgery. While no prices were mentioned in this 
particular study, it was noted that savings could be made from the more efficient use 
of beds and the increased patient turnover by the use of flumazenil. Furthermore, 
93% of those patients receiving this treatment and who had experienced similar 
surgery with a general anaesthetic preferred this method. The authors therefore 
recommended that the use of flumazenil should be extended from the intensive care 
or emergency room situation to use in day-case procedures. 
With the growing importance of such analysis many major pharmaceutical 
companies are undertaking- cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness studies for their 
products, as encouraged by many governments, including the UK. Such data can 
help justify prices and secure reimbursement while also being used as an attractive 
marketing tool. Australia has gone one step further and now requires evidence of 
the cost-effectiveness of new products prior to reimbursement by the public health 
care system. For a medicine to be reimbursed for use in primary care it has to be 
listed under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) operated by the 
Commonwealth (Federal) government. To be listed on this, the company must 
submit information to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) 
which is required by a 1987 amendment to the National Health Act of 1953, to 
consider, effectiveness and cost before recommendation. This amendment was 
designed to encourage the PBAC to consider the full economic impact of each drug 
and select- only those which are cost-effective. Such economic analysis is 
mandatory as of January 1993 (Drummond 1991 a). 
The increased use and importance of such economic evaluations has led to 
substantial improvements in methodological standards making such analyses more 
acceptable. Although mandatory economic evaluations are unlikely to be required 
in the majority of countries in the near future, studies which are submitted will come 
under increasing scrutiny and may hold increasing weight when decisions are made. 
Given this, pharmaceutical companies are likely to continue to undertake such 
analysis adding yet another expense and restriction onto the R&D process. 
5.1.4: Summary- 
The pharmaceutical industry is highly, research intensive with long term 
investments in R&D vital for the future of the individual firm, however this function 
is increasingly coming under pressure from new regulatory requirements. It is not a 
viable option for the industry to function without regulation as there are always 
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some companies who could not be trusted to adequately test their products. Yet 
regulations that are too stringent also seem to have a negative impact on society. 
Other explanations of the changes in R&D have been somewhat overshadowed by 
the evidence pointing to the effects of regulation. 
- The US 1962 amendment increased the regulations concerning safety and 
efficacy of products at the end of the R&D process and throughout it. This reduced 
the likelihood of unsafe and less effective drug products reaching the market but at 
the same time, increased R&D cost and development times. This subsequently led 
to both reduced returns for R&D investment and a decline in NCE introductions and 
drug lags, putting the future innovative industry at risk. R&D funds were seen to 
flow out of the US into other countries, where regulations were more favourable. 
Taggart (1991) found that the existence of helpful and sympathetic regulations 
governing new drug development, was an important factor in the decision to invest 
research funds in a country. More importantly efficient patent laws were essential, 
as no pharmaceutical multinational corporation would wish to risk the high cost of 
R&D in a country unless it knew its intellectual property would be protected by 
vigorous patent laws. 1' 
Similarly in the UK, the 1968 Medicines Act has been seen as the cause of 
an outflow of R&D funds and a decline in the rate if NCE introductions onto the 
market. More recently, encouragement of economic evaluations have added further 
to the burden of the innovative firm. Fortunately, progress has been made in the 
understanding of the economics of the pharmaceutical industry and it has been 
recognised that price competition is not the only source of competition in such a 
market, with innovation also assuming an important function. It has been realised 
that stringent regulations can cause as may problems as they are designed to 
eliminate and hence, concessions have been made. These concessions include the 
extension of patent life in the US, the European Community and in Japan. The 
Canadian government which had previously employed a compulsory licensing 
feature with its patent protection, has begun an attempt to repeal such legislation, 
much to the relief of the innovative companies, while Bill C-91 passed in February 
1993 extended the patent law. In 1991 Dan Quale, the vice-president, proposed 
further reforms to the FDA in an attempt to shorten the approval times by 'fast- 
tracking' life-saving drugs such as AZT for AIDS, and by accepting more animal 
and clinical studies which had been carried out abroad (The Economist 1991d). 
The companies have also been attempting to help themselves by shifting the 
emphasis of R&D away from the random method of testing, to 'discovery by 
design'. With the explosion in knowledge in biochemical science, there is now a 
better understanding of the biological behaviour in cellular and molecular levels and 
the mechanisms of interaction. As this increased knowledge of biotechnology 
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occurs, the face of research is changing, reaching a level where scientists and 
researchers can almost pre-design a drug and then try to synthesise it to treat a 
specific disease. It is hoped that this directed approach will cut down on the amount 
of wasteful research. Glaxo is even toying with the idea of using virtual reality in 
the drug R&D process. 
SmithKline Beecham has reorganised its R&D department with a more 
directed approach in an attempt to get products onto the market more rapidly. In 
1991, they spent £430m on developing over 70 different compounds for 100 
different indications. This has now been reduced to 30 molecules, with the aim of 
bringing products into the market 2-3 years earlier than before (Abrahams 1992). 
Drug companies are becoming more selective in the R&D'process in order to 
improve their efficiency and competitiveness. 
Although it is estimated that fewer, than 15% of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers can engage in R&D because of the high costs and risks, the outlook 
is not completely bleak, and some even believe that we are on the verge of the 
second chemotherapeutic revolution. The future will be increasingly competitive 
but for those companies who can rationalise their R&D processes and maintain their 
research pipeline there is still the potential for success. 
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5.2: Drug Promotion, Pricing and Profitability 
5.2.1: Introduction 
Previous sections have clearly illustrated that innovative and imitative 
competition are important forces within the pharmaceutical industry. Traditional 
economic analysis of the pharmaceutical industry has focused solely on price 
competition, which was found to be lacking, however with increased recognition 
that a'price and performance' approach is more appropriate, views of competition in 
the industry are changing. A complete analysis of competition therefore, has to 
consider the effects of product competition, product differentiation and price 
competition on profitability. This section will examine the role of promotion and 
product differentiation in the pharmaceutical industry, the pricing of products and 
their effects on profitability. 
5.2.2: Promotion 
In the pharmaceutical industry there are few actual barriers to entry with 
regards to production, hence imitation is easy. If the imitation of a new innovative 
drug product were to take place immediately after, the product was introduced onto 
the market, the returns to innovation would be greatly reduced. The imitator faces 
only marginal if any R&D costs and can correspondingly set a price considerably 
below the original, designed to'steal' the market via a price advantage. Wu (1980) 
noted that there was a maximum rate of imitation beyond which the innovator 
would no longer innovate as the returns to R&D would be insufficient. This would 
bring a stop to future R&D and lead to a loss to society. 
To prevent this from happening, the authorities of most countries permit the 
use of a patent system, while the innovative companies themselves have developed 
a powerful means of protection via their promotional activities. It is these two 
aspects which have arguably allowed the pharmaceutical industry to become as 
successful as it presently is. 
The patent system grants the innovator a temporary monopoly during which 
time prices can be set to ensure the recovery of costs and an adequate return on the 
investment without fear of attracting competition. The system is designed to reward 
the innovator sufficiently and so ensure innovation continues. During the patent 
period, this monopoly is legally binding and therefore, the only promotional activity 
really required from the company is that which is sufficient to notify the market of 
the existence of the new product, its characteristics, indications, dosages and other 
information. However, once the patent expires competition becomes a free-for-all 
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and the requirements of promotional activity from the company change. It has been 
previously noted that competition from other innovators in the industry is a 
possibility, threatening the sales of existing drugs by the introduction of new and 
better drugs. There is little companies can do in the face of this product innovation 
except continue to innovate themselves and introduce drugs with further advances. 
However, in the face of competition from new but equivalent products, promotion 
can delay penetration, especially after patent expiry. 
Once the patent expires and entry occurs, there is a possibility that price 
competition can become fierce. As previously mentioned imitators do not incur the 
high R&D costs of the innovator, but merely duplicate the product, charging prices 
considerably lower than the innovator, whilst still earning a profit. Nevertheless, 
while the patent may have expired, it does not necessarily follow that the monopoly 
power of the company will be eliminated and that fierce price competition will 
evolve. Through promotion and product differentiation it is possible for a company 
to delay the erosion of product sales and extend the profitable life of a product for a 
number of years after patent expiry. In essence, competition is not wholly price 
determined. 
Promotional activities are aimed at differentiating particular products from 
rival equivalents, such that brand and company loyalty is created. It is often found 
that promotion of a trademark is effective in differentiating products and companies 
from their competitors. Greer (1979) identified the two broad functions of 
trademarks. Firstly, from the buyer's point of view a trademark identifies a given 
level of product quality, including certain combinations of product features. 
Secondly from the seller's view point, it identifies an exclusive source and serves as 
a repository for 'goodwill', which is protected from the unfair competition of 
imitators. The loyalty created through such promotional activities is hoped to be 
strong enough to withstand the onslaught of competition, whether product or price 
competition, so that the consumer or in this case the prescriber will, having formed 
a habit of prescribing one particular brand, be reluctant to change. Promotion can 
mean market power. 
The extensive promotional expenditure required to build up such loyalty can 
act as a barrier to entry in a number of respects. There are potential economies of 
scale possible for the innovative firm with large expenditures on promotional 
activities. Such huge expenditures are initially required to create demand for the 
innovative product, but may have the side effect of increasing promotional 
effectiveness by the sheer volume involved. Table 5.4 shows the percentage of 
sales spent on marketing by two of the top world pharmaceutical companies. It has 
been suggested that expenditure on marketing exceeds that on R&D (Bleidt 1992) 
which is substantiated by these examples. 
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Table 5.4: Pharmaceutical Marketing Expenditures 1988.1991 
Warner-Lambe rt 1 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Year 
Ad. & Promo as 
% total sales 
R&D as a 
% Sales 
Ad. & Promo as 
% total sales 
R&D as a 
% Sales 
1991 23.7 8.4 - - 
1990 23.5 12.9 8.6 
1989 23.8 
t7. j 
13.3 6 
1988 22.5 1 ,. 13.9 8. 
1= support for new and existing products. 
Source: Company Annual Reports 1988 - 1991 
This volume of promotion from innovative firms can 'jam' out' any 
promotional material from entering rivals, leaving the prescriber ignorant of the 
existence of any new competition. Furthermore, the sheer costs involved can bring 
economies of scale from the bulk buying of the requirements. It has be argued that 
there is a threshold level for advertising below which higher unit costs will occur. 
Many small firms without the financial and technical capability to innovate survive 
by imitation. While imitative products may have a price advantage very often their 
attempts to inform prescribers of their existence prove futile. Promotion is more 
expensive in comparison to the larger firms who can generate economies of scale, 
therefore the volume and sometimes the quality of promotional attempts are 
inadequate to 'steal' any significant share of the market. It makes it more difficult 
for the smaller firms to compete effectively, especially if they are not producing 
highly innovative products. 
Schmalensee (1974) argued that if existing firms and new entrants could 
produce equally effective advertising and equally desirable products there would be 
no reason for any restrictions on entry to exist. Meanwhile Telser et al. (1975a) 
found a positive relationship between promotional intensity and entry, implying that 
promotional outlays did not constitute a barrier to entry, but actually encouraged it. 
Promotional activity can make demand more elastic by informing consumers about 
the many products available, hence aiding entry and encouraging competition, 
however, it depends on the type and volume of information portrayed and the 
product, as to its influence. While promotion may aid the entry of a new major 
therapeutic innovation, it can hinder the entry of imitative and generic drug 
products. There is considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that heavy 
promotional expenditure can have substantial anti-competitive effects within a 
market. The previous studies of Schmalensee and Telser did not consider the 
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possibility of remaining price differentials despite entry which would be one of the 
consequences of anti competitive results. 4 
The primary objective of company promotion is to differentiate its products, 
by highlighting its drug characteristics and depicting them as superior in qualities 
such as safety, efficacy and consistency. Especially when an innovative product has 
a 'first mover advantage' as most patented products do, the company has a chance to 
convince the prescriber of the superiority of the product whilst competition is 
restricted and the prescriber gains experience of the product. When competition 
does then enter the market, it is hoped that the prescriber is familiar and 'happy' with 
the original product, having known it for a number of years. Price inelastic in 
nature, the prescriber may therefore, be complacent about trying out a new imitative 
version which although claimed as equivalent, is perceived as significantly different 
in matters of safety, efficacy and consistency. Competitive products may therefore, 
be perceived as very different from the original, due to the image promoted by the 
company: an image which may be very costly to overcome if it is at all possible. 
This is particularly evident when one considers the different attitudes 
towards branded and generic products and their subsequent prices. Generic versions 
of innovative products are supposed to be equivalent, but are often perceived as 
inferior. Problems of inequivalence have occurred and obtained widespread 
publicity, resulting in a general attitude of suspicion concerning the properties of i 
such products. Although the FDA has proclaimed that there is no substantial 
evidence of significant differences, in bioavailability or in general quality between 
brand and unbranded products, nor between the products of large and small firms, 
suspicion remains. Wyllie et al. (1987) reported on a patient whose seizure 
frequency had increased when she was switched from Mysoline to a generic version 
of primidone, while Stoughton (1987) also found that 13 out of 18 generic versions 
of corticosteriods tested, were less potent than the original branded formulations. 
Further inconsistencies between the many versions of generic products available 
may also make the patient more prone to side-effects. These facts and the general 
suspicions of generic use have made the experience gained of the original product 
while patented, and the trust built up with the brand and company very important. 
This has pushed price differentials to one side in many instances. 
Companies have even been able to influence patients by the marketing of 
products. For patients who have been on a particular medication for a long time the 
size, shape, and even colour become associated with the alleviation of symptoms. If 
an alternative is prescribed, the differences in product appearance may provoke the 
patient into ask for the original medication which they feel more comfortable with. 
The originating company can therefore maintain its high price level in the face of 
cheaper generic competition, with the knowledge that such entry will have little 
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immediate effect on sales. It is hoped that by promotional activities, the demand 
curve facing the branded product will remain relatively inelastic in comparison to 
the elastic demand faced by its competitors. 
Caves, Whinston & Hurwitz (1991) noted how promotional expenditure is a 
durable goodwill asset. As such, the expenditure required is not continually high 
throughout the product's life span. Two years before patent expiry expenditure was 
estimated to have fallen by 10% and it was further depressed by generic entry, 
however sales were not particularly affected. After patent expiry, branded sales fell 
by an estimated 20% in the first year and 12% per year afterwards, however this was 
not due to generic entry, which had not yet occurred in the cases studied. This fall 
in sales was more due to a shrinkage in the market as demand fell off. Possibly a 
new better therapy had emerged or simply the fact the company was no longer 
undertaking such extensive promotion led to this fall off in demand and market size. 
Generic entry was estimated to have little overall effect on sales. 
Statman (1981) noted that generic and brand name competitors were not 
very successful in capturing significant market shares from original products. This 
was reflected by the fact that in his study of 12 drugs that lost their patent protection W^' 
during the period 1970 and 1976, no original drug had less than 92.8% of the market 
Ir, ý in 1978. This share of the market declined gradually, but it was not seen to be the 
result of price reductions on the part of the branded product, but rather a general 
shrinking of the market. 
New legislation such as the Waxman-Hatch -Act 1984 in the US, has 
facilitated the easier entry of generics onto the market and as a result, an increase of 
generic penetration. Grabowski & Vernon (1992) found that in their study, the 
average market share of generics was 9% after the first month of entry, rising to 
35% after one year on the market and reaching 49% after 2 years. This was a 
dramatically higher rate of generic penetration than that found by previous studies 
(Statman 1981, Masson & Steiner 1985). Nevertheless, the original product still 
accounted for just over half of all prescriptions, even 2 years after generic entry. 
A further means of maintaining sales in the face of new competition has 
been the introduction of new dosage forms of the original brand product just before 
patent expiry. An example of this successful strategy was the slow release dosage 
form of Calan (Isoptin), which was introduced in Dec. 1986 and within 2 years 
accounted for 81 % of pioneer sales (Grabowski* Vernon 1992). 
These anti competitive effects of promotion depend upon the demand 
asymmetries created between existing firms and new entrants. Although promotion 
can ease the entry of new and better products it can retard the later entry of cheap 
close substitutes by accentuating preferences for particular brands, even though each 
drug's physical characteristics are the same. These effects are not, however, the 
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only cause for concern with respect to the promotional activities of companies in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The influence such information relays to doctors can have 
significant consequences on the volume and quality of prescribing. 
When making each prescribing decision, a doctor may use a 'portfolio' of 
information sources to help firstly, determine a set of possible treatments (an 
'evoked' set) and then, one specific therapy. The information required to make this 
decision comes from a variety of sources such as the educational training of the 
doctor, advice from colleagues, journals, government leaflets, practice policies, 
medical conferences and many others. Included in this list of information sources is 
the promotional material sent out by the pharmaceutical companies on their various 
products, a source which has become a continuing area of controversy. 
Information gathering from many of these sources can prove time- 
consuming and costly for the doctor, however the promotional activities of the 
pharmaceutical companies bring information directly to them in coherent packages. 
These packages range from direct mailing, advertising in journals, videos, audio 
tapes, conferences and symposia, to the most successful means of transferring 
information, the medical sales representative. All of, these methods are convenient 
and cost the doctor nothing except his time. This source of information therefore, 
has an important role to play in the provision of relevant drug information to 
doctors. 
The prime purpose of this promotional activity from the companies is not 
however, the provision of information to doctors. Company promotional activity 
has a dual role. - While company promotional material does provide information to 
the prescriber, it is primarily designed to increase and maintain the demand for 
company products. The companies aim to generate an awareness of their drug 
products and increase interest in them, while hopefully encouraging increased use. 
By communicating new and 'good' information about the drug products, the 
companies hope to indoctrinate prescribers with a positive attitude towards them 
and their products. 
These two aspects of company promotional activity can however come into 
conflict with one another. It is probably sufficient to say that increasing the use of 
company drug products is the prime objective of company promotional activities, 
but one which is not necessarily. consistent with consumer interests. The 
educational value of promotion is to provide the prescriber with better knowledge of 
what is available and what is the best therapy for the specific symptoms observed, 
allowing a rational choice to be made. Bradley (1992) described rational 
prescribing as that which is appropriate, safe, effective and economic showing that 
reasoned thought had been applied to the decision. This decision should therefore 
be based on independent scientific data, clinical experience and patient needs with 
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some consideration of price now also included. Nevertheless, in the prescribing 
decision, the choice of specific therapy may be subject to the influences of a number 
of non-pharmacological aspects which can cause irrationality in the prescribing 
decision. This irrationality can take the form of inappropriate, uneconomic or 
unnecessary prescriptions whereby a drug is given for the wrong indication, when it 
is not necessary or when an equivalent cheaper generic exists. 
Once a product reaches the market and even before, companies undertake 
extensive promotional campaigns to launch it and educate or persuade prescribing 
doctors and medical students of its value as a medication. A simple, easy to 
remember brand name is chosen and along with the trademark of the company, the 
product is ready for launch. This trademark is something which is associated with a 
company and only it, e. g. the unicorn figure of Wellcome. The company has a 
permanent monopoly of a trademark, which is regarded as a durable goodwill asset 
outlasting the protection period of the patent. It is hoped that the doctor will come 
to associate a company trademark with a good record of safety and quality, giving 
them more confidence in new products introduced by the same company. All of the 
facets of company promoting are targeted at familiarising and persuading doctors of 
the superior qualities of particular products. 
The medical sales representative is currently the most important form of 
promotional activity and was estimated to consume 74% of all promotional outlay 
in 1989 (Caves, Whinston & Hurwitz 1991). Rawlins (1984) noted that there was 
approximately one sales representative for every 7 or 8 doctors. In May 1992 over 
110,000 representatives were sent out to visit doctors all over the US to help launch 
SmithKline Beecham's Relafen (Abrahams 1992). Average expenditure on R&D 
for American companies has risen from 15% of revenue in 1975 to 20% in 1989, 
while the average cost of marketing was 22% in 1988 (Ballance, Pogany & Forstner 
1992). Surely companies would not spend such amounts of money on marketing if 
it was not successful! 
For the goal of maintaining market share, the company promotes the 
superior characteristics of a product in the hope of persuading the prescriber of its 
value. The prescriber is not the final consumer in the pharmaceutical industry and is 
therefore, not interested in price, but in the quality, safety and efficacy of the 
products. If the doctor can be convinced, that only the one brand can give a 
satisfactory level of these qualities, this brand will be prescribed regardless of price. 
The company can therefore use the period of exclusivity during patent protection, to 
'educate' doctors about their product, an easy enough task in many cases as it may 
be the only product of its type available. 
While the patent protection is in effect and few if any other competitive 
products exist on the market, prescriptions will be filled only by that one brand. It 
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is therefore easy for the doctor to become an habitual prescriber. Denig & Haaijer- 
Ruskamp (1992) identified three possible routes for the decision making process in 
choosing a specific therapy. Firstly, a doctor could decide by active problem 
solving, whereby all the pros and cons of each potential treatment are analysed and 
weighed up for each case. ' Then there is habitual prescribing based on reasoned 
rules, e. g. if one particular therapy worked well for certain symptoms it could be 
used in future patients with the same symptoms. Finally, there is habitual 
prescribing based on unreasoned rules. This occurs when the doctor is influenced in 
the choice of therapy by such irrelevant factors such as the popularity of the 
product, its packaging and brand image. It is this unreasoned prescribing that is 
open to influence from the company promotional activities. 
It has already been mentioned that the prescribing decision involves-the 
collation of information from a variety of sources, including the pharmaceutical 
industry. All of these sources contribute to the likelihood of the doctor making a 
rational choice of therapy. Such information gathering may however be time- 
consuming and costly, hence the pharmaceutical industry provides an easy option. 
However, the question arises as to how reliable the information provided by the 
companies actually is. As the aim of promotional activity is to increase sales, it is 
possible that the information presented to the doctor will be biased. 
Mickey Smith (1977) identified a number of controversial areas in 
advertising. Firstly, the scope of advertising meant that there was quite literally too 
much, and as a result scarce resources were being wasted. Secondly, considerable 
controversy arises over the content of advertising. There have been cases of 
incorrect or false information being put forward, or information which is correct but 
inappropriate and misleading. All of these have an effect on the prescribing pattern 
of doctors. Information may be perceived as educational and so accepted without 
question when it is purely promotional. This can lead to irrational prescribing and 
may have an indirect effect on attitudes towards certain health care issues. For 
example, Smith (1977) noted that there is a possible sexist content in advertising, 
with greater use of female models to depict advertisements for mood-modifiers and 
for psychotropic drugs. By using such advertising, the doctor may get the 
impression that women are more prone to mental illness, causing them to 
subconsciously prescribe such products more readily to women when perhaps they 
are not appropriate. 
Further studies have been conducted on the effects of company drug 
promotion on prescribing have revealed alarming results. Once a drug becomes 
marketed, the doctor shifts from the role of co-investigator, to one of the consumer 
and hence the target of promotional campaigns. Caudill et al. (1992) believe it is 
the attitude of doctors to this promotional activity of the pharmaceutical companies, 
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that'is the key determinant of the use made of such information. They note that 
Becker and associates (1972) found more appropriate prescribing to be associated 
with more negative perceptions of drug-advertising,, with the sales representative 
considered an unreliable source of prescribing information. Nevertheless, in a 1973 
survey by the American Medical Association (AMA), over 50% of all physicians 
believed that sales representatives had a 'marked' or ''moderate' influence on 
prescribing patterns (Harrell 1978): 
A renowned study by Avorn et at. (1982) demonstrated the possible 
influence of commercial sources of information on prescribing. Two prescription 
only drugs were chosen whose pharmacological effects in controlled studies showed 
minimal if any difference from otc preparations. These two products were, 
however, heavily advertised as effective by. their relevant companies. The two 
therapies were cerebral and peripheral vasodilators for senile dementia and 
propoxyphene analgesics for moderately severe pain. The scientific sources of 
information concluded, that the first of these products was ineffective in the 
treatment of senile dementia, while the latter was no more effective than aspirin or 
codeine. From questioning a number of doctors about their prescribing of the two 
drugs, the general opinion was that drug advertising and representatives were of it 
minimal use to the majority-of doctors (68% and 54- %, respectively), while 
academic sources and training were very important (62% and 88% respectively). 
Contradicting this, they found that 33% of doctors thought cerebral vasodilators 
useful in managing confused geriatric patients. There was also a strong correlation 
between the belief in overall superiority of propoxyphene and the usefulness of 
cerebral vasodilators (Chi-squared, X2 = 5.420 degrees of freedom; p=0.02). 49% 
of doctors believed that, propoxyphene was more potent than aspirin and 31% 
believed it to be equivalent. They seemed generally unaware of the strong influence 
of non-scientific sources of information on their prescribing decisions, or at least 
reluctant to admit it. 
Recently, sin filar concern over the influence of commercial information on 
prescribing has arisen with reference to continuing medical education (CME) and 
symposia, sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. These aspects of promotional 
activity have been the fastest growing areas of pharmaceutical marketing in the 
1980's with expenditure rising from $5m in 1974`to $86m in 1988 (Bleidt 1992). 
Orlowski & Wateska (1992) conducted a study of the effect on prescribing in one 
American institute of an all expenses paid conference at a particular holiday resort. 
Before attending the conference most of the doctors believed that their prescribing 
would in no way be influenced by the location and method of information transfer 
employed by the company. Doctors genuinely believed that their prescribing 
decisions were based on scientific data, clinical experience and patient needs, rather 
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than on the promotion received from companies. Nevertheless, the trip was 
associated with a significant increase in the prescribing of the promoted drugs. It 
was possible that this increase was due to an acknowledgement that the promoted 
drugs were safer and more effective than those presently on the market: If this was 
so, there would have been an accompanying fall in the prescription levels of those 
drugs currently available as they were replaced with prescriptions for the new 
products. This fall did not, however, occur and Orlowski & Wateska concluded that 
the increase in prescribing of the promoted drugs was additional prescribing, 
perhaps excess prescribing. 
Cases of enticements from companies have long been an acknowledged evil. 
There are many references to free samples, free dinners, cash payments to 
compensate for the doctors' time, free return flights to various destinations if a 
certain level of prescribing is reached, meetings on such venues as the golf course. 
Many such inducements have been used to persuade doctors to prescribe particular 
products in preference to equivalent competitive drug products. The success of such 
promotional campaigns has also lead to prescriptions for brand drug products being 
given when a prescription is not even necessary or for an indication for which the 
drug has not been formally approved by the regulatory body. 
The regulation of such promotional activities of the pharmaceutical industry 
has been a difficult task and ý one which has recently come much more to the 
forefront. The first legislation was in Virginia 1736 when medicine labels were 
required to specify all ingredients. In 1848 federal legislation in the US on imported 
drugs specified that they were to have correct lists of ingredients. While these 
regulations may have been considered adequate at the time, they were eliminated 
once the industry developed into one of mass production and intensive promotional 
activity, associated with brand-names and trademarks. In 1906 there was an act 
against" possible false therapeutic claims supported by the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC) of 1914, however, in 1931 the Supreme Court intervened to 
stipulate that the FTC was only applicable to false claims which injured present or 
potential competition, making the FTC almost powerless. In 1938 the Wheeler-Lea 
amendment to the FTC allowed it to regulate false advertising injurious to health, 
regardless of its competitive effect, however advertising to doctors was exempt from 
their control. This led to the usurpation of the FTC by the FDA. In 1958 Senator 
Estes Kefauver led a Subcommittee on the pharmaceutical industry and determined 
that promotion to doctors was misleading, uninformative and responsible for high 
drug prices. This led to the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments, whereby all 
promotional material was to be submitted to the FDA to be assessed for its 
accuracy, balance and consistency with approved therapeutic claims. All chemical 
and generic names of products were to be included in advertising, along with a brief 
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summary of side-effects, contraindications and effectiveness, while for the first time 
the medical sales representative also came under scrutiny. 
This was not, however, the end of the concern over pharmaceutical 
promotional activity and its influences. In the Greenfield Report of 1982 in the UK, 
prescribing in general practice was considered less than optimal, which was at least 
partially due to the lack of impartial advice and information on drugs given to the 
doctors. By introducing an academic representative targeted at non-steroidal anti- 
inflammatory drugs, the cost of prescribing per doctor per month fell, with potential 
savings of £30,000 per year (Newton-Syms 1992). Various codes of practice have 
been formulated by the industry associations to ensure balanced promotional 
activities, but they have become increasingly criticised due to the inflated use of free 
gifts and all expense paid conferences in exotic locations. 
In 1990 the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA adopted a 
code of ethics for the medical profession. This specified that any gifts accepted by 
doctors should primarily entail a benefit to the patient or be of relevance to the 
doctor's work. They should also not be of any substantial value, e. g. a textbook or a 
stethoscope, not free return flights to Disney World. ' Subsidies to underwrite the 
cost of Continued Medical Education (CME) conferences or professional meetings 
contributing to an improvement in patient care are allowed, ' but under certain 
conditions. The new guidelines referring to such conferences state that a company 
cannot dictate any aspect of the course as a prerequisite for funding, while' such 
funds as they do provide will be in the form of an educational grant payable to the 
CME provider. Neither the CME provider nor the industry sponsor, can provide for 
travel, lodging, honoraria or personal expenses incurred by attendees, spouses or 
guests. Subsidies for hospitalities are not permitted outside the provisions of 
modest meals or social events held as part of the CME activity. Presentations 
should be balanced to give all therapeutic views and use generic names where 
possible, while commercial exhibits should not interfere with the presentation of 
CME activity. Furthermore, in this code of ethics, scholarships or special funds to 
permit medical students, residents and fellows to attend selected educational 
conferences are allowed only if the selection is conducted by the academic or 
training institution. Finally no gifts are to be accepted if there are any strings 
attached (Randall 1991a, b, c; McMurray 1991). 
Such codes of practice do regulate activities, however it would be 
impossible to eliminate all such influences. Subtle biases of a speaker cannot be 
regulated, while it is simply not possible to police every CME activity. 
Consequently some companies may be encouraged to take the risk of being caught 
and continue with their manipulative activities. 
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To sum up, the promotional activities of pharmaceutical companies have a 
very important role to play in competition within the market. Traditionally, the 
leading product is replaced by a superior new product, however this new superior 
product is not always forthcoming. When product competition does not occur the 
emphasis shifts to product differentiation as created by promotional expenditures: 
Such product differentiation accentuates the qualities of the original product and 
builds up brand-name and company loyalty. By persuading doctors that the original 
product has the best set of operational characteristics, it is possible for the company 
to extend the profitable life of their product well past the patent expiry date without 
undertaking price reductions. - While fulfilling the useful role of providing 
information to doctors, this information is not always guaranteed to be impartial. 
Consequently, while promotional expenditures can ease the entry of superior new 
products, they can retard the entry of equivalent products by anti competitive effects 
on absolute costs and product image. °- 
While enhancing the life span of products, such expenditure can also have a 
unwanted effect on prescribing with the promotion of -inappropriate, expensive, 
excessive prescribing. Lexchin (1989) noted that in Canada, advertising costs added 
to the costs of prescribing by approximately $1.15 per prescription, with a 
conservative estimate that detailing increased the Canadian drug costs by up to 10%. 
Some analysts considered the creation of brand-name loyalty to be a more effective 
method of guaranteeing high returns than the patent system itself (Lall- 1985). 
Nevertheless, with all its potentially undesirable consequences the, elimination of 
such promotional information could have a dramatic effect by slowing down the 
dissemination of information. If it takes longer for doctors to learn of new drugs, 
indications, dosage forms etc. many patients will be deprived of appropriate drugs. 
5.2.3: Pricing 
The next issue within the pharmaceutical industry arises as a result of 
product competition and differentiation, and that is the controversy over price 
competition or the lack of it. Obviously when a new innovative product is given 
market approval there is still a number of years of patent protection left. This 
allows the innovator time to recover the costs of R&D and production along with a 
risk premium before imitative competition is permitted onto the market. It is 
therefore, a period characterised by high prices set to recover such costs quickly 
before the product becomes obsolete or competition becomes so vigorous that such 
costs could not be recovered. Unless the innovator licenses out this product or if 
another new innovative product is introduced which may replace it there will be no 
competition in the market until patent expiry. With such a possibility it is easy to 
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understand why prices are initially set at high levels, however criticism remains of 
prices being kept high for longer than is necessary to recover costs and a return on 
investment. 
Ideally after patent expiry, entry of close substitutes is possible and under 
traditional market theory this competition pushes the price down towards the 
perfectly competitive level. Using the traditional approach to competition, the 
farther actual price is from the perfectly competitive level, the more the industry is 
associated with monopoly power and a misallocation of resources. Looking at the 
pharmaceutical industry, where in the past; price competition was not much in 
evidence, conclusions were reached that the industry was therefore not competitive 
and was profiteering out of the suffering and misery of the ill. 
One of the first condemnations of the pharmaceutical industry for high 
prices and profits came from the Kefauver-Harris Hearings of the late 1950's. This 
hearing concluded that the pharmaceutical industry was characterised by monopoly 
power, based on the high ratio of price to direct costs. Numerous other studies also 
concluded a lack of price competition in the industry. Schwartzman (1979) 
conducted a study which found only minimal price competition in all therapeutic 
markets except that for antibiotics (also see Cooper 1966; Lall 1974). 
It was believed that the extensive'expenditure on company promotional 
activities created such a strong brand and company loyalty that the price elasticity of 
demand for pioneer products remained low, even after patent expiry and the entry of 
cheaper, usually generic competition. As a result prices were set high and could be 
kept high. 
This initial high price level for innovative or pioneer products depended on a 
number of demand, supply and environmental factors. The demand factors 
considered by the firm consist primarily of the qualities of the product, its safety, 
efficacy and consistency relative to existing products on the market. - These quality 
characteristics of drug products set the boundaries on feasible prices. The firm also 
considers the dosage forms to be used, the length of the treatment period and the 
expected product life. With regards to supply factors, one of the major 
considerations of the firm was the R&D costs and risks involved in the investment 
put into the product. If the product was extremely expensive and risky to research 
and develop for the market, the firm would be more likely to price it higher than if it 
cost less to develop. It must also consider the number and type of competing 
products that already exist on the market and anticipated competition, indicated by 
the rate of development of competing products. The patent position of the product, 
the available distribution systems, the expected shelf-life and the regulations and 
controls on the research, production and quality of the product, all must be taken 
into account. The environmental factors to be considered relate to the size of the 
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economy, its rate of growth, the economic and political stability of the economy, the 
attitudes of government and public, and relevant regulations. 
Hudson (1992) identified that the price of a product on launch was 
dependent on the discount rate (the rate of return necessary to ensure cost recovery 
within a specified time), the diffusion rate (how quickly the product is expected to 
be widely accepted by the market) and the degree of competition in the market: - If 
the therapeutic properties of the product make it superior to existing products, the 
innovative product would be valued more highly than a minor therapeutic advance. 
The firm can therefore, charge high prices which the market is prepared to pay for. 
Milton Friedman believed that the only social responsibility of business was to 
increase profits, and so charging whatever price the market is prepared to pay, is not 
morally wrong. Many would, however, argue that health care provision should not 
be in the private sector at all and such high prices are morally wrong. 
r Companies repeatedly claim that prices are necessarily high. in order to 
compensate for the high risks and expenses of R&D, and to ensure the recovery of 
an adequate return before the product is replaced by a more advanced therapeutic 
product. In many situations the more expensive drugs may cost less in the long-run gyp' 
by cutting down the need for hospitalisation etc. Vagelos (1992) noted that in 1983 
the US health bill for measles, mumps and rubella vaccination programs, came to 
$100m, while the US Public Health Service estimated the cost of these diseases 
would have been $1.4bn. Another study suggested that Medicaid expenditures for 
patients taking H2 antagonists, cimetidine (Tagamet from SmithKline Beecham) and 
ranitidine (Zantac from Glaxo) for anti-ulcer treatment, may be 70% less than for 
ulcer patients who do not take an H2 antagonist. The reason for this is that patients 
not taking such medicines have a much higher incidence of hospitalisation and 
surgery. While these medicines are expensive, in the long-run they save money. 
There is therefore some validity for the high prices set by companies, 
especially when one considers that without a reasonable return to R&D investment, 
future research would be in jeopardy. Nevertheless, critics continue to target prices 
as excessively high, earning more than a 'reasonable' rate of return. A recent 
example-of this was AZT or Azidothymide from Burroughs-Wellcome, for the 
treatment of complications found in acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
patients. This drug is priced at $6,500 per year, which is prohibitively expensive for 
most patients, especially in countries with insufficient state health provisions and 
little if any medical insurance cover. The company explains this price as necessary 
to recover high R&D costs, especially with the threat of obsolescence and the need 
to fund future R&D (Spinello 1992). While all this may be true, many believe the 
pharmaceutical companies have taken this high pricing too far, charging the patient 
for not only high R&D costs and risks, but also for wasteful advertising expenses 
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incurred in attempting to differentiate the product, and wasteful duplicative R&D, 
both of which artificially inflate prices and allow companies to reap excessively 
high profits. 
Price competition does, however, occur although perhaps not in the same 
way as traditional theory would suggest (Grabowski & Vernon 1992; Caves, 
Whinston & Hurwitz 1991; Statman 1981). In recent years there has been a general 
decline in the price level of drug products over time, related to the increased 
competitive effect of strong generic competition, although the effect of such 
competition on the price of the original innovative product is not as expected. This 
will be explained more fully after the possible pricing strategies that firms might 
adopt on entering the market are considered 
On the entry of an innovative product there are a number of pricing policies 
open to the firm. Firstly, after considering the factors described above, the firm may 
decide between price-skimming, penetration pricing, cost-plus pricing, competition- 
based pricing or limit-entry pricing. Price skimming often takes place when the 
product is a major innovation and can charge a higher price than existing products 
as it is more in demand. The price elasticity of demand for this product will be low, 
therefore its price will remain high, however as new competition enters the market, 
this price elasticity will gradually increase and so the price charged will fall. The 
firm charges the reservation price at each successive stage of the product's life. 
Penetration pricing, in contrast, is usually undertaken by firms introducing a new 
product which has only a marginal, if any, therapeutic advantage over existing 
products and therefore cannot ask the same premium as a major innovation. To gain 
any significant market share, the firm must therefore rely on lower prices than 
existing products to gain leverage onto the market. Likewise, cost-plus pricing is 
simply when a set premium is added onto the cost of production, while competition- 
based pricing occurs when a competitor gauges its pricing policies on those of its 
competitors. Finally, limit entry pricing occurs when perhaps there is a major 
innovation, but competition is expected within the near future. The innovative firm 
may therefore price their product at such a low price that competition cannot enter 
the market at comparable prices, and so compete effectively. This occurred with the 
market for Valium and Librium from Roche. They were described as priced at 
Volkswagen prices rather then Rolls-Royce prices, portraying an image of value for 
money which deterred future entry by competitors. 
What is of more concern is the development of these prices over time. 
Obviously if no product competition enters the market, this high price can be 
maintained without fear of attracting imitative competition throughout the patent 
life-time. After the patent expiry date, imitative competition in the past was not 
particularly strong and the innovative product could maintain its market share and 
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price level without much fear of competition. This was due to the strength of brand 
loyalty nurtured by the companies during the patent period and the lack of strong 
generic competition. Gumbhir & Rodowskas (1974) found that price differentials 
between brand and generic products were statistically significant in 5 out of 7 drugs 
studied with the drug prices of generic versions much lower. The success of these 
generics, even with this price advantage, was negligible. Similarly Bloom, Wierz & 
Pauly (1986) found that on average consumers generally paid less for generics, 
although there were wide variations within and among pharmacies. Nevertheless, 
while the savings from cheaper generics were generally passed onto the consumer, 
generic competition was only just beginning to strengthen. 
Previous to the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act in the US, imitative products had 
to undergo the same regulatory requirements as the original product, making the 
cost and speed of market entry higher than many would wish and consequently 
discouraging much competition. There have nevertheless, been' a number of 
changes in the market which have actively encouraged generic manufacturers. This 
Act of 1984 facilitated the easier access of generics onto the market after the patent 
expiry of an innovative product by requiring them to provide evidence only of 
bioequivalency. Since such new legislation, more price competition has been 
apparent. 
This stronger generic competition and the positive encouragement' of 
government and third party payment bodies, has resulted in an increasing tendency 
for generic prescribing after patent expiry, lowering the general price level of 
products. This can, however, be misleading, as much of this effect is due to the 
increased share of the market accounted for by generics and the increasingly 
intensive competition within the generic market. Lower prices are not totally 
attributed to a downward trend in brand-name drug product prices. 
Statman (1981) conducted a study of 12 major drug products and determined 
that patent expiration, at least for the first few years, has only a small effect on the 
market share and price of the original product. The success of the original brands in 
maintaining market share was not due to price reductions but from brand loyalty. 
No'original drug in his sample had less than 92.4% of the market by 1978, a number 
of years after patent expiry. Only 4 drugs in his sample had lower prices in 1978 
than their prices 3 years before patent expiry. 'Essentially, competition after patent 
entry had not, on the whole, effected the prices of the original products. 
Masson & Steiner (1985) concluded that while the new laws increased 
market-price sensitivity and the amount of generic usage, there was still a surprising 
amount of brand loyalty. Caves, Whinston & Hurwitz (1991) found that as the pre- 
generic entry price cost margin of branded drugs was so large, the decline in brand 
prices due to generic entry represented only a small fraction of this margin. 
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In a study by Grabowski & Vernon (1992), -18 major products were 
reviewed and it was found that pioneer prices remained higher than competitors and 
in some cases actually increased in nominal terms in the period after entry. 
Nevertheless, the average market price fell over time as the lower-priced generics 
gained significantly more of the market. The different behavioural patterns of 
pioneer and generic products caused the gulf in prices to increase over time, e. g. one 
month after generic entry the average generic price was 61% of the pioneer price 
while it accounted for 9% of the market. After one year on the market, its price had 
fallen to 46% of the pioneer price, while its market share had risen to 35%. By the 
end of year two, the generic price was 37% of the pioneer price and it held 49% of 
the market. With each 10% market share gained by generics, the market price fell 
by 6.1%. This price fall and increased market share nonetheless, had little effect on 
the price of the pioneer product. Rather than matching the, lower price of the 
generics, the originators continued to increase prices at an average rate that 
exceeded general inflation. 
The firm could continue with its pricing strategy because the market for its 
product was segmented between those who were price sensitive and those who were 
brand loyal. As a result, the pioneer product could maintain half of the market at 
consistently high prices, while generic equivalents priced two-third's cheaper, could 
attract no more than just under a half of the market in two years. The firm earns 
more revenue from not competing via price, but rather relying on the brand and 
company loyalty created by the extensive promotional campaigns undertaken during 
the patent protection period. 
With regards to generic competitors, the larger the difference between the 
pioneer price and the potential entrant's minimum cost, the more rapidly entry is 
undertaken as the market is more attractive. Generic entrants can charge a price 
which is seen as a considerable discount from the pioneer product, but still make a 
substantial profit. Grabowski & Vernon found that the entrants with the largest 
market share in half of the product markets studied had the lowest price, yet those 
firms with prices up to 50% more than this minimum price, still held significant 
market shares. This was believed to be due to branded generics and the first mover 
advantage effect, as the generic market leader was an early entrant in virtually all 
the products studied. Branded generics are products sold under the generic name, 
but relying on the reputation of the manufacturer to differentiate it from other 
generics. The company not, only promotes the name of its products, it promotes 
itself in order to instil an image of reliability and safety with the prescriber. What 
Grabowski & Vernon found was that pioneer firms do not attempt to deter entry by 
cutting their prices, but rely on their brand and company loyalty to extend their 
product life in the face of competition. 
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With the increasing generic competition the innovative product is losing its 
market share much more quickly than ever before, however the brand loyalty 
cultivated during the period of patent protection still has an effect. This effect is 
enough to enable such innovative firms to refrain from price competition in many 
instances, and to let the revenue of their products fall gradually over time as their 
market share declines. Such companies acknowledge that product revenues at this 
stage of the product life cycle are likely to decline due to increased product 
competition, therefore the revenue generated from continuing brand loyalty, whilst 
falling, may still be considerably more than that earned if a vigorous price war 
ensued. 
The issue of pricing has recently come to the forefront again with the 1993 
report released by the US Democratic Senator, David Pryor. Tanouye (1992) noted 
the claims of this report that drug prices had doubled, even quadrupled between 
1985 - 1991, with many of the major drug companies breaking public promises to 
hold price increases below inflation. Quoting two examples from the study, Parke- 
Davis' anti-epileptic drug, Dilantin, increased in price 349% between 1985 and 1991 
for a package of one thousand 100mg capsules, and increased 334% for one hundred 
capsules. Another of Parke-Davis' drugs, Nitrostat, a heart drug, had a price 
increase of 274%. Such incidents were not isolated, with similar results found for 
29 of the major prescription drugs studied (Tanouye 1992). When asked 
specifically about Dilantin, Parke-Davis referred to the fraudulent manufacture and 
sales of a generic version of their drug which required the company to change 
specifications in order to improve the product quality and consistency. This 
involved more difficult and costly manufacture techniques. The industry in general, 
replied to these claims by quoting the ever increasing R&D costs and risks involved, 
the increase in product value due to new indications or uses, and the prices of 
comparable therapies, along with increased exposure to product-liability litigation, 
stronger generic competition and inflation. 
The US has increasingly been seen as the victim of rising costs and 
increasing regulations in the pharmaceutical industry. It is one of the few nations 
where there is a free market for medicines, and as a result it is claimed that the US 
patients are shouldering a larger share of world costs. Previously, most of the 
world's pharmaceutical R&D was conducted in the US market and the higher prices 
in this market were attributed to this, however with the increased regulations 
regarding research and market approval, a significant proportion of R&D is now 
conducted abroad. Nevertheless, in other countries there are certain restrictions on 
the market. For example, in Britain the Pharmaceutical Price Regulatory Scheme 
(PPRS) has evolved. This scheme does not set direct restrictions on prices, but 
rather on the profit rates of companies with regards to their sales in the domestic 
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market and primarily to the NHS. The annual figures of the larger companies are 
checked and if the actual profit rate achieved is above the set target rate for the 
company, it is strongly 'advised' to lower its prices. Such policies have contributed 
to the moderation of prices within the UK, as have such policies as the 'limited list' 
excluding expensive products from NHS prescriptions. This 'limited' list has been 
in action since 1985 and proposals have recently been made to extended it to 
include up to 20% of all NHS prescriptions (Sivell 1993b). It has also been 
announced that the prices paid by the UK government will be cut across the board 
by 2.5% (Abrahams 1993f). This-price cut and the threat of black-listing has led 
one of the leading world companies, RhonePoulenc Rorer to issue a statement that it 
will think twice before launching certain drugs in the UK in the future. Similarly, in 
France there is a Black-List of products which are considered too highly priced 
compared to alternative treatments, and in Germany a reference price system is 
used. 
These are just a few countries which undertake certain price restraints in 
their domestic drugs market. In the US prices are argued to be higher than ever to 
compensate firms for the lower prices they are forced to charge in these other 
countries. Such price restrictions have been increasingly used as health care costs 
have escalated, and it could be argued that the rate of growth of prices in the US has 
accelerated to keep up. With the repeal of the remaining anti-substitution laws in 
1984, pharmacists were again able to use their discretion in substituting cheaper 
generic equivalents for brand-name prescriptions, provided the patient did not 
object. This greatly, increased the possibilities of generic competition. Also, 
measures taken by Health Maintenance Organisations (HMO's) in the US to 
encourage generic utilisation, along with Medicaid's introduction of reimbursements 
limited to generic levels, have all intensified generic competition. This increased 
competition has led to the escalation of branded drug product prices in an attempt to 
maintain revenue levels. 
Although many of the major companies in the US promised to keep price 
increases down to the rate of inflation, Senator Pryor found that the prices paid by 
pharmacists for all prescription medicines increased by 6% in 1992, compared to the 
rate of inflation of 3%. The companies claim that these figures are misleading and 
incorrect, as they neglect the many discounts, rebates and offers that companies now 
market. The drug Sinemet from the joint venture of Du Pont and Merck saw an 
average wholesale price increase of 15.1% in 1992, but Du Pont Merck claim they 
only received a 4% increase. Merck actually contend that their prices increased by 
3.1% before rebates in 1992 and only 2.7% afterwards. Looking at the 1991 
average Fortune profit levels of 3.2% for all industries and the average profit rate of 
the pharmaceutical industry at 12.8%, it is not surprising that there has been strong 
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criticism of the industry (PBN 1993a). The solution to the issue would be a 
determination of exactly what is a high level of pricing and consequently a high 
profit rate. A high price has already been defined as one above the marginal cost of 
production and high profits as those in excess of the costs incurred and a return to 
the investment sufficient to keep the firm in the industry and for the pharmaceutical 
industry to keep it researching. The high R&D expenses and the element of risk 
makes it difficult to determine just what is a normal rate of return for 
pharmaceuticals. In comparison to some industries profits are excessively high but 
then so are the costs and risks involved. What may be a high profit level for one 
industry may only be the normal rate for another industry with very different cost 
and risk elements. Such comparisons will be considered in the following section. 
The threat of price regulations in the US has brought the industry into a 
frenzy of activity. It is believed that price regulations would be fraught with 
difficulties and it would be much better to encourage voluntary measures of price 
containment. If regulation was implemented using cost as an indication of the 
relevant price to impose, there would be little incentive for firms to then minimise 
their costs. At the same time, a calculation on costs would probably be based on an 
industry-wide evaluation. Firms with costs above this average would be forced to 
withdraw from the market, resulting in diminished competition. In the long-run, 
this could mean fewer'players' in the market and probably lead to higher costs and 
prices. Such hopes for a successful voluntary regulatory scheme to avoid the 
pitfalls of price regulation, do not seen to have been effective, and in the face of the 
growing criticism, the major firms such as Merck, Pfizer and Bristol-Myers Squibb 
have again promised to keep prices down below the rate of inflation. Many still 
believe that such voluntary regulation is not enough and there are hopes of radical 
action from the new Clinton administration: The question for the future is will such 
heavy criticism result in price restrictions and what will the industry do? 
As a last note, price competition has always been much more evident in the 
hospital market of the pharmaceutical industry. With only one purchaser, the 
innovative companies have a much more elastic price demand and are therefore, 
more likely to undertake price cuts in the face of competition from generic 
substitutes. 
In summary, pricing in the pharmaceutical industry is yet another area of 
controversy. Obviously, price is related to the characteristics of the products such 
that the more therapeutically beneficial the product, the higher its demand and so 
the higher the price that can be charged. If this therapeutic benefit is considerable, 
perhaps the reward provided to the innovator is only just, however this is a 
statement which is impossible to quantify. Determining the appropriate level of 
reward and so price for each pharmaceutical product, is very much a matter of 
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personal discretion: What can be determined is the general pattern of pricing for the 
industry. 
While prices are initially high for innovative products, there is a growing 
pattern of a declining overall price level as the products becomes older and more 
competition enters the market. With stronger generic competition the rate of this 
price fall will most likely increase, although the price of the pioneer brand products 
tends to remain relatively high. This does not, however, detract from the overall 
pattern of declining prices as the market share of these brand products declines 
significantly. While the innovative companies restrain their price increases under 
the scrutiny of governments world-wide, the growing generic market will continue 
to be involved in vigorous price competition. The future therefore, seems to be one 
of increasing price competition for the industry as a whole. ' 
5.2.4: Profitability 
The pharmaceutical industry is characterised by consistently high profit rates 
which can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, a financial analyst may view such a 
performance as evidence of good management, marketing and a natural return from 
a risky investment, making it an excellent investment opportunity. Secondly, and 
the more publicised interpretation, is that such high profit rates can be seen as 
further evidence of the monopoly power of the innovative companies in this market. 
Although price competition does exist in the pharmaceutical industry, it is still 
possible for the innovative company to cultivate a strong brand and company 
loyalty by intensive product differentiation and so maintain their monopoly power 
even after patent expiration. The resulting high prices charged for such products 
leads to high profit levels. As the pharmaceutical industry is dealing in a very 
emotive 'area, such high profit rates are seen as 'excessive' profiteering from the 
misery of others. Many believe the industry"should never have been allowed to 
continue in the private sector, however there are neither the funds nor the facilities 
to conduct the necessary research in the public sector. 
Even in the face of such criticism, there are a number of arguments that the 
industry have put forward with at least some degree of foundation to justify their 
high profit rates. Firstly, the costs involved'in the R&D process to ensure the 
continuous discovery and development of improved therapeutic products and 
treatments, are considerable. The pharmaceutical industry invests much more than 
most in the R&D process. Looking at the percentage of sales attributed to R&D as 
shown in Figure 5.1, in 1989 R&D represented only 2.1% of all manufacturing sales 
in the UK, 5.17% of the chemical industry sales but 14.7% of pharmaceutical sales. 
Furthermore a NCE is estimated to cost a company upwards of $230m over 10 - 12 
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years, with only a1 in 10,000 chance of a compound actually reaching the market. 
Scherer & Ross (1990) noted the results of a study by Mansfield et al. on the 
riskiness of individual corporate R&D projects 1963 - 1965. They found that the 
average fraction fulfilling their technical objectives were; 
73% in 3 electronic organisations 
70% in 7 chemical laboratories 
50% in laboratories in 4 petroleum companies 
32% in 5 drug companies 
Obviously the risks involved for pharmaceutical R&D are much higher than 
for most industries. The high prices set are, therefore, to give a premium on this 
high risk and an adequate return to ensure continued research will take place. The 
high profit levels found are, in reality, merely ploughed back into the R&D process 
to ensure future successes. Such arguments give an initial justification of the higher 
than average rates of return for the pharmaceutical industry, but there are also other 
possible considerations. 
- Brownlee (1979a) suggested that when looking at the pharmaceutical 
industry profit rates, there may have been repeated underestimates of future returns, 
or perhaps costs may have fallen much more than was expected. If this was so, the 
actual profit rates would be in excess of the expected rates, allowing the critics to 
claim that the industry is experiencing excessive profits. Such explanations are 
plausible, but evidence of their occurrence in the pharmaceutical industry is not 
obvious. Alternatively, he noted the possibility of higher than expected growth 
rates in demand, resulting in higher profit rates for the industry. The pharmaceutical 
industry has experienced a rapid growth in demand since its take-off in the post war 
period. Between 1960 and 1970 Redwood (1988) estimated that the medicinal and 
pharmaceuticals product market grew by approx. 13% per annum. Such high 
growth rates may have some bearing on the higher than average profit rates found in 
this industry. Nevertheless, the overwhelming justification for high profit rates lies 
in the provision of a sufficient return to the R&D investment of the innovative 
company. Provided the industry continues to introduce superior therapeutic 
products and treatments, it is argued they should receive a just reward. While this is 
not disputed, the controversy continues over exactly what this just level of reward 
should be. 
In assessing the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry relative to other 
industries, the treatment of advertising and R&D (ARD) expenditures in the 
calculations of profit rates is a controversial issue. Campbell & Smith (1978) noted 
that between 1958 and 1975 the return on equity for all manufacturing averaged at 
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11.1% while for the pharmaceutical industry this average was ° 18.1 %. This 
difference has continued, with the pharmaceutical industry experiencing profit rates 
well above the average for all industry. In the recent climate of recession when 
most industries have experienced financial hardship and companies have been 
struggling to remain solvent, the pharmaceutical industry has been reporting a return 
on assets of 16% in 1989 (Vagelos 1992). Obviously those who look to criticise the 
industry will pounce on such comparisons as evidence of monopoly power, however 
certain other considerations must be taken into account before judgement can be 
passed. 
In the annual accounting methodology usually adopted by companies, such 
ARD expenditures are treated as current expenses because of the difficulty in 
estimating future sales of undeveloped and unproven drug products. Such 
conventional accounting measures of profitability can, however, seriously overstate 
the real rate of return, especially in those industries which are very capital and 
technologically intensive. For the pharmaceutical industry, such ARD expenditures 
comprise a larger share of total expenditure than is characteristic in manufacturing. 
These expenditures are also, in reality, investments and consequently need to be 
treated differently. High accounting profit rates cry out of possible barriers to entry, 
high prices and monopoly power, especially in association with the dramatic 
increases in price that have taken place recently. Evidence to support this is easy to 
find. For example, prescription prices in the US jumped from $10.73 to $20.78 
between 1981 and 1988 (PBN 1992b). Furthermore, a study by Clarkson (1979) 
conducted on 69 firms in 11 industries with varying levels of intangible capital, 
initially found the accounting rate of return for the pharmaceutical industry as 
18.3%, compared to an overall industry average of 11.2%. 
Nevertheless such industry comparisons are not accurate as they do not take 
into account the discrepancies of accounting measures of profitability. The 
accounting measure is an unreliable indicator of the monopoly power of excess 
profits as it does not reflect the true economic rate of return for an industry. ARD 
expenditures as an investment are undertaken over a long period of time and with a 
certain amount of risk involved. They are therefore, subject to an opportunity cost 
and depreciation factors which are not considered in accounting measures. To 
estimate an appropriate measure of profitability or the economic rate of return, 
Clarkson identified a number of factors to include. Firstly, the period between 
development and the introduction of the product as a productive asset needs to be 
considered. The economic life of the asset after production begins then needs to be 
taken into account, as does the opportunity cost of the resources used in R&D, the 
changes in relative or absolute price levels, the risks involved and the expected 
reward from the assets. For the pharmaceutical industry it is estimated that it will 
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be 10 to 12 years before a compound undergoing tests and development will reach 
the market while there is only a1 in 10,000 chance of a compound actually getting 
this far. 
Stauffer (1975) identified a pattern of four separate flows of funds in the 
process of bringing a drug product to market and afterwards. Firstly, there is the 
actual R&D expenditure followed by the fixed and working capital expenditure on 
facilities to support R&D, manufacturing and distribution. Eventually, there is an 
inward flow of sales revenue dependent on the price of the product, its speed of 
penetration, and the existing competition on the market. Simultaneous to this 
inflow is an outflow attributed to advertising and promotional costs. Figure 5.4 
illustrates this pattern of outlays and receipts, 
Obviously R&D expenditure begins long before the product starts to earn a 
return, however it is not just this accumulated expenditure that must be considered 
but the opportunity cost of that money. To induce any investment, the rate of return 
must meet a minimum level consisting of the interest foregone and a risk premium. 
Clarkson (1979) assumed an opportunity cost for capital of 10%, the prescribed rate 
for US government investment decisions on deferred costs and benefits. He 
concluded that differences between accounting and economic rates of return 
therefore depended on several variables. These included the magnitude and rate of 
growth of advertising, promotion, R&D expenditures, the opportunity cost of capital 
and price level changes. A number of studies have been undertaken to estimate this 
variation in accounting and economic rate of return in the pharmaceutical industry 
and the general profitability of pharmaceutical products. 
Figure 5.4: Outlays and Receipts in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
$ Receipts 
Sales 
Revenue 
Basic Development Y F. C. Marketing Costs R&D R&D 
$ Outlays 
F. C. = fixed capital 
Time 
(Yrs) 
Source: Stauffer 1975, 'Profitability Measures in the Pharmaceutical Industry'. 
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Mund (1970) assumed there was a ten year development period before a 
product reached the market, with all the R&D expenditure made at the mid-point. 
He then assumed that the product had a sales life of fifteen years after this 
development cycle, however during the initial years on the market, certain non- 
recurring promotional and other introductory costs were incurred, and so no return 
on investment was made during the first two years of product life. He then tried to 
determine what annual cash inflow was required for a period of 13 years to pay off 
the accumulated R&D investment on principal and interest basis, at a rate of 13% 
(he also took into account the possible tax relief for companies with their R&D 
expenditures). It was estimated that to obtain a 15% operating margin, annual sales 
of $19.2m were needed to provide an after-tax profit. In the US market only 34 
products had sales of $10m at manufacturing levels in 1967, and only 12 
prescription products had sales in the US of $20m. This- implies, that many 
pharmaceutical products will not earn sufficient returns to their investment, leaving 
the industry reliant on a small number of highly successful products for the bulk of 
their revenue. 
Similarly Grabowski & Vernon (1982) estimated that with a 10% real rate of 
interest averaged between 1970 and 1976, a new drug required nineteen years to 
break-even (recover all R&D, production and marketing costs). If an 8% rate of 
interest was assumed, it would take only 12 years for a new product to reach break- 
even, nevertheless, when one considers that after the development period a product 
in 1978 was estimated to have an effective patent life of only 9.7 years (Statman 
1981), presumably only the very successful products would break-even. Grabowski 
& Vernon did however, find that there were only ,7 out of 37 cases where firms were 
worse off by carrying projects through to marketing. 
Brownlee (1979a) identified the accounting (racc) and economic (recon) rates 
of return using the following equations: 
racc = Y-Kdk-a-m 
K 
Y= sales - current expenditure 
A= advertising capital 
K= tangible capital 
M= R&D capital 
a= advertising expenditure 
recon =Y- Kdk-Ada -Mdm 
K+A+M 
m= R&D expenditure 
da = rate of depreciation of advertising capital 
dk = rate of depreciation of tangible capital 
dm = rate of depreciation of R&D capital 
m= R&D expenditure 
It was then possible for him to establish the relationship between these two 
variables as: 
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racc = recon + FI(recon - g)(dacc-decon)I 
F= function of 
dacc = accounting rate of depreciation decon = Economic rate of depreciation 
g= rate of growth of capital base 
To treat ARD expenditures as current expenses underestimates the current 
earnings and the capital base of the company, such that if the growth rate of ARD 
expenditure is less than the accounting rate of return, this accounting return will 
overestimate the true rate of return. 
Ayanian (1975), by distinguishing the differences between the accounting 
and economic rates of return, found evidence that pharmaceutical companies as a 
group did not earn unusually high rates of return. For a six-firm average the 
accounting rate of return was estimated at 17.7%, while the corrected rate of return, 
assuming a 13% depreciation rate, was 14.06%. Stauffer (1975) estimated the pre- 
tax accounting rate of return for SmithKline & French 1953 - 1969 as 31.2%, while 
the economic rate of return was 17.75%. Comanor (1986) estimated the average 
accounting rate of return to be 17.3% and the economic rate of return as 11.1% for 
the industry. Vagelos (1992) also found such a discrepancy between these two 
measures of return, estimating the return on assets in 1989 for the leading eight 
pharmaceutical companies to be approximately 16%, while the average economic 
return on assets was 11%. All of these studies demonstrate that the accounting rate 
of return significantly overstates the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry, 
however they did not take into account the similar differences which would be 
found in other industries. If this capitalisation and depreciation methodology was 
not applied to other industries, a realistic comparison of profit rates could not be 
conducted. 
Clarkson (1979) rectified this discrepancy `by applying the appropriate 
methods of capitalisation and depreciation on 69 firms in 11 industries. In this 
study a correction was made for inflation, provision was made for the accumulation 
of capital during the basic R&D stages, 'different economic life cycles for 
advertising and basic research and development were viewed, and different 
opportunity costs of capital for the various industries with differing levels of 
intangible capital examined. It was assumed that the economic life of advertising 
could vary from 1 to 10 years depending on the media, scope, clarity, nature of the 
product and life cycle of the product. Advertising was directed at the long-term 
effect, therefore a-lower bound of 3 years for its economic life was assumed. 
Estimates of the average total economic life of a pharmaceutical product, including 
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the R&D time, was 20 to 30 years. From these assumptions the corrected rate of 
return for the pharmaceutical industry 1965 - 1974 was calculated (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5: Accounting and Economic Rates of Return in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 1965 - 1974 (1973 dollars). 
Year Racc % Recon 
1963- ---I T33 11.15 
1966 18.32 11.51 
1967 17.11 11.30 
1968 18.5 11.75 
1969 18.14 11.61 
1970 17.15 11.07 
1971 15.78 11.04 
1972 17.47 11.14 
1973 17.76 10.64 
1974 16.76 9.36 
Source: Kenneth W Clarkson, 'Intangible Capital and Rates of Return 
'(Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977) 
Comparisons between the accounting and 'corrected' rates of return show 
striking differences. For this period, the average accounting rate of return on net 
worth was 17.3%, compared to an estimated average economic rate of return of 
11.1%. Clarkson also attempted to validate this process of capitalisation and 
depreciation of ARD expenditures by looking at the variance of the rate of return 
before and after correction. Some variance in the rates of return will occur due to 
different levels of risk, information and transaction costs, as well as disequilibrium 
forces. If such rates contain systematic biases for some industries, the measured 
variance will tend to be larger than the variance based on corrected rates of return. 
He found that the variance of the rate of return on net worth for the period 1965 - 
1974 fell from 0.67 % to 0.41% when the figures were capitalised, therefore the 
process of capitalisation and depreciation of ARD expenditures was more 
appropriate than the accounting methodology. Clarkson then went one step further 
than the previous studies by looking at the corrected rates of return for a number of 
other industries as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 illustrates the change in the rates of return for all the surveyed 
industries once they were capitalised and depreciated. Industry variations can arise 
from a number of factors: e. g. industries are never in a static equilibrium, therefore 
observed rates may not be the same as usual rates. Furthermore, differences in non- 
money characteristics can cause differences in the rates of return as will differences 
in risk and the quality of resources, entry barriers and possible systematic errors. 
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Nevertheless, from Table 5.6 it is clear that while the pharmaceutical industry still 
holds the highest average rate of return, the difference between it and. other 
industries has fallen quite substantially. Whereas, with the accounting rates of 
return, the pharmaceutical return was 7.1% higher than the industry average, with 
the corrected rates of return this difference is only 3.3%. Clarkson concludes that 
the accounting measures of profitability are not reliable for illustrating monopoly 
power and excess profit. The biases that are evident in accounting rates of return 
make inter-industry comparisons useless and highlight the necessity for corrections 
to take into account ARD expenditures and all the factors that such calculations 
entail. What is clear from his study is that the differences with regards profitability, 
between the pharmaceutical industry and other industries, need not be as substantial 
as critics like to predict. 
Table 5.6: Accounting and Economic Rates of Return in a Number of 
Industries. 
Industry Racc Recon Difference 
Pharmaceuticals 18.3 12.9 -5.4 
Electrical Machinery 13.3 10.1 ----3-. 2 
Food Stuffs 11.8 10.6 -1.2 
Petroleum 11.2 10.8 -0.4 
Chemicals 10.6 9.1 -1.5 
Paper 10.5 1 .1 -0.4 Office Machinery 10.5 
Motor Vehicles 10.5 9.2 -1.3 
Rubber Products 10.1 8.7 -1.4 
Aerospace 9.12 7.4 -1. 
Ferrous Metals 7.6 7.3 -0.3 
Average 11.2 9.6 -1.6 
Variance 7.5 2.5 - 
Source: Kenneth W Clarkson, Intangible Capital and Rates of Return' 
(Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 64. 
-- From the industry comparisons made in Figure 5.1 the pharmaceutical 
industry invested upwards of 14% on R&D in 1989 in the UK, compared to 5.2% 
for the chemical industry and 2.1% for total manufacturing products. Scherer & 
Ross (1990) illustrated the differences in the risk element involved (see page 109) 
therefore it seems justifiable that the pharmaceutical industry profit rates should be 
above those of other industries which do not undertake such extensive and risky 
R&D. Archer (1993) noted that the minimum return on investment for a company 
given the risks involved in pharmaceutical R&D is 15%. 
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One of the recent trends in the pattern of profitability for the pharmaceutical 
industry has been its declining rate. Industry in general, started to experience a 
decline in profit rates, with all industry rates falling from 18.4% in 1960 to 14% in 
1977. The pharmaceutical industry is no exception to this trend, with rates of return 
falling from 29% in 1967 to 21% in 1975 (Reekie 1980). In a study of the British 
pharmaceutical industry Reekie determined that although the industry managed to 
keep its rate of return a third above that of the industrial average 1972 - 1976, this 
was only due to the success of its export performance. He concluded that while the 
pharmaceutical industry and British industry in general, have both become less 
profitable, the pharmaceutical company with only domestic operations has become 
even less attractive as an investment. This is because the declining rates of return 
have been accompanied by rising levels of risk, so that there are now more firms 
making a loss while fewer are proving very successful. 
Currently, the Financial Times fortnightly publication, the Pharmaceutical 
Business News (PBN 1992a), also reported of the slowing down of profits due to 
the increasing inability of companies to raise prices. For the latter half of the 
1980's, profit rates for the industry had been rising by 17 - 20% per year, most of 
which critics associate with the steep increases in price levels in the US. Unlike 
most other nations, the US does not impose any price restrictions and it has been 
argued that the US patient suffers for this lack of foresight, paying higher prices to 
finance R&D and marketing world-wide. The PBN noted considerable differences 
in the views taken by analysts of the effect of such price increase on profitability. 
Shah estimated that the increased prices accounted for between 70 and 80% of the 
profit growth experienced, while Ron Nordmann believed it to be a mere fraction of 
this (PBN 1992a). Whatever the contribution price increases make to profitability, 
the future looks decidedly stormy. 
There is increasing pressure from governments to cut the costs of health care 
provision, with drugs tending to be the most visible target for such expenditure 
reductions. The US Waxman-Hatch Act 1984 made the entry of generics onto the 
market much easier in an, attempt to increase competition and reduce price levels, 
but with the consequence of reducing the potential profit of the innovative company 
by increasing competition and shortening the economic life of products. 
Furthermore, as most governments are undertaking open campaigns to encourage 
generic prescribing, this form of competition can be expected to strengthen even 
more. 
Meanwhile, the current controversy over price increases in the US market 
has brought the industry under even more pressure. President Clinton in his 
presidency campaign targeted the health sector as one of the main areas of reform, 
with special mention of the pharmaceutical industry and the vaccine manufacturers, 
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who he accused of 'shocking' prices and 'unconscionable' profits at the expense of 
poor children's health. It was not only the vaccine market that was specifically 
targeted, but the whole industry with its enduring robust profits. President Clinton 
noted that the profits of the industry were rising at four times the rate of the average 
Fortune 500 company, and compared to other countries the prices in the US were 
shocking. Senator Pryor accused the industry of 'unadulterated greed'. 
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in the US, found that drug 
industry profits exceeded those of similar high-risk, high technology industries by 2 
-3% points. It was estimated that they earn $36m more than is needed to pay off 
R&D costs for each new drug. The excess profit was claimed to represent about 
4.3% of the price of each drug (PBN 1993c). 
Scares in the stock market as a result of such strong public condemnation are 
evident when one looks at the share value of many of the leading companies, not 
just in America, but world-wide. Since the summer of 1992 when it was clear that 
Clinton was leading the polls, drug shares fell by about 17% in the US. Billions of 
dollars have been wiped off the stock market values of firms. It has been estimated 
that the drug sector has under performed the general market indices by 20%, which 
is likely to continue (The Economist 1993c). Whereas in the late 1980's and early 
1990's it was believed that the industry was completely recession-proof, these 
moves in the market have proved that it to can be vulnerable to economic downturns 
and government controls. In Germany, the government tightened doctor's budgets 
resulting in a fall in drug sales of 30% in January 1993. This was the first fall in 
drug sales for a rich country in over a decade and has led to fears that a similar 
action from the US government will have similar results. The Lehman Brothers of 
London estimated that if price controls were introduced into the US market, annual 
growth of drug sales would drop from 15% to 9% (The Economist, 1993c). 
The industry has responded to these condemnations by claiming that it 
already restrained price increases in 1991 and 1992, and will adopt further voluntary 
controls. The threat of a loss of tax benefits and other penalties if prices are not kept 
down, makes the future for the industry look increasingly challenging. 
Nevertheless, it must be recognised that there will always be a demand for the 
products of the pharmaceutical industry. While President Clinton was condemning 
the industry, he was also promising to provide health-care insurance to the 35 
million uninsured Americans. This would obviously increase their consumption of 
drugs and stimulate the market. Furthermore, demand is likely to continue to 
increase as the population ages, not only in America but world-wide. To a certain 
extent the pharmaceutical industry is one of the few industries that is relatively 
protected from recession, as the demand for its products is guaranteed to continue. 
However, it is not protected from government interventions. 
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Obviously one of the main concerns for not only the industry, but for 
society, is the maintenance of a productive stream of R&D for future innovative 
progress. If prices are restrained too much there is a danger that innovation will be 
reduced substantially as investors withdraw, the returns being too small to justify 
the extraordinarily high cost and risks of R&D. It is argued that the large 
companies will be able to withstand possible price restraints by developing drugs 
more efficiently and scaling back on overheads and promotion budgets 
(representing 22.5% of sales compared to 16% R&D - PBN 1993a). As Grabowski 
& Vernon 1992 noted, higher revenues and profits go hand in hand with higher 
R&D spending and presumably more innovative products. A high private return 
may therefore be associated with a high social return, although this does not 
necessarily hold in all circumstances. 
There are a number of processes that the companies could 'trim' without 
touching their R&D facilities, e. g. marketing and administration. A number of 
companies have already made moves towards downsizing programs, BMS planned 
to cut 2280 jobs, Monsanto (November 1992) planned to lay off 10% of its 
workforce and Merck was also considering cuts in personnel (PBN 1992b). Ways 
to increases R&D efficiency have also been proposed, e. g. paying doctors less to 
run clinical trials, licensing agreements, and increased efficiency of the regulatory 
processes in approving products. DiMasi et al. (1991) estimated that with a one 
year reduction in the approval time of the NDA process 8.2% of the total costs of 
R&D would be saved. 
In summary, while it is safe to say pharmaceutical industry profits have been 
consistently higher than industry averages, there is no real evidence that such profits 
have been unjustifiably higher. When the true nature of ARD expenditures are 
taken into account, the differences between this industry and most others becomes 
considerably smaller than previously quoted. Although it remains higher, there is 
no way to determine whether this is merely a reward for the high costs and risks 
involved in R&D, or whether it is, as claimed by critics, the ill-gotten gains from 
monopoly power by way of the patent system and brand loyalty from wasteful 
advertising. Obviously as R&D costs have risen, effective patent life of products 
fallen and generic competition strengthened, the available profits have declined. 
They are still however, higher in comparison to other industry averages. 
While high prices and consequently, high profits have been argued by the 
industry as necessary to continue the financial support of R&D, others argue price 
restraints would not necessarily damage the industry as much as they would like us 
to believe. Expenditures on marketing and perhaps administration are prime targets 
for a trimming down process within the industry without a loss of support to the 
R&D divisions. Although the future may not hold the promise of the huge profits of 
previous periods, there is little doubt that the pharmaceutical industry will continue 
to profit and progress. While price cuts and increased competition will mean the 
end for some firms, the most innovative will likely continue to emerge as 'winners'. 
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Chapter 6: Continuing Controversies in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
6.1: Introduction: There are a number of issues that have continued over the past 
few years to generate controversy for the pharmaceutical industry. The most 
important of these current controversies relate to the criticisms of industry 
operations within the developing world, the potential impact for the industry of a 
united Europe and - the threat of an increasingly competitive Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry. These issues will be considered in this chapter. 
6.2: The Pharmaceutical Industry in the Developing World 
6.2.1: Introduction 
The criticisms that have abounded about the pharmaceutical industry in the 
developed world are accentuated even further in the context of the Developing 
World. Taylor (1986) noted that the poorer nations have-all the current and past 
health problems of the developed world, plus their own special difficulties. These 
special difficulties arise from the one common characteristic of Developing World 
countries, viz. the extreme poverty of the vast majority of the population. Although 
there are significant differences between the nations of the developing world with 
regards to their industrial development and economic and political cultures, 
overwhelming poverty has led to a number of common problems, especially with 
regards to health care provision. 
Obviously if the vast majority of the population are extremely poor there 
will be few funds available for the authorities to provide public services such as 
sanitation, clean water supply, communications and a health care system. This lack 
of infrastructure and funds has 'resulted in a shortage of health care facilities and 
appropriate drugs at public dispensaries, a poor distribution system and a shortage 
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of qualified medical personnel, all of which can have a dramatic effect on a nation's 
health. 
This shortage of facilities has made pharmaceuticals the first line of defence 
against the many diseases that occur in these nations. Whilst expenditure on health 
care is not extremely large the proportion of that which is spent on pharmaceuticals 
is substantial. In developed nations approximately 8- 10% of health care budgets 
are spent on pharmaceuticals, while for the developing nations this is upwards of 
25% and in some over 60% (Silverman, Lee & Lydecker 1982). Table 6.1 
illustrates some of the general differences between a number of selected nations 
categorised as Third World countries, compared to a selection of industrially 
advanced countries of the Developed World. 
Table 6.1: Population, Gross National Product, Life Expectancy and Medical 
Care Expenditure in a number of Selected Countries 1987 
Country 
Population 
(millions, 
mid-1987) 
GNP per callita 
- av. annual 
$1987 growth 
rate 
1965.87 
Life 
Expectancy 
at birth 
(Yr. ) 
1987 
% Share of 
total 
household 
consumption 
1980-1985 
Medical Care 
Ethiopia 44.8 130 0.1 47 3 
Mozambique 14.6 170 - 48 - 
India 797.5 300 1.8 58 
Zimbabwe 9.0 580 0.9 48 0 
Egypt 50.1 680 3.5 61 14 
Colombia 29.5 1240 2.7 66 7 
Mexico 81.9 1830 2.5 69 5 
Brazil 141.4 2020 4.1 65 6 
Argentina 31.1 2390 0.1 71 4 
Korea, Rep. 42.1 2690 6.4 69 5 
Italy 57.4 10350 2.7 77 10 
UK 56.9 10420 1.7 75 8 
FDR 61.2 14400 2.5 75 13 
US 243.8 18530 1.5 75 14 
Switzerland 6.5 21330 1.4 77 15 
Source: 'World Development Report 1989, Financial Systems and Development. '; 
World Development Indicators. 
It can clearly be seen that there is a wide variety of development within the 
Third World countries, from the very poorest such as Ethiopia to the upper middle 
income group containing Brazil, Argentina and the Republic of Korea. Even more 
apparent are the differences between these nations and the developed countries of 
the world. Comparing the richest and the poorest nations of this selection, 
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Switzerland has a GNP per capita of over' 164 times that of Ethiopia, the life 
expectancy at birth is 30 years longer and the average share of household 
consumption on medical care is 5 times greater. Even the difference between the 
highest middle income nation, the Korean Republic and the poorest developed 
nation selected, Italy, remains substantial. The Italian GNP per capita is over three 
times greater than that of the Korean Republic, there is an eight year difference in 
the life expectancy at birth, while Italy spends double the percentage of total 
household consumption on medical care than do the Korean Republic. 
Continuing this comparison at a global level, world drug consumption has 
risen from $43bn in 1976 to $94. lbn in 1985, with an average Annual increase of 
9.1%. However, in 1976 over three-quarters of this world consumption was 
accounted for by the developed world representing only 27% of the world 
population. By 1985 this proportion of world consumption was accounted for by 
only 21% of the world population in the developed countries. " In other words the 
majority of the world population had no access to modem-day pharmaceuticals. 
W. H. O. (1988) estimated that of 5bn people in the world, between 1.3 and 2.5bn 
have little or no regular access to essential drugs. 
Even within the Third World this discrepancy continued, with eight' of the 
top newly industrialising countries consuming 64% of the available drugs in 1985. 
In terms of value each inhabitant of a developed country consumed on average 8.5 
times as many drugs as an inhabitant in a developing country, a 
. 
figure which had 
increased to 11.5 times as much by 1985 (W. H. O. 1988). When one considers that 
in these developing countries the incidence of disease and the rates of mortality and 
morbidity are considerably higher than in developed countries, these figures just do 
not make sense. 
Breckenridge (1986) identified four distinct stages of development in the 
developed world. They began with environmental improvements such as advances 
in sanitation and hygiene, which were then followed by the advent of curative and 
preventative medicines. 
.i 
After this stage came the prevention of diseases by 
improved living conditions and finally the current stage of development, the advent 
of curative drugs for degenerative and chronic diseases such as cancer and senile 
dementia. The developing countries neither have the funds nor the capabilities to 
initiate such environmental improvements. In such conditions the short-term 
immediate alleviation of health problems are therefore sought by the use of 
medicines alone. While it is recognised that the advent of medicines proved to have 
a significant impact on health in the developed world, it was but one of many 
contributing factors. The use of medicines alone, in these countries, is not a long- 
term solution, especially as the application of such medicines cannot be sufficiently 
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undertaken, again due to a lack of funds. The consequence for these countries is 
therefore a lack of health care structure and a severe shortage of drug products. 
Health care provision is not typically a prime policy objective for the 
authorities in developing countries, and consequently has not been the main target 
of their scarce funds. The result is little, if any, public health care system. Supplies 
of pharmaceuticals are scarce as the foreign currency to buy imports is insufficient, 
while for those which are bought there are neither adequate storage facilities nor 
distribution systems to enable a rapid and fair distribution of effective medicines. 
To further exacerbate conditions, there is considerable irrational prescribing and 
improper dispensing due to the severe shortages of qualified medical personnel and 
agencies to overview the products which are available. Table 6.2 illustrates the 
physician/patient ratio of a number of selected countries. 
Table 6.2: Population per Physician and Nurse in Selected Countries 1965 and 
1984 
Population per physician 
Population per Nursing 
Person 
Country 1964 1984 1965 1984 
Ethiopia 70190 77360 5970 5290 
Mozambique 18000 37950 5370 5760 
India 4880 2520 650 17 
Zimbabwe 8010 6700 990 1000 
Egypt 2300 790 2030 800 
Colombia 2500 1190 890 630 
Mexico 208 1240 980 880 
Brazil 2500 1080 = 3100 1210 
Argentina 600 370 610 980 
Korea, Rep. 2680 1170 2970 590 
Italy 1850 230 790 260 
UK 870 230 200 120 
FDR 640 380 500 230 
US 670 470 310 7 
Switzerland 710 700 270 1 
'7 130 
Source: 'World Development Report 1989, Financial Systems and Development': 
World Development Indicators. 
It is obvious from the above table that there is a severe shortage of qualified 
medical personnel in the developing countries of the world. This has resulted in a 
number of important issues, primarily irrational prescribing practices due to 
ignorance and a shortage of medical skills. As the public provisions for health are 
inadequate and the private sector has grown to satisfy the increasing demand for the 
miracle of modern medicines, the influence and importance of the pharmaceutical 
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industry dominated by the foreign MNEs has escalated. Doctors in these nations 
seem more susceptible to the influences of this industry as there are fewer 
governmental regulations in existence or enforced concerning the promotion and 
supply of safe, efficacious products. The culmination of these factors is a health 
care provision which is very open to abuses from all sides. 
The lack of public health' provision has left the private sector to satisfy 
demand, while the lack of regulations for the private sector has allowed rather 
dubious methods of operation to come into play, from not only those 
pharmaceutical companies present in the countries but also from the unregulated 
availability of ethical drugs from private dispensing pharmacies. Many 
prescription-only drugs can be obtained over the counter with ease and often in 
questionable conditions and dosage forms. The private sector is a potentially 
unrestricted export market for the MNEs and unscrupulous traders within the 
industry, which has resulted in a number of unwarranted problems for these nations. 
6.2.2: Problems Facing the Developing Countries 
The problems facing the developing countries come under two categories: 
firstly there are the problems resulting from the lack of resources these nations have 
available to provide an adequate health care service. Secondly, there are the 
problems that have been created by the dubious dealings of those supplying the 
demand for drugs. This demand is based on the assumption that drugs can provide 
the prime source of health improvement, therefore the pharmaceutical industry and 
the private distributors are the main culprits in this area. 
Looking at the first of these categories some of the difficulties facing the 
developing nations have already been introduced. To recap, these nations generally 
have very little industrial development and the majority of the population therefore 
rely on subsistence farming for survival. This is heightened by the often political 
instability of these nations, many of whom have only recently achieved 
independence from Western powers, such as Indian independence from Britain in 
1947, and the People's Republic of Mozambique from Portugal in 1975. Therefore, 
many have not established governing systems, and existing political rivalries often 
culminate in civil wars as seen in many of the African countries, such as Somalia. 
With the undeveloped economy and political instability, those who do 
obtain power are often not interested in developing a health care system and 
consequently very few of these countries can provide adequate health support for 
their people. There is no money to fund the efficient spread of a health care system 
throughout the country, nor foreign exchange to purchase the necessary levels of 
essential drugs from overseas. Likewise, local suppliers seldom exist and the few 
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that do are unable to meet the requirements of the country. W. H. O. (1988) 
estimated that world drug production in 1973 was US $29.6bn of which the 
developing countries produced only 10.5%. By 1980, while world production had 
risen to $83.5bn, developing country production had only increased to 11.5%. Also 
over two-thirds of this production took place in only six countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico and the Korean Republic. While some nations had 
developed some industrial strength and reduced their dependence on imported 
finished goods, others remained heavily dependent. For example, the average Latin 
American country could produce nearly two-thirds of its requirements, while many 
African countries remained almost totally dependent (W. H. O. 1988). - Table 6.3 
shows the extent of trade in pharmaceuticals for the developed and developing 
countries of the world in 1984. 
Table 6.3: Pharmaceutical Imports and Exports 1984. 
Region Imports (%) Exports (o 
Developing Countries 36 6 
Developed Countries 64 94 
Source: World Health Organisation (1988); The World Drug Situation 
Where the developed countries experienced a huge trade surplus in 
pharmaceuticals, the developing countries experienced a huge trade deficit, draining 
their already meagre foreign funds. 
In addition to this shortage of foreign exchange to purchase needed drugs 
from abroad,, the system of legislation is usually inadequate and results in 
substantial delays of imports at customs, in storage and in transit. Often by the time 
the drugs reach the patient they have been so long in transit they have passed their 
expiry date, which is magnified by the fact that they are kept in insecure warehouses 
from which a substantial portion is stolen. Blumberg & Wilensky (1988) noted how 
one African participant at a conference on Pharmaceuticals in Developing 
Countries, estimated that 20% of his country's drugs were pilfered out of the 
system. This is exacerbated by a poor communications networks, non-existent 
roads, the lack of petrol and a lack of adequate transportation vehicles. This is 
especially true of the more rural areas where more often than not, these drugs are in 
even more demand. 
These factors are not helped by the lack of trained medical professionals in 
these countries. Often those who are adequately trained are attracted out of the 
country. Likewise those that stay are ill-equipped and poorly paid giving them the 
incentive to supplement their income through dispensing the drugs they prescribe, 
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selling free gifts they have received from pharmaceutical companies, prescribing 
more than necessary, and perhaps using exclusively expensive brand name 
products. Furthermore, the doctors and medical staff in these countries rely heavily 
on the pharmaceutical industry for their postgraduate education, which will 
obviously be biased in MNEs own favour. Wartensleben (1983) estimated that for 
700 different drugs there are 20,000 trademarks in the US, and assuming there are 
30,000 additional names elsewhere, for the same 700 compounds an average of 70 
names per drug is found. It is impossible for a doctor to be fully informed on the 
relative merits of each drug in a developed nation let alone a developing one where 
communications are so limited. It is therefore unlikely that rational prescribing will 
always occur in developing countries because of the barriers for doctors in isolated 
areas in obtaining objective information for rational decision making. 
Greenhalgh (1987) in a study of prescribing behaviour in India, found that 
prescribing practices in large urban teaching hospitals compared favourably with 
studies of similar institutes in the West. Likewise, prescribing in rural public health 
clinics showed this, as they were supervised by principals in the teaching hospitals. 
However, as already mentioned, the vast majority of health care is provided by the 
private sector and dispensing pharmacies. She found these institutions to be 
characteristic of unnecessary and inappropriate prescribing and dispensing. 
Another factor which results from this shortage of trained personnel is the 
high proportion of self-medication. Hardon (1987) conducted a study of common 
childhood diseases in Santa Catalina and found that 42% of children received no 
medicines, 38% were treated at home and only 20% saw trained medical staff, 
either at hospital (15%) or at a health centre (5%). Furthermore, of those cases 
where no doctor was consulted, over half of them used pharmaceuticals which could 
be prescription or non-prescription. The lack of regulation in such countries has 
allowed the development of a private market where numerous prescription drugs are 
readily available over the counter, with no requirement of a prescription and in 
dubious conditions. Greenhalgh (1987) again found that 64% of the patients buying 
drugs from a pharmacy had no prescription and in fact, 84% of the self-medicated 
drugs bought had provisions for less than a week. In 34% of these cases, less than a 
days supply of the drug was bought because there was simply not enough money to 
purchase the amount of drugs required for a full course of treatment. This is 
especially significant with antibiotics, as it not only renders them ineffective, but 
contributes to the development of drug resistant infections. Effective drug therapy 
is also hampered by the improper conditions which many are kept in, with no 
information provided to the patient on dosage requirements. Compliance with the 
designated requirements of the drug treatments as given in the developed countries 
are therefore unknown and consequently not followed. To have the optimal benefit 
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one of the necessary conditions of drug use is compliance with the specified 
treatment length and dosages. In developing countries such conditions are often 
impossible to satisfy. 
All of these difficulties are enhanced by the behaviour of the actors in the 
health provision stage, the main one being the western pharmaceutical industry. As 
already mentioned, there is generally very little or no indigenous industry to satisfy 
the demand requirements of these countries. They are therefore, potentially 
valuable export markets for the MNEs who have been faced with demand curves 
that are rising exponentially. It is often thought that the developing countries are 
merely a spillover market for the multinational pharmaceutical industry, and as such 
countries have very little purchasing power, their effect on the dynamics of the 
industry is negligible. The industry can therefore use all those techniques of 
marketing that have been criticised in the developed world without fear of 
retaliation. Looking at a number of selected developing countries, the MNE market 
share is shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: MNE Market Share (%) in the Third World 
Country MNE Market Share 
Egypt 30% 
Argentina 50% 
India 70% 
Brazil 78% 
Ecuador 90% 
African nations 100% 
Source: W. H. O. 1988, 'The World Drug Situation'. 
Obviously as drugs play a major role in health care in developing countries, 
and the MNEs dominate so much of this market, they hold considerable power. 
This allows the MNEs to set high prices and undertake unscrupulous marketing 
campaigns, which go unchecked in many cases because of the unenforced or non- 
existence of protective legislation. The main areas of criticism of the MNE in 
developing countries arise from the policies of double standards of drug promotion, 
the marketing of inappropriate drugs, drug dumping, the promotion of brands and 
trademarks, overpricing and restrictive clauses. 
1. Double Standards of Promotion: There has been a considerable amount of 
study conducted on the double standards of pharmaceutical companies with regards 
to their promotional activities in the developed and developing countries. 
Silverman & Lydecker (1981) conducted a study on such double standards in the 
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Third World and found numerous examples of the widening of indications for drugs 
and the glossing over of many major side-effects. They noted how 
Chloramphenicol, discovered in 1947 and highly effective against a wide range of 
assorted infections, was promoted in developed countries with appropriate warnings 
about the possible lethal side-effects of aplastic anaemia. Caution was noted with 
reference to its use for minor infections, while it was never to be used for 
prophylaxis. However, in Indonesia, Malaysia, Central America, Singapore and the 
Philippines this drug was recommended for much broader uses with fewer 
warnings. A further example they found was in antibiotics, and especially 
combination antibiotics. These combination antibiotics are a fixed mixture"of two 
or more drugs, whose clinical value has been found dubious in many developed 
countries. The formulation of such products is left completely up to the 
manufacturer, and so it is difficult to regulate with regards to safety, absorption and 
of course, adverse reactions. It is possible for such combinations to produce much 
more varied and unidentifiable reactions in patients, hence, the FDA removed such 
products from the US market, describing them as 'ineffective'. In developing 
countries the promotion of these combination products has led to their mass 
popularity, despite their ineffectiveness and expense. 
A further example of this double standard of promotion is Searle's Lomotil 
(diphenoxylate/atropine - an äntidiarrheaol) which was contraindicated for children 
under 2 years of age in the US, but recommended for infants of 3 months in Hong 
Kong, Thailand and the Philippines (Smith & Quelch 1991). Braithwaite (1989) 
noted the findings of the government in South Korea in 1978 when they reviewed 
2058 indications for 1097 products and found that only 50.2% of them were valid. 
Lee, Lurie, Silverman & Lydecker (1991) conducted a number of follow-up 
studies. They reviewed information given to doctors in the US, the UK, 6 Latin 
American countries, 15 Central African countries and 4 Asian countries (1980). 
This information covered 34 drug entities or fixed combinations marketed as 515 
drugs by 149 companies. They found that doctors in the Third World still received 
grossly exaggerated claims of efficacy and a glossing over of hazards. Braithwaite 
(1989) identified one of the greatest tragedies of the overuse of chloramphenicol in 
the Third World in Mexico in 1972/3. This product had been prescribed and used 
for health problems for which it was not designed. When it should have been 
invaluable for the treatment of a typhoid fever epidemic almost 100,000 victims 
could not be helped because the particular typhoid bacteria had developed a 
resistance to the drug after long exposure to it 20,000 of the typhoid victims died. 
Lee, Lurie, Silverman & Lydecker (1991), however, found evidence that 
MNEs are becoming both more willing to restrict claims of efficacy to what is 
scientifically justifiable, and to disclose major hazards. The problem has now 
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shifted to the promotional activities and fraudulent production of the growing 
number of indigenous companies, a matter which will be approached later. 
2. Inappropriate Products: A follow-on from this double standard of 
promotional activity by the MNEs in developing countries is their marketing of 
inappropriate products. In countries where public funds and income per capita are 
so low, it makes sense to spend what money there is wisely. With reference to 
pharmaceuticals this implies buying those products which will cure or prevent 
specific diseases, in the correct amounts and with proper instructions. This 
unfortunately, does not happen very often. Patel (1983a) in a study of Bangladesh 
found that over 60% of health care expenditure was accounted for by drugs, but 
approximately 70% of annual drug sales were for preparations which were 
described as therapeutically useless by the British National Formulary (BNF) and 
the FDA. Melrose (1983) found that in 1980 in North Yemen 17.8% of the total 
pharmaceutical imports were vitamins and tonics, and only 1.3% were for the 
treatment of three of the most widespread diseases in that country; malaria, 
bulharzia and tuberculosis. 
Hartog and Schulte-Sasse (1990) reviewed the exports of German and Swiss 
pharmaceuticals into the developing world in 1988. Of 1273 German products and 
1084 Swiss products evaluated, only 12% and 17% respectively met with the 
W. H. O. recommendations on essential drugs. This recommendation referred to 
drug products that appropriately fulfilled the majority of disease requirements in a 
country at least cost. 60% of the German and 48% of the Swiss imports were 
deemed as inappropriate, although overall, there was a slight improvement in 
appropriate products imported, from 34% to 40 % in 1984-1988. Table 6.5 shows 
some of the findings of Hartog and Schulte-Sasse with regards the proportion of 
essential drugs exported from Germany to developing countries. 
Table 6.5: The Number of Preparations in various Compendia of German 
Products 1988 
Area No. of Drugs No. of Suppliers No. of Essential Drugs % 
Africa 375 12 53 14 
India 195 12 31 19- 
Philippines 323 18 53 1 
Mexico 343 13 58 17 
C. America 474 14 9 12 
Colombia 305 7 63 21 
Brazil 342 11 51 15 
Source: Hartog & Schulte-Sasse (1990), 'German and Swiss Drug Supplies to the 
Third World', H. A. I. 
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Greenhalgh (1987) in her study of prescribing practices in India noted the 
overuse of nutritional supplements when the real solution would have been an 
improvement in the quality and variety of food. In many instances the demands of 
the Western world have been transplanted into the developing world where they are 
not appropriate. Nevertheless, the strength of promotional campaigns by MNEs 
have created a market which is dominated by the demand for luxury goods, while 
what is really needed is a reliable supply of essential pharmaceuticals appropriate to 
the diseases patterns of the countries. 
In addition to the marketing of inappropriate drug products there is also the 
problem of inappropriate dosage forms as found by Medawar (1979). He found that 
the maximum recommended dosage for Burrough-Wellcome's Migril, for 
migraines, was twice as high or even more, in Africa and Asia than in the US and 
UK. Ironically the effect of such high dosage recommendations in Africa was a 
drug induced headache. There are obvious dangers in this practice as well as the 
fact that such products will undoubtedly be more expensive. This is especially 
evident when it is considered that many pharmaceuticals are purchased without 
professional consultation from pharmacies which are likely to employ untrained 
staff. Braithwaite (1989) refers to a number of studies where prescription-only, 
products in developed countries have been purchased with ease over-the-counter of 
pharmacies in developing countries. He experienced this himself in Mexico City 
when he visited 8 pharmacies complaining of 'la tourista' (traveller's diarrhoea). At 
three of the pharmacies, he was offered Lomotil, a prescription drug with worrying 
side-effects, but one which might have been prescribed in the US. At the fourth he 
was offered clioquinol (Ciba-Geigy Enterovioform) and at another a variation of 
this, Ciba-Geigy Mexaforma. Clioquinol is banned in many countries, and where it 
is permitted by prescription, it is specifically warned that the drug should not be 
applied to its historical use of traveller's diarrhoea. The sixth pharmacy offered a 
drug called Yodozono which - was not listed in the Mexican Diccionario de 
Especialidades Farmaceuticas, the seventh offered an antibiotic and the last 
pharmacy offered him Chloromycetin. 
Such inappropriate prescribing and purchasing can have quite devastating 
effects. Initially, such purchases of inappropriate products and dosage forms have 
no therapeutic benefit to the health problems of the country, and may in reality 
cause drug-induced illnesses which go largely unnoticed. Furthermore, purchases 
of these products merely drain the already scarce resources of the country, leaving 
less to be devoted to other measures such as improvements in the infrastructure of 
the health syst; m, improvements in public provisions of sanitation, water supply, 
etc. 
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3. Drug Dumping: Drug dumping can take a number of forms, from the dumping 
of products which have been banned elsewhere or which have been a batch of low- 
quality products, to the dumping of products that have passed their shelf-life dates. 
Examples of such dumping practices have been readily available. For example, 
Upjohn's Depo-Provera, an injectable drug preventing conception in women for 3- 
6 months, was banned from human testing in the US but was available without 
prescription in Central America. Similarly A. H. Robin's Dalkon Shield was 
recalled after at least 17 deaths in the US; but was subsequently provided to the 
Third World countries through the US governments Office of Population 
(Braithwaite 1989). 
In 1981 two Hoffmann-La Roche executives were jailed in Morocco for 
obliterating the expiry dates on a number of products that were imported to the 
market (Braithwaite 1989). Obviously the temptation for more sales was too strong. 
Dowie (1979) produced a list of strategies that companies could use in dumping 
activities. The easiest strategies are perhaps the name change or the formula 
change. Similarly there is the last-minute pull-out, whereby if a product looks like 
it will not gain approval in a market, it is withdrawn rather than risk non-approval. 
There is also the possibility of dumping the whole factory in the intended market, as 
there would likely be few if any strict regulations on safety and quality testing in the 
developing countries. Next there is the skip, whereby if an importing country only 
allows those products which have been approved in the country of export origin the 
company moves registration to a country with few requirements. One such country 
is Guatemala, where registration is only a formality. Finally, there is the possibility 
of an ingredient dump, where the company has formulating and packaging facilities 
in the intended market and simply exports the separate ingredients to these 
facilities. 
Previously, US law inhibited the export of products to Third World 
countries which had not been approved in the US market; however, it is easy for 
companies to get around such restrictions. Furthermore, this provision was 
withdrawn by the 1986 Drug Export Amendments Act, which now permits the 
export of drugs unapproved for use in the US provided that both the recipient 
government is notified of the regulatory status of the drug in the US, and that these 
recipient countries cannot re-export. Such measures and the general controversy 
surrounding this practice have led to a reduction in the amount of dumping which 
now takes place, but it is by no means completely eradicated. 
Along a similar line as product dumping is the claim that developing 
countries are used as the guinea pigs of the pharmaceutical industry for research and 
testing purposes. It has been claimed that products considered too risky for testing 
in the developed world are merely shipped over to the Third World where tests are 
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conducted without supervision, and in some cases without the informed consent of 
the participant as required by the Helsinki Declaration 1964 (Braithwaite 1989). He 
argued that companies viewed life as of a lesser value in these countries, while the 
absence of strict regulations governing testing in humans makes them attractive as 
testing sites. ý Such trials, also save money for the company by allowing them to 
eliminate obviously 'bad' drugs which would otherwise have cost them considerably 
more money to test in developed countries. A further attraction of these countries is 
the reduced possibility of legal action from the patients and the possibility of 
increasing knowledge about the product while realising sales. The first large-scale 
trials of oral contraceptives from Searle took place in 1953 in Puerto Rico. Johnson 
& Johnson and Syntex followed this example with testing in Puerto Rico, Haiti and 
Mexico, while the first major US clinical trials were conducted on women from 
low-income groups (Braithwaite 1989). 
4. Brand and Trademark Promotion: The next problem facing the developing 
world due to MNE activities is the promotion of brands and trademarks in the 
market, - which- cultivates expensive irrational prescribing and drug consumption 
patterns: The extensive promotional campaigns undertaken by MNEs yields a great 
deal of influence over the prescribing doctors and on the dispensing pharmacies in 
developing countries. As already mentioned, the main source of postgraduate 
education for medical staff in these countries is the drug industry. In some 
instances there is one medical sales representative to every three or four doctors in 
the Third World compared to a ratio of one to seven in the UK (Fabricant & 
Hirschhorn 1987). By undertaking this heavy promotion of brand name and 
trademarks, the companies retain substantial market power and are able to restrict 
competition and subsequently charge high prices. This behaviour promotes 
irrational prescribing as there are often cheaper effective generic versions of 
products available. Nevertheless, the brand or trademark is required to satisfy the 
doctor and/or the patient. Lall (1985) considers the fact that the hold branded drugs 
have, even in countries which do not grant patents, suggests that they are a more 
powerful means of appropriating the returns from innovation than the intellectual 
property system. 
Trademarks from the buyer's point of view identify a given level of product 
quality, while from the sellers view point they identify an exclusive source and 
serve as a repository for 'goodwill', protected from the unfair competition of 
imitators (Greer 1979). Their promotion can lead to errors of commission or errors 
of omission. The former of these errors refers to the possibility that the consumer 
may purchase more than he would if he had perfect knowledge of the product. In 
the latter case he may buy less than he would if he had full knowledge. 
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Trademarks, in one way, reduce the uncertainty surrounding certain products, but 
they also have a persuasive effect rather than a totally informative one. In 
developing countries the majority of trademarks are owned by foreign companies 
whose promotion of them and their brand products can distort demand in the 
market. This results in wasted resources. I- 
The demand patterns of the developed world seem to have been transplanted 
into the developing world by the activities of the MNEs in the market. These 
companies have successfully cultivated an unfailing belief in the capabilities of 
modern pharmaceuticals to cure all ills., Greenhalgh (1987) in her study of 
prescribing practices in India noted that the mean prescription rate of doctors was 
2.9 prescriptions per patient, with 96% of these prescriptions by brand name. 
This market power permits the foreign MNEs to charge high prices and 
leads to a repeat of the criticisms of overpricing and excessive profits that are found 
in the developed, world.. As, in most countries in the developed world, the 
pharmaceutical companies argue that they must set prices substantially higher than 
manufacturing costs in order to recoup the R&D expenses and risks undertaken. It 
is however, arguable whether this is really necessary in the developing world. The 
basis of this is that the pharmaceutical industry is only estimated to spend 
approximately 1% of its total R&D budget on diseases specifically for the 
developing countries (Läll 1985). The majority of the products which are available 
on the market of developing countries are available everywhere, and are primarily 
designed for the developed markets. As these products are therefore not designed 
for their requirements, why should they pay for their development, especially as the 
prices are so high? 
UNIDO (1984) found the price of 1000 ampicillin capsules of 500mg 
varying from US $ 262.1 in Grenada, $223.7 in St. Lucia, $184.4 in Antigua, $150 
in Jamaica and $106.08 in Monsterrat, all from the same supplier. International 
price discrimination often results in lower prices for the developing countries 
because of their lack of purchasing power, although these prices are still much 
higher than necessary. The real costs of the drug products relative to the purchasing 
power of the population are considerably higher. For example, the real costs of 
drugs in Malawi are over twelve times greater than in the US, while Sri Lanka also 
experiences approx. 60% higher real costs (Schut & Van Bergeijk 1986). 
Part of this higher price is hidden by the use of transfer pricing. Transfer 
pricing occurs when parent companies engage in intra-company dealings with their 
subsidiaries in other countries and charge prices other than the international arms- 
length prices. Usually such transfer prices need to include production costs, a 
contribution to current R&D, a contribution to the parent company's overheads, and 
an appropriate rate of interest on centrally invested capital including a margin for 
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inflation and currency fluctuations. It is, however, impossible to determine how 
companies set their transfer prices, which leaves this action open to abuse. With the 
different regulations in each country with regards to profit rate, taxation, and 
perhaps even the political climate which might effect the value of the currency, 
transfer pricing is an easy tool for the parent company to move funds into those 
areas where it will benefit the most. 
5. Restrictive Clauses: This intra-company activity also has a number of 
consequences for restrictive clauses in industrial contracts which can prove a very 
difficult problem for developing countries to solve. It has already been seen that 
foreign MNEs dominate the market share of most developing countries. This is 
accomplished by imports and by the establishment of subsidiaries in various areas. 
The incentives to establish such subsidiaries are varied. They range, from the 
possible economies of scale realised from cheaper labour and property with 
formulation and packaging subsidiaries, to the exploitation of tax incentives from 
host governments, the evasion of various host government laws concerning imports 
or the evasion of stricter regulations in home countries. Table 6.6 shows the share 
of MNE subsidiaries in 1980 for a selection of countries. 
Table 6.6: Market Share (%) of MNE Subsidiaries 1980 
Area Country 
MNE sub. 
market share (%) 
Argentina 53 
Mexico 72 
Latin America Brazil 78 
Costa Rica 82 
Colombia 88 
Egypt 30 
Africa Kenya 90 
Sierra Leone 100 
Korea, Rep. 18 
Asia Malaysia 64a 
India 
!; 7ý 
a= 1978 figures used 
Source: UNIDO, 1984 ' 
This industrial activity in developing economies by foreign MNEs has both 
desired benefits and unwanted consequences for the host country. As mentioned 
before, these developing economies usually have very little industrial development 
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and in order to improve this situation need access to technology which can often 
only be provided by the MNEs. Ideally the MNE will proceed with a transfer of 
technology into the economy and subsequent investment which' will benefit the 
economy as a whole. Unfortunately, things are not as simple as this. More often 
than not, the technology transferred by the MNEs is not appropriate for the 
resources that the economy has, and even if it was, it is restricted by various 
contractual clauses which prohibit-its spread throughout the economy. These 
restrictive clauses can come in the form of patent requirements, tie-in clauses, 
export restrictions, post-expiry restrictions and non-competitive clauses. 
Patent requirements allow the company exclusive rights to supply a 
particular product in that market. Very often, even when the developing country 
allow patents, over 90% of them are owned by foreign concerns. The majority of 
these will never be used, but are held mainly to restrict the entry of competition, 
especially local competition. Penrose (1973) found that the prices of patented 
products imported into Colombia in 1968 were extremely high compared to the 
prices of the same products offered by sellers not restrained by patent. The 
overpricing in this instance ranged from 74% to 5647%. 
Tie-in clauses usually relate to the obligatory use of bulk drugs provided by 
the licenser for the formulation and packaging by the licensee. This may often be 
desirable for the licensee as it ensures supply, however it is an ideal opportunity for 
companies to make use of transfer pricing activities. It is also a means for the 
parent company to ensure a continued market for their products. 
Export restrictions are simply what they imply: the banning of exports by a 
subsidiary or contractual company. If the subsidiary or local company relies on the 
technology of the parent for its existence, such export restrictions may hamper 
future possibilities for expansion. If the domestic market is limited and, the 
company wish to expand via exporting their products they can not do so or they will 
loose the technical support of the parent. This measure also insulates the parent 
from future competition on the international market. 
Next there is the possibility of post-expiry restrictions, whereby the licenser 
has only 'rented' the technology out for a specific period of time after which the 
licensee is not allowed to use it or make it known to others. Finally, there are 
specific non-competitive clauses which relate to the freedom of the licensee 
regarding the manufacture and/or selling of competing products, and the acquisition 
of competing technology. 
Any of these restrictions can be enforced on the developing country which is 
not in the strongest of bargaining positions. Previously such clauses have been very 
difficult to regulate and have resulted in both high prices in developing countries 
relative to their purchasing power, and consequently higher profits for the MNEs. 
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6.2.3: Policy Options for Developing Countries 
In 1976, a Conference of the Heads of State recognised the politically 
central role of new pharmaceutical policies in developing countries to ensure access 
of required drugs to the entire population at a reasonable cost. Obviously, one of 
the main weakness of the developing countries was their lack of regulatory structure 
and control, which led 'to practices which wasted scarce national economic 
resources, resulted in an undesirable degree of dependence on foreign companies 
and saw the exploitation of the majority of the population. The first step to 
improving such a situation lies in the development of a-relevant national drugs 
policy which may include a variety of policy options. 
The main aim of the national drug policy is to make effective, safe and low- 
cost drugs available to meet the needs of the entire population, ensuring their 
rational use and also stimulating, when economically feasible, a national 
pharmaceutical industry which will provide for the local market and support 
economic growth and overall development strategies of the country. This is based 
on the recommendations of W. H. O. (1977) who originally suggested the potential 
importance of an Essential Drugs List (EDL) for developing countries. 
The first of these policy options open to developing countries is based on the 
use of an EDL which limits the drugs available to the public sector to those which 
are believed to be essential and appropriate. Such a limited list protects the public 
from low benefit, high risk products, while promoting the cost-effective use of 
limited resources. This list can also ease management problems of procurement, 
storage and distribution enabling the authorities to perfect the arrangements 
necessary for the specified drug products., It is easier to set up adequate storage 
facilities and to determine which are the best suppliers in the market for a limited 
number of products than to get bogged down by the extensive range of possible 
products available. The restriction of available products to only these essential and 
appropriate products also facilitates measures to improve the quality of prescribing 
and makes it easier for the authorities to provide objective information and 
undertake the monitoring of drug uses. 
A number of developing countries have undertaken to develop and 
implement such EDL's. Patel (1983a) noted how in Bangladesh (1982), the 
Ministry of Health accepted recommendations to the National Drug Policy and 
introduced an EDL of 150 essential drugs and 100 supplementary drugs. Over 
1,700 drug products were withdrawn from the market. It had been estimated that in 
1981 US $75m were spent on over 3,500 brands of allopathic drugs with 
approximately half of this on unnecessary and useless medicines. Therefore there 
were huge potential savings from the implementation of this EDL. Another 
example was in Sri Lanka when before the introduction of a limited list there were 
almost 4,000 drugs in over 6,000 dosage forms. After the introduction of an EDL, 
this was reduced to approximately 600 drugs in 1000 dosage forms and spending on 
pharmaceuticals was estimated to have dropped by about 40% (Wolffers 1987). -, In 
Mozambique (Marzagäo & Segall 1983), the first national formulary in 1977 
reduced the priority list from 1,100 to 640 products and then in } 1980 this was again 
reduced to just over 500 items. I't. 
M. Patel (1983) estimated that the rational choice of drugs could save 20% 
of total drug expenditure: 11% in the form of savings of foreign exchange and 9% 
in domestic currency. The government could also undertake to tax inappropriate, 
luxury products imported into the country for the private market. and using the 
revenue obtained subsidise the prices of essential drugs. Such savings could also be 
ploughed back into the economy to help develop and improve its infrastructure, e. g. 
expanding the reach of the public health care services which would have long-term 
benefits for health. If it was also possible to spread the use of an EDL to the private 
sector, a national formulary could be established which would hopefully promote 
widespread rational prescribing and save considerable sums of money throughout 
the economy. This would leave the householders and the authorities with more 
money, which could be used to improve other aspects of life. . 
An extension of this policy of rational drug choice by restricting at least the 
public sector to the use of only essential and appropriate drug products, is the 
promotion of generic products. From the analysis of differences between the 
pricing Of brand and generic products in the developed world, it is obvious that 
considerable savings can be made when prescribing is switched from brand to 
generic. } This is also a feature of the developing world., In the US 54% of drugs are 
generic compared to only 2% in Brazil. Smith & Quelch (1991) noted that in Sri 
Lanka the UNIDO reported a 65% savings on the drugs bill in 1974 from the use of 
generics and local manufacture. They found that an equivalent to Roche's patented 
Diazepam could be purchased for only 4% of the original price. It has been argued 
that developing countries should not buy the newest and most expensive drug 
products available, as in many cases older almost as effective products are available 
at a lower cost. One of the main priorities of the authorities in such countries is the 
widespread access to the population of their drug requirements at a reasonable cost. 
This reasonable cost aspect is of extreme importance when limited funds are 
available, and so the use of generic products, which are usually subject to much 
more intense competition, can result in substantial savings. M. Patel (1983) 
estimated that the use of generics might save up to 60% of the total expenditure of 
drugs, of which 40% would be savings in foreign exchange. 
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Generic use may also be stimulated by the abolition of patents and 
trademarks, or at least a reduction in the duration of patent protection and the use of 
compulsory licensing. If patents and trademarks were abolished it would be easier 
for generic competition to thrive, and so stimulate price competition; For example, 
in India, the Patents Bill of 1970 reduced the period of patent protection from 16 to 
7 years, ruled out product patents and provided for compulsory licensing after 3 
years for a royalty of not more than 5% of the value of the production (Lall 1974). 
Such legislation also leaves the way open for the development of local' enterprises. 
Money may also be saved by the imposition of specific pricing systems. It 
has been suggested that internally developing countries could implement a three-tier 
pricing system. The first tier of this system would be for new innovative products. 
These could be priced by market forces when sold to the private sector but then 
priced at'a lower rate for the public sector. Secondly, there would be the established 
drugs with multiple sourcing (generics), where competition would ensure that prices 
were kept at reasonable levels. Finally there would be special concessions on prices 
negotiated with MNEs for essential and appropriate drugs destined for the poorest 
rural ý areas of the country (Lall 1985). Alternatively, an international two-tier 
pricing system was suggested whereby prices in the developed world were set by 
market force, while those in developing countries were related only to the marginal 
cost of production. The argument behind this is that prices are usually determined 
by the costs of production, the costs incurred for R&D and marketing, which can 
have a considerable mark-up on the marginal cost. As it is estimated that only 1% 
of MNE R&D expenditure is devoted to research on diseases specifically for 
developing countries (Jayasena 1985), it is argued that they should not have to 
contribute to the expenses incurred by these companies for R&D nor for the 
excessive expenditure on marketing. 
- Another possible policy option is the establishment of a public procurement 
system, whereby an agency is set up to undertake negotiations with international 
suppliers in an attempt to find the most competitive tender. This could be done by a 
national agency which would undertake bulk purchasing of products, raw materials 
and intermediates. -UNCTAD (1977) estimated that this procedure could save 33% 
of total drug expenditure. Alternatively UNIDO and UNCTAD proposed a regional 
Co-operative Pharmaceutical Production and Technology Centre (COPPTECS) 
with the same idea but on a bigger scale. These centres would pool the procurement 
process, facilitate the transfer of technology, monitor prices and quality control, co- 
ordinate R&D and help train the necessary personnel for all the new departments 
which would need to be established for the future success of the system. It would 
be hoped that there would be strength in numbers for these developing countries in 
dealing with the powerful MNEs in the pharmaceutical industry. 
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A number of examples of these regional centres have emerged and seen 
considerable success. Six out of the eight members of the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States organised the Eastern Caribbean Drug Scheme which undertook a 
centralised tendering service. It also gave technical assistance for training facilities, 
provided limited equipment for storage improvements and provided a vehicle and a 
computer for each of the member states. = This organisation initially established a list 
of suppliers who met with a minimum level of quality requirements and from this 
list determined which had the most competitive pricing strategy. They thereby 
ensured the quality of products as well as procuring the best price on offer. While 
this project was initially funded by US AID, it was hoped that it would become self- 
financing and perhaps even spread to the private sector (Blumberg & Wilensky 
1988). 
Another example of successful regional co-operation in developing 
countries is the Asociaciön Latinoamericano de Industrias Farmaceuticas (ALIFAR) 
described by White (1983). Before the Second World War, 1939-1945, some 
industrial development was already established in this region, however in the post- 
war period with regards to pharmaceuticals the indigenous companies were pushed ' ikV11I1. 
out by the competitive strength of the Western MNEs. By the 1970's these MNEs 
controlled 70 - 80% of the market. During this decade, -however, growth in the 
market was substantial and enabled the indigenous companies to develop their own 
aggressive promotional campaigns, promoting their own trademarks in competition 
with the MNEs. They began to see a triangular relationship emerging between the 
government, the MNEs and international agencies which excluded them and as a 
result, formed ALIFAR. This was a legal non-profit making organisation 
independent of government and international organisations. 
ALIFAR was primarily designed to ensure supplies of raw materials and 
intermediate products for the local industries at fair prices and under just conditions. 
It was also designed to begin programs of regional integration and to facilitate 
reciprocal knowledge and development of the members. MNEs were not dissuaded 
from involvement in the market, provided they did not hamper or infringe 
indigenous development. It also held the strategic objective of encouraging the 
adoption of public policies that promoted the development of domestic enterprises. 
A logical extension of a public procurement system is the establishment of a 
public distribution system. The use of a large number of small private distributors 
could result in a mass of inefficiencies which could be easily resolved by the 
establishment of one large public system. This allows a uniform and effective 
storage network to be developed throughout the country, improving the quality of 
the products that reach the market. It also allows for effective inventory control, 
possible reductions in product prices to consumers and generating some revenue for 
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the government. M. Patel (1983) estimated that savings from the establishment of 
such a system could be in the order of 10% of domestic currency. Another possible 
saving from the use of a public distribution system which Yudkin (1977) noted was 
the possibility that as manufacturers need no longer promote their products, ex- 
factory costs would fall translating into savings of 20% of overall drug costs. 
An example of a public distribution system can be seen in India where the 
State Trading Corporation (STC) was established to channel imports into the 
country (W. H. O. 1988). The government owned India Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
Limited then undertook distribution of the imported materials to ensure a reliable 
supply at reasonable prices to the indigenous manufacturers. This could prevent 
transfer pricing from taking place. Similarly in Egypt, many changes took place 
after the 1952 Nassar Revolution and the nationalisation of the pharmaceutical 
industry in 1962. The Egyptian General Organisation for Drugs, Chemicals and 
Medical Appliances was formed with a state monopoly on the distribution of 
imports (Galal 1983). -I 
' Finally, the developing countries have'the option of stimulating their own 
indigenous pharmaceutical industry to such a position that it can satisfy most of the 
requirements of the country. Obviously, many of the developing countries have 
very little if any industrial structure, and therefore for many, this means starting at 
the very beginning and establishing formulation and packaging plants. Once these 
have been established, it is possible to diversify gradually into other ý more 
complicated aspects of production and perhaps eventually R&D. By disallowing a 
patent system in the early days of indigenous company formation they may ease the 
development of these companies by allowing easy access to products which would 
otherwise have been restricted by patents. Similarly they could allow patents to 
encourage foreign operations in the country but then enforce compulsory licensing, 
again allowing indigenous companies to benefit. 
Such attempts to establish an indigenous industry have a number of 
attractions for developing countries. Firstly, it would reduce the dependence on 
foreign MNEs and so strengthen their bargaining positions in dealings with such 
companies. Secondly, profits would accrue to the economy and not to the 
headquarters of these MNEs. It would also stimulate an accumulation of skills 
which would spread throughout the economy as well as reducing the need for 
foreign exchange. 
In Bangladesh, the Drug Control Ordinance of 1982 stated that drugs and 
raw materials already produced in Bangladesh were not allowed to be imported into 
the country, thereby ensuring that there was no competition for the indigenous 
firms. It also established an EDL of 150 generically named products for the 
national health system. By 1984 over 80% of the requirements were produced 
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locally, with local corporations increasing their production from 35.3% in 1981 to 
over 50% in 1985. Unfortunately almost all of the raw materials for production had 
to be imported, but nevertheless, significant progress was made (W. H. O. 1988). 
M. Patel (1983) estimated that if these policy options were implemented in 
various forms and adapted for the unique situations in each country, the potential 
savings to developing countries from a rational drugs policy would be US $10bn in 
1981. It is obvious that substantial savings are possible, however, there are a 
number of factors which may hamper their success. 
The first obstacle to the success of some of these policy options is the 
strength of the MNE in the developing country. Obviously for many of these 
countries, the MNEs are the only source of technology and products, hence their 
decisions are tainted by their desire not to agitate these corporations. They are 
hampered by their fear of retaliation and withdrawal. An example of the strength of 
the MNE was in Pakistan when the government attempted to control drug costs by 
using generic sourcing and local manufacturing. Ciba-Geigy withdrew from the 
market in protest and ultimately the project failed because of alleged pressure from 
the pharmaceutical companies (Smith & Quelch 1991). A. further example of the 
ways MNEs evade attempts to implement certain policies was found in India when 
the Drug Price Control Order was introduced 1970. This determined the prices of 
18 basic products and 69 formulations. However all that happened was that the 
companies increased the prices of their other products to compensate and the overall 
price index for 1970/71 rose by 12 points (Lall 1974). 
Attempts at improving the marketing and basic quality of products in the 
developing countries have also been evaded. It was suggested that there should be a 
Country-of-Origin rule, whereby imports of products were only allowed if they had 
been approved for use in their country of origin (Silverman, Lee & Lydecker 1982). 
In the previous section a description of dumping tactics is found, which provided 
MNEs with a means of avoiding this -attempt at regulation. Companies could 
simply export the ingredients of a product and formulate it in the destined country, 
move the whole factory into the country, or register the products in a country such 
as Guatemala where registration is nothing more than a formality. 
Another suggestion was the Certification Scheme whereby an appropriate 
agency of the exporting country had to certify to the importing country that the 
product was approved for marketing, or if not why. In Europe, the European 
Parliament held talks on the export of pharmaceuticals from the European 
Community to the developing world. They proposed that package inserts with 
exported drugs should contain information of the same standard as that required in 
the exporting country, that manufacturers be required to inform importing nations if 
a given preparation had been withdrawn or restricted for safety reasons, and that 
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any drugs banned in the EC could only be exported if, after receiving' all the 
information relevant to the bang the importing nation specifically requested the drug 
(prior informed consent). This proposal was unfortunately not passed and at the 
moment there are no regulations concerning the export of products to the 
developing world (Michlitz 1988). This has shifted the whole burden onto the ill- 
equipped domestic governments of these countries. - 
The lack of adequate infrastructure in most of these countries has meant that 
there are few resources to establish quality control laboratories. Even in some of 
the more advanced developing nations with regards to industrial development and 
established lines of government control, e. g. India, quality control is neither 
comprehensive nor very efficient. Lall (1974) noted how the enforcement of quality 
controls varied greatly from state to state in India, with Bihar and Madhya Pradesh 
lacking drug control staff altogether. The main weakness that domestic 
governments need to resolve is their lack of control over what goes on in their 
countries. Even if the public sector is brought into order, it represents only a small 
proportion of the health care market in these countries. There is very little 
regulation in existence or that is suitably enforced in the private sector. Again in OM 44 
India, while domestic production has been successfully stimulated it was not a 
requirement that essential drugs be produced. The result has been a concentration 
of production in the profitable non-proprietary market, leading to the paradoxical 
situation of an overproduction of non-essential drugs simultaneous to a shortage of 
essential drugs. In 1980 essential drugs accounted for only 16.8% of total 
consumption. Furthermore, it was found that the quality of these locally produced 
products was generally much poorer than the MNE products. This resulted from the 
implementation of import controls but a negligible range of domestic controls. 
Similar evidence of the poor practices of domestic companies was found by 
Lee, Lurie, Silverman and Lydecker (1991). They had been studying the marketing 
practices of MNEs in developing countries and found that since both the emerging 
initial controversies and the formulation of the 1981 Code of Marketing Practices 
by the IFPMA, MNEs had shown some improvements in their behaviour. What 
was found was that the domestic firms had not changed their policies and it was 
they who were still providing doctors with grossly exaggerated claims of efficacy. 
A more recent problem of fraudulent drugs has also developed. Frequently, the 
products of MNEs are associated with a minimum standard but there have been 
growing reports of fraudulent production taking place domestically. This has 
become an increasing concern in Brazil and Indonesia where it has been disclosed 
that such products represent 20-30% of the products on the market, with no relevant 
regulations formulated as yet (Lee et al. 1991). 
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These weaknesses will take time to overcome, but already some evidence of 
strengthening has come in Brazil. The Ministry of Justice in Brazil officially 
charged nine laboratories on 19 August 1991 under the anti-trust law. The charge 
was of withholding stock and cutting production by 15-20%, including production 
of controlled drugs for chronic diseases, in order to pressure the government to raise 
prices. Of these nine companies some were well-known multinational names i. e., 
Glaxo, Pfizer, Merrell Lepetit etc. (PBN 1991). Obviously,, the government is 
refusing to let itself be bullied by these MNEs. Furthermore, they have introduced 
new legislation forcing drug companies to print their generic product names in a 
prominent place on packaging. - They are also hoping to enforce a requirement that 
such generic names be printed in the same size as the brand-names. ' 
6.2.4: Conclusion - 
The problems facing the developing countries of the world are numerous 
and extremely complex. They not only have the problems of high'prices, dubious 
marketing practices, and excessive profits 'which waste resources and result in 
exploitation of the consumer, they also have their own special difficulties based in 
the common characteristic of poverty. As a result of this, they have a proliferation 
of inappropriate, often useless and sometimes dangerous products in the market 
absorbing what scarce resources are available. Their lack of infrastructure and 
funds usually means that attempts at a public health care systems are inefficient and 
grossly inadequate for the needs of the population. This leaves the private sector to 
fill in the gap. 
Again the 'absence of regulatory controls which are enforceable have left this 
market open to abuse from all sides: the MNEs and the domestic producers. 
Progress has been made in many instances with the successful implementation of at 
least some of the policy options described above, in an attempt to establish a 
national health policy, especially with regards to pharmaceuticals. As mentioned, 
success has been partial, but at least most developing countries, no matter how poor, 
have been trying to implement some reform. Hopefully the W. H. O. 'Health for All' 
strategy of 1981 will some day be a reality. 
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6.3: Europe: A Changing Environment 
6.3.1: Introduction 
Since the Second World War the continent of Europe has been divided not 
only by national boundaries, but by an East-West division based on the differences 
between communism and capitalism. As separate units most of these countries 
cannot be compared to the economic might and market size of the US and Japanese 
markets; however, if they could harmonise their economic goals, Europe could 
become the largest market in the world. 
Moves towards this goal have been taking place in the West for a number of 
decades since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This European Community (EC), 
currently consisting of twelve nations, recorded 325m inhabitants which represented 
approx. 30% of the world pharmaceutical market. United, this market is bigger than 
both the US and Japanese markets and worth $25bn (Cawthorn 1989). 
The EC pharmaceutical industry accounts for 40.6% of the R&D investment 
in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 
it employs 40.8% of the skilled R&D staff in these countries and over the past 
fifteen years has produced 41.9% of the NCE's introduced onto the world market. It 
is one of the major positive contributors to the Balance of Payments for the leading 
EC countries, and has contributed $4.2bn of a trade surplus to an overall trade 
deficit in the EC of $33.3bn (PBN 1993d). These figures illustrate the importance 
of this industry and give some impression of how its continuing success is in the 
interests of the EC. The moves towards harmonisation are not however, solely a 
concern of the EC countries as the eventual market is important for the US and 
Japanese industries, therefore the events in Europe are of importance in a global 
sense. 
Recently, political events have also seen the opening up of Eastern Europe 
and the former Comecon countries. These countries are neither as affluent as their 
Western counterparts, nor as poverty stricken as the Developing Countries, and 
therefore are experience unique problems of their own. They also represent a huge, 
potentially untapped market for the industries of the West, not just Europe but also 
for American and Japanese companies. Developments in the political movements 
of these countries will be of prime interest to the rest of the world and the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
The events in Europe, East and West, are resulting in some quite profound 
effects for the those in the pharmaceutical industry. Events in the EC effect not just 
those companies that originate from these nations, but all those who operate there. 
The events in the former Comecon countries represent a whole new marketing 
opportunity, but a risky one, as the political climate remains volatile. 
6.3.2: The European Community 
The pharmaceutical market in the EC shows all the same characteristics of 
the world market. There are a small number of large multinational companies 
dominating production and sales from a small number of highly specialised 
countries, viz. France, Germany, Italy and the UK. These countries account for 
90% of the EC output. There are estimated to be 33 companies with the capacity 
for serious product innovation in the EC in globally competitive terms, with the 
remaining 1500 firms producing drugs via licensing agreements, specialisation and 
out-of-patent products (Burstall & Senior 1985). 
The European market, as a microcosm of the world market, has the same 
characteristics and is targeted for the same criticisms. These characteristics are high 
R&D and marketing expenditures, high concentration ratios in therapeutic 
submarkets, and instability. The criticisms remain excessive profits and prices, and 
wasteful and inappropriate advertising. It does, however, have some very unique 
problems to contend with and a rapidly changing economic and political 
environment. This is stimulating dramatic changes in the approach and strategic 
decisions of the main companies in the European arena and world-wide. 
While the combined market is huge and accounts for a substantial 
proportion of world trade, the majority of this trade takes place within the bounds of 
the community. Approx. two-thirds of the drugs sold within the EC are made by 
companies that are based there, with the local manufacture of finished dosage 
forms, either by indigenous firms or local subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies, 
predominating (approx. 27% of the total community market is accounted for by US 
subsidiaries of PMA members only). In 1984 only 4% of the value of total sales of 
finished products was imported from outside the Community (MacArthur 1989b). 
Nevertheless, variations in the regulations imposed on the industry by individual 
member state governments of the EC have resulted in the community being far from 
unified. This has led to a number of anomalies, not necessarily in the interests of 
the European pharmaceutical industry or the consumers in this market. It has been 
argued that the fragmented European market is loosing its competitive edge, 
especially in comparison to the US and the rising Japanese industries. Gradual 
harmonisation has therefore been the goal of the EC for a number of years. 
The idea of European economic unity was established with the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 and the formulation of the basic idea of an internal market created by 
the elimination of barriers for the free circulation of products and personnel. This 
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would allow market forces to operate throughout a larger area and would produce 
economic benefits by improving the allocation of resources, subsequently 
improving European competitiveness. For the European Commission, with regards 
to the pharmaceutical industry, it is concerned with creating -a favourable 
harmonised regulatory environment for an industry which it considers already to be 
over-regulated, whilst supporting the protection of the public health and it's 
improvement by increased development of pharmaceutical research in Europe. 
Despite these goals, the establishment of a true common market has been an 
extended affair. The Thalidomide disaster of the late 1950's gave rise to national 
regulation without thought to international harmonisätion, and it was not until 1968 
that all internal tariff barriers were eventually removed. Even so, there remained a 
number of non-tariff barriers in the form of physical, technical and fiscal barriers to 
trade and the internal market. Directives with regards to the pharmaceutical 
industry first emerged in 1965, but until recently little progress had really been 
accomplished because of the differences among member states. 
These differences emerge not only from regulatory variations but also from 
cultural variations, effecting attitudes to medicines and prescribing, and 
subsequently attitudes towards the pharmaceutical industry. 'Taylor (1992) 
identified a number of characteristics of the European market. Firstly, he noted that 
overall richer countries spent more of their GNP on health and, in cash terms, more 
on medicines, but in real terms it was the less affluent countries that spent more on 
pharmaceuticals. Secondly, those EC nations with the highest medicine prices at 
home also tended to have the most successful foreign trade records and the lowest 
volumes of domestic prescribing (with the exception of Germany which experiences 
very high prices and prescribing rates). With reference to regions, the northern EC 
countries had otc sales worth approx. one fifth of the total value of the medicine 
markets, whereas Portugal, Spain and Greece, the less affluent countries, tended to 
have only 5 -10 % of the market as otc. There was therefore considerable room for 
expansion. One common characteristic was the interest of all the EC governments 
in promoting value for money with regards to the publicly financed use of 
pharmaceuticals. Table 6.7 illustrates the differences in medicine consumption per 
capita in all but one of the countries of the EC. 
Differences in disease patterns have led to differences in prescribing and 
attitudes. For example, in Belgium 88% of consultations resulted in a prescription, 
whereas this figure was only 50% in the Netherlands (Burstall 1991). Other 
differences in attitude can also be found, e. g. German physician acceptance of 
combination medicines which are seen by British doctors as unscientific and in 
some cases, unsafe. To develop a pan-European policy with regards to the 
treatment of pharmaceuticals and the pharmaceutical industry is not an easy task, 
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especially with the sensitivity of each national government over relinquishing any 
of their sovereignty. 
Table 6.7: Consumption of Medicines per Capita in European Countries 1988. 
Country Index (average 100) 
W. Germany 161 
France 160 
Italy 145 
Belgium 123 
UK 96 
Denmark 89 
Netherlands 71 
Spain 64 
Portugal 61 
Ireland 55 
Greece 43 
Source: EFPIA; Scrip Yearbook 1991, p 56. 
6.3.3: Problems facing the Harmonisation of the European Community 
The source of the main problems of the EC lie in the divergence of national 
structures and opinions within the member states. With reference to the 
pharmaceutical industry, this is highlighted by the problems encountered over 
pricing and reimbursement strategies, registration of NCE's and marketing in' the 
various countries. These aspects are determined by each member state government 
and as a result the community is characterised by numerous methods of control. 
Looking firstly at the pricing and reimbursement strategies of the member 
states, dramatic variations can be found. For example, the German government 
allows manufacturers to set their own prices, but undertakes a very strict 
reimbursement control system of reference pricing. For this there is a basic 
reimbursement price set out for an entire class of drugs and when an expensive drug 
is prescribed the patient must directly pay the difference. This acts as a disincentive 
for the prescription of such expensive drugs. Alternatively, in the UK the system 
used is the Pharmaceutical Price Regulatory Scheme, whereby prices are not pre- 
determined, but the government negotiates the possible profit rates of each 
individual company. A target profit rate is set for the more prominent companies 
and if this target is over-shot the company is strongly recommended to cut its 
prices, unless a convincing explanation of why this has happened can be presented. 
This all acts to keep prices lower than in Germany. However, the prices are lower 
still in France. 
148 
In France, very strict price controls are employed to curb the high national 
demand for pharmaceuticals, otherwise the public purse would be bankrupt.. This 
has not made the French market unattractive, for although prices are low the high 
sales volume compensates. In Greece a simple cost-plus system based on the 
production costs of products is used, making prices significantly lower than 
elsewhere in the community. 
These obvious differences in regulatory systems are accompanied by hidden 
incentives for production or research activities to be located in particular countries. 
In the UK the target profit level allowed is higher the more local investment the 
company undertakes, while in France the pricing of finished products is higher 
when they are produced locally. In Italy a cost-plus pricing system was proposed to 
allowed a research cost allowance, which was higher for those products entirely 
developed in Italy, giving Italian firms an 'unfair' advantage. It was not however, 
permitted under EC legislation. Similarly Belgium openly awarded price increases 
to companies in return for their investment in Belgium causing quite an uproar. 
Needless to say it was discontinued. 
.. These different national 
incentives encouraged the establishment of 
production and research facilities in most of the member states.. The European 
Commission estimates that most pharmaceutical plants now operate below two- 
thirds capacity, sometimes below half capacity, representing lost revenue of $450 - 
750m across the industry in Europe (Walker & Esposito 1991). For a typical MNE 
in Europe with 12 formulation plants there is a waste of $l Om. 
These variations in pricing and reimbursement regulations have also led to 
substantial price discrepancies between countries, which have been further widened 
by fluctuations in exchange rates, the lack of a single European currency being 
another bone of contention within the EC. Table 6.8 illustrates the price index of 
pharmaceutical prices in the EC for 1989. 
In a 1986 pan-EC consumer study. by Test Achats (Belgium) it was found 
that 63% of products in the drugs basket surveyed showed at least a three-fold 
difference between the, cheapest and, the, most expensive countries (MacArthur 
1989b). For 20% of these products there was more than a five-fold difference, with 
the average prices in Germany being 2.5 times greater than those in Spain. In 1989 
the Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs reported some extreme 
illustrations of price distortions. They noted how Zyloric was ten times more 
expensive in the UK than in Spain, Indocid was ten times more expensive in the 
Netherlands than in. Greece and Microgynon was eight times more expensive in 
Germany than in France (Taylor 1992).. 
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Table 6.8: EC Pharmaceutical Prices 1989. 
Country Price Index 
Portugal 68.1 
France 72.2 
Spain 72.8 
Greece 73.9 
Ital 79.8 
Belgium 89.4 
Luxembourg 97.8 
EC 100.0 
UK 116.9 
FDR 127.3 
Denmark 1 
Ireland 131.6 
Netherlands 1171-0---l 
Source: BEUC March 1989; ABDA: Scrip Yearbook 1991, p. 55. 
The result of such price discrepancies has been parallel importing, ' whereby 
a product produced in a high price country and exported to a low price country is 
bought and re-exported back into the country of manufacture, where it is sold in 
competition to its higher priced version. - Provided the transportation costs are not 
excessive, it is possible for such imports to be price substantially lower than the 
original version destined for the home market. Although such imports represent 
only 1% of the value of trade in medicines in the EC overall, this figure varies 
between member states. In the UK parallel imports account for approx. 7% of the 
market and can be found in over 70% of pharmacies (MacArthur 1991). 
Controversy has arisen over the use of such parallel imports for a number of 
reasons. Firstly problems have arisen over the possibility of confusion for the 
patient. Such confusion can affect compliance and lead to possible psychosomatic 
reactions. In Britain such possibilities have led the Department of Health to issue 
parallel import licences only if such products are equivalent to the UK brands, and 
pharmacists are warned not to use products without such a valid licence. 
Nevertheless, parallel imports are estimated to increase in value to $2,000m in 1992 
or 5% of the European market (Scrip Yearbook 1991). 
A further concern arising from the use of parallel imports emanates from the 
innovative pharmaceutical companies, who identify certain short-term and long- 
term effects to their profitability. In the short-term, there are concerns over the 
pressure such imports have on the price of patented products. With approx. 40% of 
the European market satisfied by in-patent products, downward pressure on these 
prices may have a significant adverse effect on the profitability of innovative 
companies who rely on these products for the bulk, of their revenue (Burstall & 
Senior 1985). In the long-run, this fall in-prices and-subsequent decline in 
profitability will divert money from R&D, having a two-fold effect. Firstly, this 
will make the industry less attractive in the long-run, as high profits will be less 
forthcoming, and secondly, the consumers will suffer from the slowing down of 
new therapeutically advanced products introduced onto the market. It is also 
possible that most of the price savings from these products will merely go straight 
into the pockets of the middle-men and not be passed onto the consumer. A further 
factor which is disturbing the companies is the new possibility of even more parallel 
pricing now that Germany has become reunited and the Eastern Bloc is opening up. 
Prices in these countries are considerably lower than elsewhere and it is feared that 
a new surge of parallel imports will arise. 
While such possibilities are recognised, most of the governments in the EC 
welcome parallel imports as a means of converging prices over the community. 
Some harmonisation has been accomplished with regards to the quality, safety and 
efficacy standards of pharmaceuticals, although these have been administered by 
national governments and not a central body. Pricing, however, has been a much 
more delicate issue to deal with. -I 
All the governments in the EC undertake different policies with regards to 
pricing and reimbursement for political reasons. To harmonise these would be a 
mammoth task, and one which many governments would not wish to succeed, as 
they would loose a certain degree of sovereignty. Consequently, the European 
Court of Justice has identified parallel imports as legal, hoping they will aid the 
harmonisation process without enforcing any loss of sovereignty. It is argued that 
parallel importation is self-limiting, as it relies on the surplus products available in 
the low-price member states. These are surpluses which are not likely to grow 
sufficiently to satisfy the demand in the higher-priced member states. Nevertheless, 
to aid this harmonisation still further the Price Transparency Directive 89/105/EEC 
was implemented in January 1990. 
This directive was designed to eliminate some of the hidden incentives of 
individual governments which encouraged protectionism. It aimed at establishing 
an overview of national pricing arrangements of all the member states, and ensuring 
that the measures taken by them to control prices or profits, or limit the number or 
type of products for reimbursements, were done so in a fair and transparent manner. 
The provisions of the directive brought into action a time-limit of 180 days for the 
government decisions on prices and price increases. If such proposals were refused, 
a reason had to be given and a mechanism for appeal was to be established. If no 
decision was given within the time-limit it was assumed that the company could 
apply its price forthwith. Furthermore, price freezes were to be reviewed annually, 
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while the methods used, their range and criteria for controls, classification and 
determination of positive and negative lists were all to be clearly defined. An 
extensive data bank was also to be established of EC prices for all leading products 
which would be generally available. 
It was hoped that such measures would illuminate any hidden incentives and 
lead to a rationalisation of production across Europe, a 'European Specialisation 
Strategy' (Cawthorn 1989). As companies could identify the methods used in each 
member state, they could relocate production to a number of limited sites, perhaps 
as few as two, increasing efficiency by eliminating the under-capacity of many 
plants. The result of this rationalisation would then be greater efficiency within 
Europe and improvements in global competitiveness. 
Even with the Single European Act 1987 and the subsequent Transparency 
Directive, there are few positive moves towards the implementation of a definite 
harmonisation program for pricing and reimbursement in the member states. The 
issues involved are too sensitive to national sovereignty for there to be any great 
progress in the near future, but at least some progress has been made. 
An area where significantly more progress has been made is that of 
registration and patents. Registration is still a matter of approval in each of the 
member states but there have been a number of attempts at harmonisation which 
have had limited success. In 1976 the formation of the Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products (CPMP) was formed which first introduced the idea of mutual 
recognition. It was believed that individual requirements of each member state's 
regulatory body acted as barriers to trade, because of the different procedures, data 
requirements, standards and assessment times. This caused companies to duplicate 
applications and resulted in wasted resources and wasted time, not only for the 
company but for the patients who experienced delayed access to products. The 
theory of mutual recognition was one in which if a product was approved in one 
member state, the company could apply to the regulatory bodies of other member 
states for marketing authorisation, based on a recommendation from*the initial 
country. What was established was a centralised procedure for biotechnology and 
high technology products, which permitted access to all 12 markets after a single 
review, and a decentralised procedure of mutual recognition. 
This system had very limited success, as companies experienced huge 
delays in decisions of other member states, so that in 1985-the White Paper for the 
Achievement of the Common Market modified this multi-state system. When a 
product was approved for marketing in one member state the company could apply 
to another member state for mutual recognition. This time a decision had to be 
given within 120 days and a'reasoned objection' was to be supplied if approval was 
refused. If refusal did occur the company could take the application to the CPMP 
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which would issue an opinion and the state had to oblige by considering this 
opinion and providing a final answer within 60 days. This attempted to shorten the 
process of registration which had, in some cases, taken up to 27 months. 
Unfortunately, up to March 1989 the CPMP/multi-state system had been 
used for only 114 products and with the exception of one, all had been met with 
objections from one or more member states (MacArthur 1989b). This was due to a 
lack of confidence in the initial authorisation process, an absence of political will to 
implement mutual recognition, the unwillingness of experts and national scientific 
committees to accept outside advice and disguised protectionism. It was estimated 
that this general failure of the multi-state system cost the industry Ecu 350 - 650m 
in lost sales, or as MacArthur (1989b) terms it'the cost of non-EEC'. 
Part of the problem has been the differences in opinions over what type of 
system should be in place with regards to the registration of pharmaceuticals. The 
governments of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain favour a system 
of mutual recognition, while those of Denmark, the UK and Ireland favour a 
European central body, similar to the US FDA (Burstall 1991). To compromise for 
these differences in opinions, a three tier system has therefore been proposed. This 
consists of a central body, a binding decentralised mutual recognition system and a 
national system. 
This new proposition puts forward the establishment of a Medicines 
Evaluation Agency (MEA) as a central body to deal with applications for new 
active ingredients, biotechnology and high technology products, which will receive 
approval for marketing in all the member states simultaneously. The first year of 
operation for this body will be 1995 and the structure for its financing is currently 
being determined. Below this central system there is a system of mutual 
recognition, whereby if one country approves a product the company can apply to 
other member states for a reciprocal approval. This is expected to be the most used 
system, as it will make the process of registration easier for those firms who do not 
have the resources to launch a product simultaneously in 12 markets. If objections 
arise the application is submitted to the MEA, which issues an opinion to the 
Commission which makes a final decision. Finally, there is a national system for 
generics, line-extensions and products with a purely local interest, whereby 
approval is recognised in only the country where it is applied for. 
This more unified system of registration will benefit all parties concerned by 
saving the companies money from duplicative applications and ensuring rapid 
patient access for important therapeutic introductions. 
A follow-on issue from that of registration is patent protection. As the 
registration procedures in each member state differed, they all took varying lengths 
of time. As regulations became increasingly stringent the effective patent period for 
new products fell to such levels that the industry complained it was unable to 
recoup the costs it incurred in many cases. Table 6.9 shows the decline in effective 
patent life for NCE's in a selected-number of countries from 1960 to 1986. 
Effective patent life of NCE's fell dramatically in all countries, especially in the UK 
and Germany. It has been argued that Europe is loosing it's competitiveness with 
reference to patents, as it is lagging behind the other main actors in restoring the 
patent life of innovative products. In the US the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984 
allowed a maximum extension of 5 years to the patent life of a product, whose 
market entry had been delayed due to the regulatory process. Similarly in Japan the 
government amended the Patent Bill in 1987, to restore the effective patent period, 
allowing an extension of 2-5 years if the process of approval delayed market entry. 
Table 6.9: Effective Patent Life for NCE's 1960 -1986 
Year of approval a nd effectiv e patent life 
1960 1970 1980 1982 1984 1986 
France NA NA 10 10 9 
13 9 6 
W er. 16 12 7 8 9 5 
Japan - - 7 8 7 NA 
US 16 12 8 8 8 8 
Source: CMR: MacArthur 1989b. 
In Europe, the ABPI took up the banner of restoration of patent life pushing 
for a possible extension of 10 years to ensure the recovery of the cost of innovative 
companies. The British government was the main opposition to this, being worried 
about its effect on the NHS drugs bill. Nevertheless, in January 1993 the 
Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) was implemented., This SPC allows 
companies to apply for a maximum 5 year extension to their patent protection 
period, to ensure a 15 year period of protection from the date of marketing. This is 
however restricted to the country where the drug was registered. 
The restoration of effective patent life was an essential measure considering 
the possible competitive decline of Europe with respect to the US and Japan. Both 
of these nations had made provisions for patent extensions and especially with the 
rising interest of Japanese pharmaceutical firms in the global market, European 
concern escalated. Japan is actively preparing to recoup more of its research 
investments by moving positively into the international pharmaceutical market. In 
the face of such competition the restoration of the effective patent period by the 
SPC was essential for the European industry to maintain its competitiveness in the 
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global market. ' Otherwise innovative firms would have had less time in their home 
markets to recover costs, and subsequently less money to devote to R&D, resulting 
in less competitive strength in the future. 
' Finally, there is the issue of marketing within Europe. There has been some 
success in the harmonising of manufacturing standards, with the member states 
forcing brand-name manufacturers to conform to the'Good Manufacturing Practice'. 
There was also a Directive on Advertising of Medicinal Products for Human Use 
which advocated a number of reforms, viz. there was to be no general advertising of 
prescription-only drugs, while national laws were to be harmonised. They were to 
require a minimum level of information to be provided with each product, including 
the name, correct usage, restrictions, adverse reactions, and special 
recommendations to doctors. The industry claimed that this was asking too much of 
them, which was indirectly supported by the belief of many member states that the 
self-regulation of the industry was 'sufficient. This directive was rejected. 
Nevertheless, in January 1994 standard pan-European regulations for 
packaging and the format of labels and instruction leaflets with medicine packs are 
to be implemented. All products will have to be dispensed in an original pack 
together with an instruction sheet in the required format. 
6.3.4: Summary 
The formation of the united European Community is far from complete, 
especially for the pharmaceutical industry. The lack of cohesion between member 
states had meant that the European industry was losing its competitive advantage on 
the global market, with registration becoming more and more difficult and the 
patent protection period falling. Nevertheless, steps have been taken to affect the 
harmonisation of procedures effecting the industry, bringing it more into line with 
the international field. These measures have had limited success. 
As registration procedures have become more harmonised and the patent 
protection period is extended, it is likely that the industry will maintain its position 
in the world market. Obviously, the players in this market will need to change. It is 
likely that those with an strong and efficient R&D pipeline, usually the larger MN 
companies, will continue to dominate, while the smaller companies specialise in 
'niche' markets. All of those companies operating in the market will need to 
rationalise their operations and increase their competitive efficiency, not only within 
the EC, but in the world market, as competition becomes more intense. However, 
with the continued growth of the market and especially with the potential of the 
East European market, expansion is still an option. While the completion of the 
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unified market has brought with it many problems, it has also provided the industry, 
with many opportunities. 
6.3.5: Eastern Europe 
-, ý 
The former Eastern bloc countries primarily consist of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the 
former GDR, Hungary and Poland. For these countries the available information 
suggests that there is a more than adequate health service structure and sufficient 
numbers of medically trained personnel. Their main problem is their severe lack of 
funds, which has resulted in reports of hospitals going without basic amenities such 
as water and heating, and a general shortage of drugs, including essential drugs. 
These countries had an estimated population of 424.3m in 1992 and a 
political system that was in turmoil, leading to a general healthcare crisis. Looking 
at the CIS, it consisted of 15 republics of the former Soviet Union which had all 
declared some sort of independence, and also a further 20 autonomous republics,, 16 
of -which were in Russia. Many of these new republics had not yet drafted .,,,.. 
fundamental laws on taxation, foreign trade licenses etc. Within such political 
turmoil the revamping of the healthcare system was not progressing at any 
substantial rate. 
In the past, domestic pharmaceutical demand was satisfied by domestic 
production and a substantial proportion of imports from other former Comecon 
countries. The Soviet Union had funded pharmaceutical development in the other 
states and concentrated on chemical development within its own boundaries. 
Imports from the West were of sophisticated products which could not be 
domestically made or bought from non-convertible currency suppliers. They are 
now faced with a shortage of hard currency with which to buy such imports, as well 
as fears that the now fragmented industry will be unable to compete with the 
western importers. 
In the past most of these countries have been able to satisfy the majority of 
their domestic demands for pharmaceuticals, with the remainder of products 
imported primarily from -the -other former Comecon countries. Looking at 
Czechoslovakia, there were 2500 drugs on the market in 1990 of which only 35% 
were imported and the majority of those were from the other Comecon countries 
(Francis 1992a). In the former GDR a similar situation was found, with domestic 
production accounting for 71% of the drugs available in 1989 (Francis 1992a). In 
Bulgaria 80% of total trade, took place within the Comecon countries (Francis 
1992b), while for Hungary 70% was traditionally exported, most of which stayed 
within the Comecon area (Francis 1992a). 
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This is likely to change as the products produced by these nations become 
uncompetitive in comparison to those of the Western companies. The industry in 
Czechoslovakia has already recognised that it is facing a-declining market in the 
former Comecon countries as their products become less ' competitive. Their 
dependence on imports of finished products and raw materials has been increasing. 
In the former GDR (1989), only 9.7% of the market demand was imported from the 
EC, but within a year this had increased to 16.4%. Import penetration in the former 
GDR had risen from 20% to 34% in 1990 (Francis 1992a). 
While the market expansion for pharmaceuticals is expected to grow at an 
average rate of 6.5% per annum 1990 - 1995, and the increase in pharmaceutical 
market size expected to average out at approx. 36% for these countries, it is likely 
that the involvement of many Western companies and governments will be behind 
much of this. There have already been numerous joint ventures and programmes of 
government aid discussed. Looking at Czechoslovakia, joint ventures have been 
established with Glaxo, Ciba-Geigy, Hoechst'and Wellcome to name but a few. 
Hungary has negotiated a research arrangement with the Mexican government and 
come to agreements with the governments in Spain, Japan, and Taiwan etc. It has  ,.. , 
also formed joint ventures with some of the leading world companies such as 
Wellcome, Hoffmann-La Roche, Takeda and the Japan Tobacco International (JTI). 
Such evidence of international involvement can be found throughout the area. 
One particular area of concern is the possibility of a resurgence of parallel 
imports with the reunification of Germany. With the shortage of pharmaceutical 
products in the former GDR it was proposed that from the beginning of 1991 there 
would be a price reduction of 55% for pharmaceutical products from the FDR: This 
met with a lot of opposition and was subsequently amended to 'a discount Of 22%, 
effective from April 1992. The possibility of increased parallel imports is present, 
however it is unlikely that there will be sufficient supplies of products in this market 
to allow for any significant increase. 
6.3.6: Summary 
Obviously, the former Comecon countries represent a substantial new 
marketing opportunity for Western companies, although there are considerable risks 
involved in establishing operations in politically unstable' areas,. However, given 
time and help, these countries will become more stable and such risks will decrease. 
In June 1993 there is to be a summit to lay down the basis of an EC and Russian 
accord, designed to reduce trade barriers between these areas and promote trade and 
the exchange of goods. If such actions continue to take place the Western 
companies will have increasingly open access to this market. The competition they 
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face within this market is on the whole weak, therefore, unless strong government 
interventions occur, they are faced with a unique opportunity of establishing a new 
market. The market has been described as 'a once-in-a-century opportunity' by ICN 
Pharmaceuticals, while the President of SPI Pharmaceuticals, Adam Jerney said that 
his company saw the region as 'the emergence of one of the largest untapped 
(pharmaceutical) markets in the world'. (PBN, 1993g). 
6.3.7: Conclusion 
The pharmaceutical industry in Europe is undergoing an enormous change 
in the environment in which it operates. It is everywhere coming under increasing 
pressure from governments eager to contain the costs of their healthcare provision, 
and stimulating a more competitive setting. In the EC advances made towards a 
harmonised economy will be beneficial for domestic companies, although they are a 
matter of concern for foreign companies. There is a fear that the EC will become 
more introverted and protectionist. Although the US and Japanese firms rely much 
more on their domestic markets for the majority of their sales, the possibility of 
loosing access to such a substantial portion of the world market is worrying. 
Consequently, many of the major companies from these countries have established 
divisions in Europe, either through joint ventures or otherwise. 
Provided these advances towards harmonisation are implemented 
successfully, the concerns of the European industry will become exactly the same of 
those of the global industry. Their main concerns will be the efforts of governments 
to implement cost-containment strategies, the rise of generic competition and their 
general competitiveness. As 60% of the European market is in out-of-patent 
products, the potential of the generics market is substantial (Burstall & Senior 
1985). The pharmaceutical industry everywhere will be experiencing increased 
competition. 
This increased competition is also likely to occur in eastern Europe, where 
the indigenous pharmaceutical industry, although established, is not competitively 
equal to their Western rivals. The import penetration of these countries will 
increase, as the top world companies aim to establish a substantial market share. 
However, the governments of these countries. have traditional played a key role in 
managing the economy, and although things are changing, they may not give the 
pharmaceutical industry such a free-hand as in the West. Eastern Europe is 
therefore, a potentially huge market, but one which carries with it risks of political 
instability and intervention. 
This increasingly competitive environment world-wide will most likely 
breed consolidation of the companies, with increasing numbers of strategic alliances 
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undertaken between the large innovative firms, while the smaller firms concentrate 
in niche markets, generics or in licensing agreements with the large innovative 
firms. The future will become increasingly difficult throughout the global market, 
but there are still many opportunities for success for the innovative and the efficient 
company. 
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6.4: Japan 
While the existing' economic environment for the pharmaceutical industry 
has become increasingly competitive a new threat has been emerging from Asia. 
The Japanese pharmaceutical industry which before had maintained a purely 
domestic nature is beginning to show signs of interest in international affairs, 
increasing world competition still further. This Japanese industry has undergone a 
dramatic transition from operating in an almost stage-managed domestic 
environment in the post World War Two reconstruction period, to one of increasing 
competition on an international standing. Initially to protect the newly developing 
pharmaceutical industry the Japanese government placed restrictions on foreign 
investment within its economy. The Western multinationals had the choice to stay 
out of Japan and license their technology to local companies or to form joint venture 
companies, taking only a minority interest. This, coupled with the complex 
distribution system which was mainly in the hands of the Japanese companies, 
meant that the presence of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Japan was minimal 
in the immediate post war period. 
In 1964 however, Japan joined the OECD and liberalisation of foreign 
capital followed. This deregulation allowed foreign companies to own up to 50% of 
a Japanese company and with the completion of liberalisation in 1973, foreign 
activity became more aggressive. Nevertheless, the indigenous companies 
continued to focus on the domestic market which was growing sufficiently to allow 
both foreign and domestic companies to survive. The Ministry of Health had 
brought in a post war entitlement for virtually everyone to receive medical 
treatment under the National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme. This required patient 
co-payment of only 13%, one of the lowest requirements by international standards 
(MacArthur 1991). The result was a dramatic increase in pharmaceutical demand, 
with production rising from Ibn Yen to 3bn Yen between 1970 and 1979 (Sapienza 
1993). The available health benefits were subsequently increased, including a 
provision for the elimination of the co-payment of health care for the elderly. 
Such provisions for health resulted in a health care budget which was rising 
to unsustainable levels. Part of the problem lay with the doctors and medical 
institutions who earned a significant portion of their income from dispensing. They 
negotiated discounts with manufacturers of up to 20% in some cases, and then 
claimed reimbursement of the full NHI prices. In 1980 pharmaceuticals represented 
40% of the total national health care budget (Sapienza 1993): 
To contain this rising drugs bill, especially in view of the future 
requirements of an ageing population, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) 
imposed drug price cuts throughout the industry. In 1981 these price cuts averaged 
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18.6% (Sapienza 1993). It was the MHW's intention to cut official drug prices by 
approx. 10% every two years, hence this policy continued. In 1988 the average 
price cut was 10.2% (Sapienza 1993). The consequence for the pharmaceutical 
companies was a reduction in the economic life-span of their products, -* especially 
for the two most important therapeutic categories in Japan, viz. antibiotics and 
vitamins. 
This decline in economic product life was accompanied by increasing 
competition from foreign MN pharmaceutical companies. By 1985 thirty foreign 
companies held 27% of the antibiotics market and 24% of the CNS market of 
prescription drug sales. If those drugs sold by Japanese firms but licensed from 
foreign companies were included, these figures became 53.5% of the antibiotics 
market, 52% of the cardiovascular market and 91% of the CNSýmarket. Foreign 
owned drugs dominated the Japanese market in a growing number of therapeutic 
categories and accounted for 40% of all ethical sales in 1986 (Sapienza 1993). 
This increased competitiveness necessitated a volume increase in sales and a 
constant stream of new products for companies to survive. As the antibiotics and 
vitamins markets were heavily hit by the price cuts, companies began to shift their 
R&D more towards the 'Western' categories such as cancer, CNS etc. They found it 
necessary to update their technology such that between 1975 and 1985 R&D 
expenditure in Japan increased at a rate of over 13% per year compared to a rate of 
over 10% per year in the US (Sapienza 1993). Furthermore, the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1981 selected biotechnology as one of 
the three technologies of the future and introduced a number of incentives to 
promote its development in Japan, with important implications for the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
These incentives to conduct biotechnology research proved attractive to 
non-pharmaceutical companies in Japan who were coming under increasing 
competitive pressure in their original markets and were looking to diversify. 
Pharmaceuticals were seen as a viable option for developing competitiveness and a 
new 'Third Generation' of pharmaceutical companies began to make their presence 
felt. These new pharmaceutical companies tended to be large corporate concerns 
with turnovers of over a trillion Yen ($7,000m). One example is the Japan Tobacco 
Company (JTI), with fiscal net sales of $20,636m (1989), four times that of the 
leading Japanese pharmaceutical company, Takeda. This suggests that such firms 
may have considerably more finances to devote to R&D than existing firms, and 
perhaps also more than the leading companies of the US and Europe. JTI is the 
fourth largest tobacco company in the world, with one of the largest turnovers of 
Japanese companies. It did however, find that its domestic market was levelling 
off, while competition overseas was increasing, hence new business opportunities 
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were required. In 1987 they diversified into pharmaceuticals, among other things, 
and set up a drug preparatory department. By April 1988 a joint venture company, 
LIFIX was formed with Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical Industry to develop and market 
otc drugs. Their first introduction was in October 1988 and their range now 
consists of 15 lines (MacArthur 1989a). 
Throughout the 1980's the Japanese companies therefore expanded their 
R&D facilities and became the main lead-off market in the world in which to launch 
NCE's, most of which originated from the Japanese companies. Table 6.10 
demonstrates the number of NCE's launched per year in - the world and the 
percentage accounted for in Japan. 
Table 6.10: NCE launches in Japan 1985 -1990 
Year 
No. N CE 
first launches 
First launches in Japan 
No. % 
1985 53 14 26 
1986 47 23 49 
1987 58 19 33 
1988 52 14 27 
1989 5 12 4 
1990 43 12 28 
v 
Source: Donald MacArthur (1991) 'Japanese Pharmaceutical Expansion into 
Europe: Strategies and Prospects. ' p. 10. ,. 
What the Japanese pharmaceutical industry was therefore faced with by the 
1980's was a decline in domestic profitability due to the price, reductions imposed, 
rising costs of R&D, a domestic market fast approaching saturation point, the 
increasing strength of the Yen and finally, increased competition from new entrants 
and western pharmaceutical companies. While the Japanese companies were 
successfully licensing a large number of products to western companies they had 
no international network with which to operate directly outside Japan. The growing 
internal pressure therefore left the larger pharmaceutical companies with the option 
of establishing such an international network and globalisation began. 
While the Japanese pharmaceutical industry was a major source of license 
for European and US firms it had little, if any, production, sales, marketing or R&D 
facilities outside Japan. For many of the Japanese companies the domestic market 
was sufficient. However, for the leading companies overseas expansion was 
essential for survival and growth. The initial target for such expansion was the 
nearby Asian market with which Japan had cultural similarities. Eastern and south 
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eastern Asia were seen as potentially successful export markets and production sites 
where operations could be conducted at lower costs. 
The next target for expansion was the largest pharmaceutical market in the 
world, the US. The Japanese have become increasingly aggressive with regards to 
strategic alliances with biotechnology companies in the US in an effort to update 
their R&D technology. The US Office of Technology Assessment noted that 
between 1981 and 1986 there were 255 US/US collaborations and 157 US/foreign 
collaborations, of which the Japanese companies lead all other countries (Sapienza 
1993). They made their presence felt by way of joint ventures, research facilities, 
local subsidiaries and to a lesser extent by acquisitions e. g. Namai 1989, Imai 1991 
(Sapienza 1993). 
The natural progression after the US market was expansion into the Europe 
however, this market was initially considered too fragmented. The main focus of 
attention therefore remained with Asia and the US. However, the growing presence 
of Japanese companies in these markets lead to fears within the EC of their 
increasing uncompetitiveness. It was feared that the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry would follow the same path as the car, camera, electronics and other high 
technology industries, with their products soon dominating world trade. This fear 
acted as one of the catalysts for the Single European Act which gave the necessary 
stimulus to the single market programme. Ironically, Japanese interest in Europe 
only really grew when the market looked as though unity was within sight. The 
potential market within the EC, especially if agreements were made with the EFTA 
countries, brought about fears in Japan of a 'fortress Europe'. Article 58 of the 
Treaty stated that any company established in the Community would be treated as 
European, regardless of the nationality of its ultimate ownership, therefore rather 
than risk being blocked out of this potential huge market, the Japanese companies 
undertook a number of joint ventures, acquisitions and mergers -to establish 
themselves within its boundaries. 
In 1986 there were only 14 take-over deals in Europe by Japanese firms, 
worth $63.6m, but by 1988 this had increased to 37 deals worth $3. lbn, and 
between January and September 1990 there were 103 deals worth $4.3bn 
(MacArthur 1991). Acquisitions were seen as a springboard into the, European 
market. The UK proved to be the most popular location for R&D facilities as its 
approval was favourably noted by the FDA and other EC national authorities, it had 
a strong tradition in clinical research, pharmacology and pharmaceutical medicines, 
it had almost 200 clinical research organisations, the Medicines Control Agency 
offered straightforward and rapid regulatory clearance of Phase II and III studies 
and finally, it had a good innovation record. Yamanouchi, Fujisawa and Eisai have 
all established basic research centres in the UK. Unfortunately the UK is only the 
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fourth largest market in Europe and as a result production and marketing facilities 
have been established in at least Germany, France and Italy, the three largest 
European markets. Between 1987 and 1991 more than twice as many Japanese 
Pharmaceutical operations were set up in Europe than in all the previous years 
combined (MacArthur 1991). Table 6.11 illustrates the market penetration of 
Japanese companies in 1989 and the forecasts for 1994 in selected markets. 
Table 6.11: Japanese Penetration in the US and Selected EC Pharmaceutical 
Markets 1989 and Projections for 1994. 
Country 1989 1994e 
USA 2.5 4.7 
Italy 2.5 5.5 
France. 2.3 4.2 
West Germany 1. 3.3 
Spain 1.2 2.5 
UK 0.7 3.6 
Source: Machtiger (1990) in 'Europe's Pharmaceutical Industry; Tackling the 
Single Market. ', David Jacobson, 1991; p. 71. 
While these percentages of penetration in 1989 and those forecast for 1994 
are not high, the increase observed shows an almost doubling of activity within 
these markets. 
The present Japanese pharmaceutical companies have not yet become truly 
MN, with the nine leading companies still only averaging an export ratio of 6% 
(Sapienza 1993). The type and scale of operations vary considerably. 
Yamanouchi/Brocades Pharma. have an almost completely integrated European 
organisation with over 1,000 staff and facilities which cover raw material synthesis, 
finished product manufacture, sales, marketing, research and clinical development. 
At the other extreme some companies have only a one-man representative office, 
e. g. Kissei, Nippon Shinyaku and Yoshitomi (MacArthur 1991). As the senior 
management lacks experience in overseas markets the policies adopted have 
continued to be cautious, with a'wait and see' approach, mainly due to the perceived 
cultural and linguistic differences. Licensing is likely to remain the main source of 
Japanese involvement overseas, and although further mergers and acquisitions are 
predicted they are expected to be on a medium scale. 
While the current impact of the pharmaceutical industry on the world market 
is therefore small, the potential impact may be considerable and evident by the 
beginning of the next century, if not before. Investment in R&D can have a capital 
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cost barrier to entry, while also create an experience barrier for companies. If such 
investment is targeted at internal technology capability it can have a long-run 
impact on the competitive behaviour of firms. The Japanese have previously been 
noted for their willingness to investing heavily in R&D whose outcome is not 
expected for many years. While they may be behind the American and European 
industries with respect to current R&D capability, their preparations for the future 
are just as comprehensive. In 1987 it was estimated that the US drug companies 
spent $300m on biotechnology R&D, both in-house and via strategic alliances with 
other companies and universities. In 1990 Japan spent in total $lbn on 
biotechnology, including the pharmaceutical industry (Jacobson 1991). At least the 
top five pharmaceutical companies in Japan have the potential to become 
multinational and it is expected that in the future they will be on a much more equal 
footing with the US and European pharmaceutical companies (Sapienza 1993). 
This refers not only to R&D, but also to their international operations as they gain 
more experience. The increased attempts to harmonise global regulations also 
improves the outlook for the Japanese international company as it would reduce 
their need to duplicate many of their clinical trials. 
The fears of the existing pharmaceutical multinationals are therefore 
founded. It is likely that future R&D activity of the' leading Japanese 
pharmaceutical 'companies will be as productive as that of the US and European 
based companies, while experience in international dealings will sharpen their 
competitive strategies now that they have established a basic international network. 
Fears of collaboration among the Japanese companies to strengthen their 
international positions may also be founded, especially as they tend to feel 
culturally isolated. Their growth as an international player in the pharmaceutical 
market will therefore increase competitiveness still further for this market, and in 
particular the innovative race. However, this is not likely to happen for a few years 
yet, giving existing companies the chance to prepare and restructure their operations 
for the new environment expected. 
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Chapter 7: An Empirical Study of Brand Loyalty and Prescribing 
7.1: Introduction 
The previous chapters provoked some consideration as to the actual impact 
of industry promotion on the prescribing behaviour of doctors. Many studies 
conclude that company promotional campaigns induced brand loyalty among 
doctors (Avorn et al. 1982; Orlowski & Wateska 1992), resulting in irrational 
prescribing and reduced market competition. This irrational prescribing is based on 
the definition of rationality being a prescription that is safe, effective, appropriate 
and economic, taking into consideration all alternatives and their results. The main 
purpose of company promotional activity is to create demand for their products 
which is maintained in the face of alternative competition from both generic and 
brand products. If this promotion is successful the original brand product will 
continue to be prescribed. 
An investigation was therefore undertaken to determine whether brand 
prescribing actually did continue strongly after the entry of generic competition 
onto the market. Assuming generic equivalence, the continued prescribing of the 
brand product implies irrational prescribing, as it is no longer the 'economic' choice 
compared to the cheaper generic version(s). If such prescribing continues it may be 
possible to evaluate its strength by looking at just how long the brand continues to 
have a significant hold on the market. 
7.2: Methodology 
Data collected by the Medicines Monitoring Unit (MEMO), Ninewells 
Hospital, Dundee, became available for an investigation of certain aspects of brand 
loyalty. The data related to the number and type of prescriptions written by the 
doctors of the Carnoustie Health Practice 1985 - 1989. Carnoustie is a small semi- 
rural town on the outskirts of Dundee, with a population of approximately 11,500 
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and serviced by seven full-time doctors and a number of trainee doctors. The data 
had been obtained by issuing these doctors with duplicate prescription pads so that 
when each prescription was written a copy was retained and sent to MEMO where it 
was entered into their data banks. The number of overall prescriptions, their 
breakdown into brand and generic form and the numbers accounted for by each 
doctor in the practice were therefore available. An appropriate amount of data on 
twelve drug products in brand and generic form was selected and the following 
hypothesis proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Brand-name products continue to dominate the market even after a 
number of years of generic competition. 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis came from the numerous papers that 
have concluded that brand loyalty in the pharmaceutical market is very strong (see 
Caves, Whinston & Hurwitz 1991; Statman 1981; Masson & Steiner 1985). 
Advertising during the period of patent protection stimulates the market and creates 
brand loyalty. When this protection expires the loyalty created continues to exert an 
influence on the decision-makers such that the brand-name product continues to be 
prescribed even in the face of cheaper generic equivalents. Assuming the available 
generic versions of the brand product are equivalent and cheaper the continued 
prescribing of the brand becomes irrational as it is no longer 'economic', a matter of 
particular relevance in the modem health sector with its ever increasing emphasis 
on cost containment. 
To conduct the analysis of the above hypothesis, the products named in 
Table 7.1 were used to investigate the change in prescribing patterns between brand 
and generic products. The analysis was conducted in three stages. Firstly, the older 
products were considered to give some idea of what position generic and brand 
products held a number of years after generic competition had entered the market. 
The total number of prescriptions written for each product given by brand and 
generic name was considered (in most instances there was only one brand product 
available). Secondly, the younger products who experienced generic competition 
within the study period where considered. This examination would give some 
indication of the speed of generic penetration or alternatively the strength of the 
brand products' hold on the market. Finally, a joint analysis was conducted to give 
an overall picture of the pattern in prescribing for all products. 3 
3 The data used for the following Analysis is found in the Technical Appendix Section 1. 
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Table 7.1: Drug Products Studied in Brand and Generic Form 
Brand-name Manufacturer Patent 
Ex ' 
Generic name Date gen. 
available 
Total 
market 
Therapeutic 
category 
1. Indocid Morson 1980 Indomethacin 1980 219 NSAI* 
enbnan Beecham 1 75 Am icil in 1975 4 Antibiotic 
tuen Boots Ibuprofen 19814 7383 N AI 
4. ix Hoechst < 1980 Frusemide 1981 5177 Diuretics 
5. Midamor Merck 1979 Amiloride 1979 241 Diuretics 
cldene Pfizer 19 Piroxicam 19 38 NSAI* 
a ros Syntex 1988 Na roxen 1985 3820- N AI 
8. Ponstan Parke-Davis - - 
Mefenamic acid 198 47 N AI 
Ventolin A&H 190 Salbutamol 19 4 -10-6-533 BroncodiL 
10. Amoxil Bencard 1989 Amoxycillin 15 75 Antibiotic 
11. Trasicor Ciba-Gel-LYY 1970 Oxprenolol 1985 554 And-hype 
12. Neo- 
Naclex K 
Gold rest 1976 Bendrofluazide 
+ Potassium 
1987--- 630 Diuretic 
* NSAI = Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory 
7.3: The Analysis 
The initial analysis was on the older products in the study - Indocid, 
Penbritin, Brufen, Lasix, and Midamor, all of which had been available in a generic 
form for over four years. Figures 7A - 7E illustrate in diagrammatic form the 
change in brand and generic prescriptions written for these products over the study 
period. 
From this visual analysis it can be seen that by 1985 the generic versions of 
the original brand products accounted for the majority of prescriptions written in the 
Carnoustie Health Practice. In 1985 the average generic prescribing for these five 
drug products represented 84.6% of the total prescriptions. Another factor which 
can be clearly seen from these figures is the continued rise in the share of generic 
prescriptions in the market. By 1989 average generic prescribing for these products 
represented 97.1% of the total prescriptions. 
This visual description would seem to imply that the brand-loyalty created 
by the intensive advertising of the pharmaceutical firms is not as strong in the long- 
term as previous suggested. For these products which have in general been faced 
with generic competition for over four years, their market share has been almost 
completely eroded. Nevertheless, the initial strength of brand loyalty can be seen 
by the fact that it has taken at least four years for generic prescribing to reach 
dominating levels. A good example of this is Penbritin, whose patent expired in 
4 As the patent date was unavailable previous issues of the British National Formulary since 
1981 were examined to ascertain when these products became available in generic form. 
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1975. In 1985, ten years after the expiration of the patent, the brand-name product 
still held almost 15% of the market. This first stage of the analysis therefore shows 
that generics do eventually dominate the market, yet support for the brand-name 
product does not diminish completely. 
Figure 7A: Indocid versus Indomethacin   Indocid % 
Indomethacin Sib 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
Figure 7B: Penbritin versus Ampicillin 
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Figure 7C: Brufen versus Ibuprofen 
Figure 7D: Lasix versus Frusemide 
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Figure 7E: Midamor versus Amiloride   Midamor % 
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This visual study was followed up by a regression analysis to determine 
whether any formal relationship existed between the proportion of generic 
prescriptions 1985 - 1989, the size of the respective markets and the number of 
years the generic form of the drug had been available. Market size was included in 
this regression analysis to isolate any differences in generic prescribing due to the 
size of the market. Speculatively, company promotional activity may be more 
intensive in a larger market with potentially more profits to win and lose, and hence 
brand loyalty may be stronger. 
The regression model used for this analysis was: 
Yd 
,t= 
Ud, t+ PXd, t + BZdt 
Yd, t = Logit of the proportion of generic prescriptions for drug d in year t. 
CCd = Intercept for drug d. 
Xd. t = Size of the market given by the total number of prescriptions (brand and 
generic) in Carnoustie for drug d in year t. 
P= Market size regression coefficient 
Zd, t = The number of years drug d has been available in generic form in year t. 
8= Availability regression coefficient. 
The regression analysis was on the logit of the proportion of generic 
prescriptions (Yd, t) in relation to the size of the market (X d, t) and the number of 
years of generic availability for the drugs (Z d, t). The logit was used for two 
reasons: firstly as the proportion of generic prescriptions was being analysed the 
170 
°+r 
ra 
: ýk 
.v ýý 
fý 
E` 
E 
I 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Year 
171 
figures had to be between zero and one to be realistic; and secondly if an ordinary 
least squares regression (OLS) was used, the assumption of constant variance would 
not hold and therefore the logit stabilised this. It must be noted that the data used 
for 1988 had to be estimated as the Department of Health introduced new 
prescription pads in that year rendering the duplicate pads used to collect the data 
useless. New duplicate pads had to be printed and distributed leaving the data from 
March to October incomplete. By taking the average number of brand and generic 
prescriptions for the drugs in the four correct months and assuming there were 
negligible seasonal variations in prescribing, a year estimate was calculated. 
To conduct the regression it was necessary to test for the constancy of slope 
to determine whether one slope could be assumed for all the drug products with 
each independent variable. By conducting the regression including variables to 
account for the possibility of different slopes for the five drug products, it was 
found that none were significant at the 5% level, therefore a constant slope could be 
assumed for market size and generic availability. It was however found that market 
size was not a significant variable in the analysis and so could be dropped from the 
regression equation which became: 
YQ = ad, t + SZdt 
Assuming the same slope for all of the drugs but different intercepts the 
regression coefficients resulting from the analysis were: 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Q Indocid a lt -3.026 -3.95 0.001 Penbritin a 2, t -3.100 -2.50 0.022 Brufen a It 0.375 0.55 0.586 
Lasix a 4, t 0.602 0.89 0.385 
Midamor a5 t -2.305 -2.68 0.015 Z d, t 
, 6t 0.646 6.47 0.000 
n =25 R2 = 0.975 R2(adj. ) = 0.901 
This regression analysis identifies a significant relationship between the 
proportion of generic prescriptions written and the number of years the generic 
version has been available on the market which suggests the diminishing strength of 
brand loyalty over time. The 'goodness-of-fit' (R2) and the adjusted R2 (adjusted for 
degrees of freedom) suggests that the regression analysis explains a high percentage 
of the variation between the actual figures and the estimated regression line. It must 
also be noted that Brufen and Lasix were not significant in this analysis suggesting 
that the relationships associated with individual drugs may differ. 
172 
The precise transition from brand product prescribing to generic is another 
area of interest which could not be considered for these products, therefore the 
analysis continued by looking at the remaining seven products in the sample - 
Feldene, Naprosyn, Ponstan, Ventolin, Amoxil, Trasicor and Neo-Naclex K. 
By looking at these younger drugs it was hoped to determine the exact 
pattern of transition from brand to generic prescribing immediately after generic 
products became available on the market. The same visual and regression 
techniques were employed for this stage of the analysis, with Figures 7F - 7L 
illustrating in diagrammatic form the changes in prescribing 1985 - 1989. 
Figure 7F: Feldene versus Piroxicam 
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Figure 7G: Naprosyn versus Naproxen 
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Figure 7H: Ponstan versus MMefenamic Acid 
Figure 71: Ventolin Inhaler 
versus Salbutamol 
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Figure 7J: Amoxil versus Amoxycillin   Amoxil %ý 
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Figure 7K: Trasicor versus Oxprenolol 
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Figure 7L: Neo-Naclex K versus 
Bendrofluazide + Potassium 
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A visual analysis of these graphs shows a notable increase in generic 
prescribing soon after the generic form of the product became available5. Looking 
at the change in the percentage of generic prescribing after the first year of its 
availability, Table 7.2 shows just how quickly some generic products began to 
dominate. 
Table 7.2: Generic Prescribing after Year 1 and in 1989 
Brand (generic) product 
and date of generic entry. 
% Generic 
prescribing after 1 
year of availability 
% 
Generic prescribing 
by 1989 
Feldene (Piroxicam) 1986 98 
Na pros_ (Naproxen) 1985 76 98 
Ponstan (hic enamic Acid) 1986 41 
Ventolin (Salbutamol) 1984 44 92 
Amoxil (Amoxycillin) 1985 11 73 
Trasicor (Oxprenolol) 1985 25 98 
Neo- aclex K (Bendr. + P) 1987d 16 85 
It is obvious from this table that there is considerable variation between 
products as to the speed of generic penetration. One of the more notable products, 
when looking at this discrepancy, is Amoxil. For this product, one year after 
generic competition became available it represented only 11% of written 
prescriptions in Carnoustie. It was later found out that Amoxil had been 
reformulated in banana flavouring specifically aimed at children, a strategy which 
proved effective in delaying the onslaught of generic prescribing. This is a possible 
5The data suggests that Naproxen may have been available for at least the later part of 1984. 
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explanation of the slower generic growth pattern and the stabling off of generic 
prescriptions at a lower level in this market. Grabowski & Vernon (1992) noted 
how the introduction of new dosage forms of the original brand product just before 
patent expiry had been used as a method to delay the effects of competition which is 
what seems to have occurred in this instance. Similarly, Neo-Naclex K experienced 
a low initial rate of generic prescribing which could be attributed to the extremely 
lengthy and complex generic name. Such generic names are often hard to 
remember and to spell which may discourage their use in an everyday clinic 
situation when it is easier and quicker to prescribe a brand-named drug. 
This table does, nevertheless, show how generic prescribing can make rapid 
inroads into total prescribing even in the initial stages of generic availability. Again 
this suggests that brand loyalty is not perhaps as strong as previously implied, 
although there is not a complete reversal of roles. This requires an 
acknowledgement that brand loyalty can still have lingering effects on prescribing. 
This is more obvious for some products, e. g. Ponstan was subject to generic 
competition in 1986, yet by 1989 that proportion of prescriptions accounted for by 
generic products was only 41%, suggesting a strong lingering brand loyalty. 
A regression analysis was conducted on these younger products to determine 
the degree to which the proportion of generic prescribing was influenced by market 
size and the year of generic introduction. The same regression model as before was 
used: 
Yd, t = ad, t + PXdt + 6Zd, t 
Again the constancy of the slope had to be determined , and therefore an 
analysis including a different slope for each drug product was conducted. These 
variables were found not to be significant, and so a constant slope could be assumed 
for each independent variable. The estimated regression coefficients from this 
analysis were as follows; 
Coefficien t t-ratio A 
Feldene a l, t 4.605 3.01 0.006 
Naprosyn a 2, t 5.013 2.98 0.006 
Ponstan a3 t -0.216 -0.19 0.851 Ventolin , a4, t 16.315 3.48 0.002 
Amoxil a 5, t -3.190 -4.70 0.000 Trasicor a 6, t -1.988 -2.65 0.014 Neo-Naclex K a 7, t -2.207 -3.86 0.001 X d, t t -0.009 -4.00 0.000 Z d, t t 1.454 9.43 0.000 
n= 35 R2 = 0.864 R2(adj. ) = 0.487 
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From this regression analysis a 'negative significant relationship was found 
between the proportion of generic prescriptions written and the size of the market. 
With regards to the relationship between the proportion of generic prescriptions and 
the number of years of generic availability, there was a positive and significant 
relationship found for the older products. Although the generic penetration varied 
between products, it was evident that brand loyalty diminished substantially within 
2 to 3 years of generic entry onto the market. Again one product, Ponstan, proved 
to be highly insignificant in this analysis suggesting that such a relationship may 
depend on individual drugs. 
To complete the analysis, a final regression was conducted which included 
all of the drug samples in the study for an overall picture of prescribing. Before 
conducting this regression, a number of ANOVA general linear model tests were 
conducted to determine the best model. It was found that including the market size 
of the new drug products and the availability functions of both the new and old 
products gave the best model, hence the regression equation was: 
Yd, t = ad, t + ßaXdt + &lZdt + SbZd, t 
f3a = Market size regression coefficient for the 7 younger drugs 
5a = Availability regression coefficient for the 5 mature drugs. 
Sb= Availability regression coefficient for the 
,7 
younger drugs. 
The regression coefficients found from this analysis were; 
Coefficient t-ratio g 
Indocid ,- (X it -3.026 -. 2.91 0.006 Penbritin a 2, t -3.100 -1.84 0.072 Brufen a3 t 0.375 0.41 0.685 
Lasix , a4, t 0.602- 0.65 0.516 
Midamor a5, t 2.305 -1.98 0.054 Feldene a 6, t 4.006 2.99 0.004 
Naprosyn a it 4.004 2.94 0.005 
Ponstan a8 t -0.826 -0.63 0.532 Ventolin , a 9, t 11.404 3.51 0.001 
Amoxil a 10, t -2.448 -5.59 0.000 Trasicor a1i, t -0.958 -3.27 0.002 Neo-Naclex K a 12, t -2.097 -4.66 0.000 Xt a g 0.0007 -4.13 0.000 
Zt a -0.0062 4.76 0.000 Zt sb 1.062 11.47 0.000 
n= 60 R2 = 0.934 R2 (adj. ) = 0.739 
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A significant negative association was again found for the relationship 
between the proportion of generic prescriptions written and the size of the market 
for the younger drug products. Contrasting with this both groups showed a positive 
significant relationship between the proportion of generic prescriptions written and 
the number of years of generic availability. 
7.4: Conclusion 
There are a number of weaknesses with this model which must be noted 
before the summing up is undertaken. Firstly, this study was conducted on only one 
health practice. Initially, it was designed to be a pilot study with more data 
becoming available from MEMO, however this new data was not appropriate to the 
analysis, and so the study could not be expanded to cover a range of practices. The 
reason for wanting to increase the number of practices was to increase the sample 
size allowing for different practice 'cultures' which may exist. A colleague from the 
medical profession commented that the large proportion of generic prescribing of 
Ibuprofen, Frusemide and Salbutamol was not, as he considered, a typical example, 
bringing into doubt the ability of this study to be, regarded as representative. 
Secondly, the number of drugs it was possible to use in the study was limited by 
data availability. Ideally, a range of products from each therapeutic category would 
have been available to determine whether there were any differences between 
therapeutic groups. 
Considering these weaknesses the results of this analysis can be summarised 
as follows. Firstly, it is evident that the proportion of generic prescribing increases 
the longer the generic is available to the doctor, however it is the speed with which 
this penetration takes place that is of particular interest. From the analysis of the 
younger products it is obvious that such generic penetration is quite rapid in the 
majority of cases. Nevertheless, one can not rule out the brand products 
completely, for even after a considerable number of years a small percentage of 
prescriptions continued to be written by brand-name. The brand loyalty induced by 
the previous intensive promotional activity of pharmaceutical companies is not 
strong enough in this instance to ensure the continued domination of brand 
prescribing for the market, however, it has lingering effects such that brand 
prescribing is not completely eradicated. The strength of this lingering effect seems 
to depend on the individual product as suggested by the variation in penetration 
levels and the different levels of significance for different drugs as found in the 
regression analyses. 
There also seems to be a change over time with regards to market size and 
generic prescribing. The regression analysis found that the larger the market, the 
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fewer generics prescribed in the younger drug product group, conversely market 
size was insignificant for the older drug prescribing. Possibly as the doctor sees 
more patients for these larger markets and prescribes for them more frequently, 
there is an increased chance of brand loyalty developing. When the drug products 
are just out of patent this brand loyalty will tend to be stronger, and hence this 
statistical relationship. 
Previous studies found that generics accounted for an average 35% of the 
market after one year and 49% after two years (Grabowski & Vernon 1992), figures 
that were considerably higher than previous studies. ' On average for this sample of 
products, after one year on the market, generics accounted for 39%. It would seem 
that in the pharmaceutical market as in others the strength of brand loyalty is 
beginning to diminish. Hence, although these figures were from only one practice 
and may not be statistically representative, the results are not dissimilar to those of 
previous studies. 
"- Scherer & Ross (1990) noted how the first-mover advantage associated with 
brand loyalty for all products, was not impregnable and could be eroded, even 
undermined. For this to occur, customers needed to have substantial financial 
incentives to make cost saving choices while objective information about competing 
product quality was also required. For the prescribing decision the doctor is under 
increasing pressure from the government to curb prescribing costs and is therefore 
becoming more aware of price differences between brand and generic products, 
while increased publicity of the need to curb costs has also increased awareness. - It 
is perhaps no surprise that brand loyalty for drugs no longer seems so strong. 
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Chapter 8: Factors Influencing Doctor Prescribing Behaviour, 
8.1: Introduction 
One of the questions which arose out of the previous-statistical study of 
brand and generic prescribing was what factors actually influenced the doctor's 
decision to prescribe. Following on from this analysis a survey was conducted by 
sending out questionnaires to doctors to determine what they believed were the 
main factors of influence for their prescribing decisions and the main sources of 
information used. Previous studies concluded that the information provided by the 
pharmaceutical industry has had a significant influence on prescribing whether the 
doctors have realised this it or not, and this influence has often been seen as 
resulting in irrational prescribing (Avorn et al. 1982; Orlowski & Wateska 1992). 
By conducting a questionnaire of what doctors actually believe to be the 
main factors influencing them and their main sources of information it was hoped to 
isolate the influence of the pharmaceutical industry within this context of 
prescribing. 
8.2: Methodology 
The questionnaire was designed to provide information concerning the 
general conduct of the pharmaceutical companies in the prescribing environment, to 
determine what doctors thought of the promotional activity of companies, what they 
believed to be important as sources of information and influences and their attitudes 
towards brand and generic drugs and general market knowledge. In September 
1992, the questionnaire was completed and sent to 211 doctors in the Tayside and 
Fife regions of Scotland6. These doctors were selected from regional telephone 
directories and the questionnaires sent out 'blind'. No knowledge of registration 
dates or gender of any of the doctors was known. Each questionnaire was sent with 
6A copy of the questionnaire can be found in the Technical Appendix Section 2. 
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a stamped addressed envelope to encourage response and the replies were 
anonymous. In total 145 responses were made, which gave a response rate of 69%. 
8.3: The Analysis 
Throughout the questionnaire there were a number of questions which were 
designed to gather information about the general environment surrounding the 
prescribing doctor. Such questions related to how often pharmaceutical company 
sales representatives were seen and for how long, knowledge of patent expiry and 
generic entry dates and attitudes towards the pharmaceutical industry promotional 
activities. The following conclusions were found. 
With regards to how often a doctor is visited by a company sales 
representative, it was found that 46% of doctors were on average visited once a 
week, and 31% were visited more than once a week. For these visits the most 
popular length was 10 minutes, which 69% of doctors indicated. Considering the 
extent of contact between the doctor and the'sa les representative, when asked if the 
company sales representatives were serving their purpose by spreading relevant 
information on drugs, only 33% of doctors agreed, while 59% believed that this was 
sometimes the case. Many doctors took the opportunity in the section left for 
general comments to indicate that company sales representative success was very 
much dependent on the individual representative. 
Another area of interest was the degree of knowledge doctors had of the 
patent expiry dates of brand drugs and the entry dates of generic versions. With 
reference to both of these, fewer than 7% of the doctors surveyed knew the dates of 
such occurrences, assuming that date refers generally to the year of expiry or entry. 
A more reasonable figure was found with respect to this knowledge when the 
'sometimes' response was considered, with 60% indicating this. 
The opportunity was also taken to ask whether there were any specific 
therapeutic categories that were promoted more aggressively than others, and any 
specific companies that promoted their products more aggressively than others. 
These questions tied in with the analysis in Chapter 7, where it was speculated that 
there would be variations in the speed of generic entry within different therapeutic 
categories, perhaps dependent on the potential market size and the subsequent 
promotional activity of the companies within this category. The doctors at the 
receiving end of promotional material were therefore asked if they had noted any 
specific categories that were targeted more than others. 84% of their responses 
indicated that there were certain therapeutic groups which experienced more 
aggressive promotional activity from the companies. The six most frequently 
indicated groups in descending order of popularity are shown in Table 8.1: 
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Table 8.1: The Most Aggressively Promoted Therapeutic Groups. 
Therapeutic Group umber of Doctors 
Cardiovascular 110 
Anti-Ulcer 85 
Antibacterial 79 
Anti-Depressants 76 
Musculoskeletal 61 
Respiratory System 
When then asked to consider if any companies could be distinguished as 
promoting their products more aggressively than others, 39% of doctors identified 
particular companies. Table 8.2 illustrates these companies in descending order of 
frequency: 
Table 8.2: Aggressive Promotional Pharmaceutical Companies 
Company. Number of Doctors 
Glaxo 44 
SmithKline Beecham 18 
Bayer 14 
Merck 10 
Roche 10 
ICI 7 
Lilly 7 
It was interesting to note that one company, Glaxo, was regarded by 
significantly more doctors as particularly aggressive in its promotional activities. 
This aggressive aspect of their marketing strategy may be one of the contributing 
factors to their dramatic rise from eighteenth position in the world listing of top 
pharmaceutical companies in 1982 to second place in 1990 (As seen in Table 4.5). 
In the general comments section many doctors mentioned that the individuality of 
each sales representative made it difficult to associate a specific company with 
them, especially as there were so many. 
This information gave some general background knowledge about the 
environment in which the prescribing decision was made. Briefly, the majority of 
doctors have limited knowledge about patent expiry dates or the dates of generic 
entry onto the market, they are visited frequently by company sales representatives, 
who are often not regarded as 'doing their job' satisfactorily by providing relevant 
information to the doctors, and finally, distinctions can be made between 
therapeutic groups and to a lesser degree companies with respect to the degree of 
aggressiveness involved in the promotional campaigns. 
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The next area of interest was to determine what the doctors considered to be 
the most influential factors in their prescribing decisions. In an effort to keep the 
questionnaire simple and quick to ensure completion, doctors were presented with a 
choice of thirteen possible factors which were felt might influence prescribing 
choices. They were then asked to rank each factor by a simple numerical scale of 1 
to-, 5. By taking each rank and multiplying it by the number of doctors who 
indicated it, an absolute value for the various factors was found. This was then used 
to place the factors into a descending order of importance, the most important factor 
being that with the highest overall score. The definitions for the ranks given in this 
numerical scale follow. 
Rank: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Definition 
of no influence/importance 
interesting but of no direct use 
useful but not an important influence 
quite important 
very important 
Table 8.3 indicates the factors that influence the prescribing decision of 
doctors in descending order of importance, the most frequent rank chosen and the 
percentage of doctors who chose it. 
Table 8.3: Factors influencing prescribing decisions' 
Order Factor Most re uent rank o 
1 Efficacy of product 5 79 
2 Previous personal experience 5 R7 
3 Quality of product 4 41 
4 Information in medical journals 4 60 
5 Price of product 4 4 
6 Academic seminars, conferences 4 5 
7 Colleague experiences 4 45 
- 8 Patient preferences 4 W 
9 Formularies of practice/hospital 4 32 
- 10 Quick recall of product name '79 
11 Promotional inf. of companies 2 7 
12 External pressure i. e. health board 1 40 
13 Spelling of product name 1 50 
What can clearly be seen from this table is that efficacy and previous 
personal experience are the two most important influences on the prescribing 
decision, with 79% and 66% respectively, of doctors ranking these factors as very 
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important. The majority of the other factors of influence were ranked as quite 
important, but with four exceptions. The first of these was the quick recall of the 
product name, which could be associated with the brand-name of a drug product. 
This was ranked as useful but not an important influence. - Next, came the 
promotional information provided by pharmaceutical companies concerning their 
products, which was ranked as interesting but of no direct use. After this, ranked as 
of no importance in the prescribing decision, was external pressure, e. g. pressure 
from government to cut prescribing costs. Lastly, the spelling of a product name 
was cited of least importance in choosing a product. 
These rankings of possible influential factors in the prescribing decision 
implied certain conclusions. The most important factors of influence suggest that 
the primary objective of the doctor is the welfare of the patient, which comes as no 
surprise. Such factors as product name, company promotional material and outside 
pressures are not relevant to the welfare of the patient and so are not considered to 
be of any or much influence. 
The doctors were then asked to rank in a similar way, ten possible factors 
which they might use as sources of information. Table 8.4 shows the results of this 
question. 
Table 8.4: Sources of Information 
Or-der Source of information Most frequent rank % 
1 Academic seminars conferences 4 52 
2 Independent scientific journals 4 -5f- 
3 Patient feedback 4 49 
4 Colleague experiences 4 44 
5 Local drug information services 4 39 
6 Formularies 4 32 
7 Company sales representatives 42 
8 Company conferences 
9 Company advertising in journal I 
4 :1 
10 Comp an direct mailing 1 4 
The most important source of information for the doctor was identified as 
the academic seminar and conference closely followed by the independent scientific 
journal. Of more interest to this analysis was the fact that the company promotional 
activities specified were considered to be the least important sources of information. 
These were the company sales representatives, seminars and conferences sponsored 
by the companies, advertising in journals and direct mail to the doctors. At the 
most, two of these factors, the sales representatives and the seminars and 
conferences, were ranked as useful but not important. The others were considered 
useless. 
From these tables it is obvious that, the pharmaceutical company is not 
considered to be an important influence on the prescribing decision of the doctors in 
this sample group, nor an important source of information. The promotional 
activities of the companies, as specified above, were proposed to be of use to 
doctors for learning about new products, learning about new indications, dosages, 
etc., as reminders of existing products and finally, as a way of keeping up to date 
with recent R&D advances. The importance placed on each of these functions of 
company promotional material is shown in Table 8.5. It can be seen that the 
provision of information on new products is considered quite important while the 
other aspects are merely useful but not important. 
Table 8.5: The Type of Information Provided by Company Promotional 
Activity 
Order Type of information Most re uent rank % 
1 Learn of new products 4 46 
2 Learn of new indications, dosages etc 3 4 
3 Reminders of existing products 3 40 
4 Learn of R&D advances 3 3 
Nevertheless, when asked to categorise such activity as a source of 
information the majority of doctors believed it to be only of some use, while they 
relied mostly on their training. These results are shown in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6: The Importance of Company Promotional Activities as a Source of 
Information. 
Category No. of Doctors % 
Essential 9 6.21 
Very useful 56 
Some use 67 46.21 
No use 1 8.97 
TOTAL 145 
From all of this information the conclusion that can be reached is that 
pharmaceutical company promotional activity has little if any influence on the 
prescribing decision of doctors, nor do doctors use this material as an essential 
source of information. The factors that do influence their prescribing, viz. efficacy 
and previous experience closely followed by other such worthy factors as quality, 
safety, etc., and the most important sources of information i. e. the academic seminar 
and conference, all suggest that apart from inevitable human. mistakes, doctors make 
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prescribing choices based solely on rational factors. 
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This is not however, the final conclusion of this analysis, as further evidence 
was found to contradict it suggesting that what doctors say influences them and 
what actually does influence them may not be the same. The first questions asked 
in the questionnaire which required a simple yes or no response, related to whether 
the doctor preferred to prescribe brand-name products and if so why. In evaluating 
the responses it was found that 36% openly preferred to prescribe brand-name 
products for the following reasons, in descending order of popularity: 
1. The company was better known and trusted. 
2. The quality of the product is better. 
3. The name is easier to distinguish. 
4. It is preferred by the patient. 
5. The efficacy of the product is better 
6. The safety of the product is better 
7. The consistency of the product. 
8. By prescribing brands you are supporting R&D. 
li 
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Whilst there is some validity in these reasons for preferring brand name 
ti 
products, at least part of this reasoning is likely to stem from the promotional 
material emanating from the companies, who highlight the superior characteristics 
of their products above all others. In previous years generic versionsý of products 
have had a reputation for inconsistency, dubious safety and efficacy based on a 
number of well publicised cases. Those pharmaceutical companies based in 
innovative research and brand products have used this bad publicity to reinforce 
their own reputations of safety, consistency, efficacy, etc., and build up a strong 
brand loyalty. As indicated in the previous chapter, although generic competition 
now penetrates the market relatively quickly, brand loyalty lingers and can 
withstand a complete reversal of positions even after a number of years. If it is 
assumed that in the majority of cases brand and generic drug products are 
equivalent, this preference for the brand-name product is irrational. The trust 
embodied in the company implies brand loyalty, the more easily distinguished name 
illustrates the success of the short, snappy brand-name, while the belief that quality, 
safety and efficacy are better implies successful product differentiation of 
essentially homogeneous products. There is even some evidence of inadvertent 
brand loyalty from the patients. This is likely to occur when a patient is on 
continuous medication and can begin to associate the relief of symptoms with 
particular pills, capsules or liquids. Whatever form this medication takes will tend 
to have a distinctive shape, colour or taste, and be associated with one particular 
manufacturer. 
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Of those who did not prefer to prescribe brand-name products, 38% 
indicated the cost factor, while only 15% indicated that they thought brand and 
generic products to be equivalent. Obviously, until generic manufacturers can 
overcome this reputation of shoddiness, the number of doctors who will stick to the 
brand products will continue to be significant. Only 37% of doctors responded that 
they made a distinct effort to prescribe all products generically, regardless of 
availability. Other responses in the questionnaire also brought the accuracy of the 
Table 8.1 into further doubt. 
When asked if the complicated generic spelling of product names acted as a 
deterrent to prescribing in an everyday clinic situation, 44% of doctors indicated 
that it did, yet in Table 8.1 spelling came last in the list of influences for prescribing 
and was ranked as of no importance. Almost half of those doctors surveyed show 
behaviour implying that spelling does influence their choice. Then, when asked if 
they saw a brand-name as suggesting an implicit guarantee of quality, 49% agreed. 
Again, this hints of the influence of company promotional activity highlighting the 
characteristics of their products above all others and building up as much 'good-will' 
with the medical profession as possible. 4 
8.4: Conclusions 
What can be concluded from this analysis is that although there is little 
doubt that the main influences of the prescribing decision are the patient welfare, 
the contradictions evident signify that pharmaceutical company promotional activity 
is also influential. This illustrates the dubious value of doctor self-reporting in 
prescribing as found in similar studies (Avom et al. 1982; Orlowski & Wateska 
1992). In conclusion, doctors either do not realise or are not prepared to admit to 
the degree of influence such companies have on their prescribing decisions. It 
would be beneficial to train doctors to c' ontinually evaluate their methods of 
decision-making in an effort to increase awareness of the true prescribing influences 
and perhaps rectify them if they are not in keeping with the criteria of rationality. 
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Chapter 9: Age-Related Differences in Doctor Prescribing 
9.1: Introduction 
Another area of interest which it became possible to analyse was the 
relationship between prescribing behaviour and the age of the doctor. It was 
speculated that as the doctor ages and becomes more experienced, attitudes towards 
the pharmaceutical industry and its promotional strategies may change, as may 
attitudes towards brand and generic drugs. Another factor which might create a 
difference in prescribing habits is the changing educational environment, which in 
recent years has placed an increasing emphasis on cost-containment, giving the 
doctor an added responsibility. Previously, they had to ensure the drug product 
provided to the patient was safe, appropriate and efficacious, without consideration 
for prices; however in today's climate, price is becoming an increasingly relevant 
factor in the decision-making process. It could be speculated that the more mature 
doctors, who were trained in a different climate, may have a different prescribing 
pattern, perhaps prescribing more products overall, or more brand products. 
Furthermore, the longer a doctor has been practising, the longer they have been 
exposed to the persuasive techniques of the pharmaceutical industry. Following 
this, it is possible that the more experienced doctor is more likely to have formed 
decisive prescribing habits, either biased towards certain brand products and 
companies or otherwise. 
The intention of this analysis was to use the material collected for the 
previous examinations of brand loyalty and prescribing and test the hypothesis that 
there might be significant differences between doctors of different ages. 
The analysis was conducted in two stages. The first stage of analysis was 
conducted on the data which became available from MEMO on the number and 
type of prescriptions written by the seven full-time doctors at Carnoustie. The aim 
of this was to determine whether the more mature doctors prescribed more drug 
products overall, and whether there was any distinct pattern of prescribing. The 
second stage of the analysis was conducted on the questionnaire data which was 
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separated into appropriate age-groups to determine whether the more mature 
doctors held any significantly different views about the main factors influencing 
their prescribing decision, the main sources of information they used and finally, 
their thoughts on the pharmaceutical industry and its promotional uses. 
9.2: Prescribing 
The data from MEMO included the exact numbers of prescriptions written 
by each of the full-time doctors and the numbers accounted for by brand and 
generic forms of the twelve products used in the initial study of prescribing. The 
date of registration of each doctor was used as a proxy for age and a further drug 
product included. This new drug product was Tenormin (Atenolol), an anti- 
hypertensive drug product made by I. C. I. In the Carnoustie Practice the total 
number of prescriptions written for this product over the study period, 1985 - 1989 
was 9,509. 
As a precautionary note, all of the doctors were male except doctor number 
7, who was also the youngest doctor in the practice (registered in 1985). If any 
significant relationship was found between the prescribing behaviour of doctor 7 
and age, it must be acknowledged that this may be partly attributable to her sex. 
Furthermore, it was assumed that the attitudes of each doctor towards prescribing 
did not change during the study period. The prescriptions written over the entire 
period 1985 - 1989 were considered in the analysis as the more detailed information 
of yearly numbers was unavailable7. 
Firstly, Figure 9.1 gives some indication of the number of prescriptions 
written in generic form in relation to the registration dates of the 7 doctors in the 
study, based on the data collected between 1985 and 1989. No distinct trend could 
be associated with the percentage of generic prescriptions and the date of 
registration of each doctor, therefore a regression analysis was conducted. 
For this analysis each drug product was considered individually and the logit 
of the proportion of generic prescriptions was regressed on the number of Years 
since registration for each doctor. The model used was: 
Yd, t = Rd + SXd, t 
Yd, t = Logit of the proportion of generic prescribing 1985 - 1989 for drug d 
(3d = The regression coefficient for drug d 
Xd, t = The number of years since doctor registration for drug d 
7 The dates of registration for each doctor and the relevant tables of brand and generic 
prescribing for the study period can be found in the Technical Appendix Section 3. 
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The resulting regression estimations for each drug (n = 7) were as follows: 
Coefficoen t t-ratio ja RZ 
1. Indocid 0.059 2.75 0.033 0.557 
2. Penbritin 0.168 3.22 0.018 0.663 
3. Brufen 0.104 2.05 0.080 0.374 
4. Lasix 0.195 3.39 0.015 0.657 
5. Midamor 0.103 3.36 0.015 0.652 
6. Feldene 0.030 0.98 0.364 0.139 
7. Naprosyn 0.096 4.10 0.006 0.737 
8. Ponstan -0.051 -2.38 0.055 0.486 9. Ventolin 0.043 2.63 0.039 0.536 
10. Amoxil -0.049 -3.44 0.014 0.664 11. Trasicor 0.012 0.60 0.572 0.056 
12. Neo-Naclex K 0.063 6.89 0.000 0.888 
13. Tenormin -0.040 -2.25 0.065 0.458 
From this table nine drug products were found to be positively significant in 
the model implying that as the 'age' of the doctor increased, the amount of generic 
prescribing also increased. The one exception to this was Amoxil which was found 
to be negatively significant. Looking at this drug in particular, there were large 
differences in the prescribing habits of the doctors which undoubtedly had an 
influence, while there was also the effect of the new brand formulation introduced 
as mentioned, in Chapter 7. This new banana flavoured drug product successfully 
slowed down the entry of generic competition and possibly led to the negative 
relationship found here. 
What is also obvious from the table is that the fit of these regressions is, in 
most cases, not good. For example, the R2 for Trasicor is only 0.056. Furthermore, 
the wide variation in the levels of significance suggests that certain drugs may 
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behave quite differently (Feldene and Trasicor were highly insignificant ý in the 
regression). In most of the analyses doctor 1, the eldest doctor in the practice was 
found to have a very large influence over the regression. This doctor was therefore 
removed from the regression, which was then repeated with n=6. The results of this 
regression were as follows: 
Coeffliden t t-ratio, a R2, 
1. Indocid 0.105 3.97 0.011 0.759 
2. Penbritin 0.263 3.65 0.015 0.728 
3. Brufen 0.293 4.15 0.009 0.775 
4. Lasix 0.323 4.90 0.004 0.827 
5. Midamor 0.173 5.36 0.003 0.852 
6. Feldene 0.065 1.32 0.244 , 0.259 7. Naprosyn 0.153 6.55 '0.001 0.896 
8. Ponstan -0.083 -2.64 0.046 0.582 9. Ventolin 0.078 3.90 0.011 0.753 
10. Amoxil -0.041 -1.67 0.155 0.358 11. Trasicor 0.010 -. 290 0.787 0.016 12. Neo-Naclex K 0.076 5.58 0.003 0.862 
13. Tenonnin -0.027 -3.26 0.023 0.679 
From this regression analysis there were now ten drug products which were 
significant. Of these ten drugs, eight were positively significant and the same drugs 
as in the last regression, while two were now negatively significant, Ponstan and 
Tenormin. Looking at the goodness-of-fit for these regressions they have improved 
considerably in the majority of cases, but it must be noted that the R2 for those drug 
products with a negative relationship is not as good as for the other drugs. Perhaps 
for these drugs, which were more recently introduced in generic form, there was no 
clear pattern of prescribing as yet. 
The main pattern of prescribing which did emerge was one where increased 
generic prescribing was associated with increased time since registration. One 
possible explanation for this is the growing familiarity of doctors with certain 
products and so the increasing trust in such products. 
The next analysis conducted with the data provided by MEMO considered 
the total number of prescriptions written by each doctor in relation to the overall 
number of prescriptions written by the seven. It was speculated that the younger 
doctor would prescribe fewer drugs, perhaps due to the changed educational 
climate. Figure 9.2 illustrates what percentage of overall prescribing was 
attributable to each doctor. Doctor 1, the eldest doctor was excluded from this 
analysis as he took semi-retirement during the last year of the study period. The 
same thirteen drug products were used in this section of analysis. 
From a quick inspection of this diagram it can be seen that the youngest 
doctor prescribed considerably fewer drugs over the five year period. There is a 
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suggestion of a downward trend, however a regression analysis was required to 
determine whether this trend existed in any significant form. 
Figure 9.2: % Total Prescribing Per Doctor 
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The following regression model was used: 
1'd, t = Pd + SXd. t 
Yd, t = Number of prescriptions for drug d over the period 1985 - 1989 for doctor t. 
Pd = Regression coefficient for drug d 
Xd, t = Number of years since registration for doctor t. 
8= Regression coefficient for registrafion 
The results from this regression estimation were: 
CoeMcient A-ratio J2 
1. Indocid 4.23 0.05 0.961 
2. Penbrifin 202.73 2.32 0,023 
3. Brufen 615.57 7.05 0.000 
4. Lasix 339.07 3.88 0.000 
5. Midamor -230.27 -2.64 0.010 6. Feldene 131.23 1.50 0.138 
7. Naprosyn 178.07 2.04 0.045 
8. Ponstan -3.77 -0.04 0.966 9. Ventolin 960.23 11.00 0.000 
10. Arnoxil -214.27 -2.45 0.017 11. Trasicor -197.43 -2.26 0.027 12. Neo-Naclex K -182.93 -2.10 0.040 13. Tenormin 853.73 9.78 0.000 
Xt 20.462 4.92 0.000 
n= 78 R2 = 0.936 R2 (adj. ) = 0.649 
0 10 % Ttl Presc. 20 30 
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There is clearly a positive significant relationship between the number of 
prescriptions and the date of registration. As the number of years since registration 
increases, so do the number of prescriptions written: in other words the more mature 
doctors prescribe more. 
In summary, it can be speculated that the more recently registered a doctor is 
the less he or she is likely to prescribe in general, while the longer they have been 
registered the higher the proportion of prescriptions they will fill by generic drug 
products, for the majority cases. These conclusions are in reality, little more than 
speculation despite the regression analyses conducted. The main reason for this is 
the small sample size of doctors and the fact that it was also impossible to 
determine what kind of case-mix each doctor had. It is more than possible'that the 
older doctors have more elderly patients who feel more comfortable with someone 
more mature. If this is likely, it is also probable that these doctors will need to 
prescribe considerably more medication for these patients. Again it would have 
been ideal to analyse similar data for a large number of doctors in a number of 
practices and make allowances for differing case-mixes. This study however, 
suggests the need for further studies in this area. 
9.3: Prescribing Attitudes 
The second stage of this analysis on possible differences between doctor 
prescribing habits and the age of the doctors was conducted from the information 
provided by the questionnaire used in Chapter 8. While deducing the main 
influences of the prescribing decision, the main sources of information and general 
attitudes towards pharmaceutical promotional activities, and brand and generic 
products, it was possible to distinguish differences between two groups of doctors 
based on their dates of registration. 
When the questionnaires were sent out, the date of registration was asked for 
and the responses divided into two groups, those registered before 1980 and those 
registered in 1980 and afterwards. Again the date of registration was taken as a 
proxy for age. The reasoning behind this division was based on the late 1970's as 
the beginning of the generic come-back. Of the 145 questionnaires returned, 92 
were from doctors registered before 1980,50 from doctors registered in 1980 and 
after, and 3 had no registration date and could not be included in the study. Table 
9.1 illustrates the ordering and rank given to the specified influences of prescribing 
for both groups. 
Although the top two influences, efficacy and previous personal experience 
remained the same for both groups, there were significant differences for some of 
the other factors specified. In particular, the importance of price was different in 
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order and rank between the groups. Ile older doctors placed price as a factor 
influencing the prescribing decision as fourth and ranked it as 'quite important', 
compared to the younger doctors who placed price sixth and ranked it as 'useful but 
not an important influence'. Similarly, the quality of a drug, the spelling of a drug 
name, and the use of formularies and acaden-dc sen-dnars all seemed to be of more 
importance to the older doctor. The younger doctor placed more emphasis on 
medical journals, colleague experience, patient preference, company promotional 
information and external pressures. 
Table 9.1: Factors of Influence for the two groups of doctors 
<1980 1980>= 
Order Factor 
Most 
Freq. 
Rank 
% Order Factor 
Most 
Freq. 
Rank 
% 
1 Efficacy 5 78 1 Efficacy 5 80 
2 Personal exp. 5 63 - 
2 
- - 
Personal exp. 5 - 
70 
3 Quality 5 T 1 
- ., 
T 
- 
Quality 4 7r 
1 - 4 Price 4 51 
- 
7 
- - 
Medical journals 4- 67 
5 Medical journals 4 57 5 To-] league exp. 4 46 
6- 'Academic seminar 4 51 6 Price - 3 38 
7 Colleague exp. 4 44 7 Patient preference 7- -29- - 8 Pat ent preference 3/4 34 8 Academic seminar 4 -57 
9 Formularies 4 32 9 Formularies 3 34 
10 Quick recall 3 40 i 10 ick recall 3 - - 11 Promotional int. 2 40 ll 
- 
Promotional inf. 3 40 
- 112 1 Spelling I 4r 12 MR-ternal pressure 1 -39 113 1 External pressure 1 41 17-ý ing 11 56 1 
Similar differences were found when the sources of information used by the 
doctors for the prescribing decision were analysed as can be seen in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2: Sources of Information for the two age groups 
<1980 1980>= 
Order Source of inf. 
- - 
Most 
Freq. 
Rank 
% Order Source of inf. 
Most 
Freq. 
Rank 
% 
I Academic se m irnars 4 54 1 Independent journal 4 56 
2 Independent journal 4 50 2 Patient feedback 4 64 
3 Patient feedback 4- 7-2 '3= Acaden-dc seminars 4 
- - - 4 Local drug inf. 4 41 3= Colleague exR. 4 4fT 
5 Colleague exp. 4. 46 5 Local drug inf. 4 32 
6 Formularies 4 36 6 CompanX sales reps. 3 46 
- - 7 Company seminars 3' 45 7 Formularies 
- 
3 
- - 
ST 
- 8 Company sales reps. 1 40 8 Company seminars T 
- 
7 
- - 9 Company 
-journal acL-1 
-1- -4-U-I 'D Mo-mpanyjournalad. 1/3 3T 
10 Company direct mail 1 11 47 1 10 1 Company direct mail 11 40 J 
ý, ýý 
ýý 
195 
From this table it is possible to identify the academic seminar and 
conference, formularies and company seminars as the more important sources of 
information for the older doctor, while the younger doctor placed more emphasis on 
independent journals, patient feedback, colleague experience, company sales 
representatives and company advertising in journals. 
When other more general factors were considered, percentage differences 
were again found. For example, 45% of the older doctors considered the 
complicated generic spelling of drug names to be a deterrent to prescribing in an 
everyday clinic situation, compared to 40% of the younger doctors. More of the 
older doctors also thought that a brand name suggested an implicit guarantee of 
quality (52% versus 44% of the younger doctors). There were however, more 
younger doctors who preferred to prescribe brand-name products (40% compared to 
35% of older doctors). When considering those who made a decisive effort to 
prescribe all drugs by their generic name, regardless of availability, more of the 
older doctors admitted to this than younger doctors (39% versus 36%). Finally, 
looking to the market awareness of the two groups the younger doc - tors were 
generally more aware of generic entry onto the market than their older counterparts 
(72% versus 52%). 
To determine whether these percentage differences were actually significant, 
a Chi-square (X2) test was conducted on the number of answers given by each' 
group. It was discovered that only the difference in awareness of generic entry onto 
the market was in fact significant at the 5% level. 
A number of other aspects were also considered in this comparison of age- 
groups. The younger doctor tended to see the company sales representative for 
longer time periods, with an average of 12.2 minutes per visit, compared to the 
older doctor whose average was 10 minutes. All of the younger doctor were also 
visited at least once a month by the sales representative, compared to the older 
group in which 26% saw a company sales representative only once a month or less, 
with 8% never seeing a sales representative. 
If the uses of the company information are considered, 41% of the older 
doctors found it as quite important for learning about new products compared to 
56% of the younger doctors, which proved a significant difference at the 10% level 
when a'X2 test was conducted. As a reminder of existing products 24% of the 
younger doctors and 29% of the older doctors, found this as quite important, but this 
was not a significant difference. In the categorisation of pharmaceutical company 
promotional information, 46% of the younger doctors found it very useful, 
compared to 35% of the older doctors, while 45% found it interesting compared to 
48% of the older doctors. The spread of this categorisation proved interesting as 
shown in Table 9.3. 
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Table 9.3: Categorisation of Company Promotional Information 
Category Old (%) Young 
Essential 9 2 
Very useful 35 46 
Interesting 48 45 
Of no use 12 4 
The impression given from this . 
table is that over one-fifth of the older 
doctors have already formed very definite opinions about pharmaceutical 
promotional activity. Meanwhile, 38% of the younger doctors thought that 
company sales representatives successfully did their job of spreading relevant 
information on drugs compared to 32% of the older doctors, another difference that 
proved significant at the 10% level with a X2 test. 
In summary, there are some interesting differences found between the 
attitudes of the two groups. The main differences that proved significant when 
statistically tested related to the awareness of generic entry onto, the market, the use 
of information from companies and the competence of company sales 
representatives. It could be speculated that the educational climate for the younger 
doctors may have led them to be more aware of their market, while their relative 
inexperience in practice allowed them to be more open-minded to the potential uses 
of company promotional material. This inexperience may also be reflected by the 
higher percentage of young doctors preferring brand-name products, with already 
proven, therapeutic effects. Speculation on the differences in the sources of 
information could also be interpreted by the fact that younger doctors possibly 
undertake a more ýctive information search, exhibit differences in training, personal 
differences or general differences when they try to expand their overall knowledge 
when their experience is still limited. 
Obviously methods of training will vary with time and perhaps location, 
however, there are subtle differences in ordering and rank. Although it may be 
expected that the younger doctor is more aware of the need to be economic when 
prescribing, it is the older doctor who ranks price as of more importance. This 
difference was 42% compared to 30% of the younger doctors which proved 
significant at the 5% level with a X2 test. One possible explanation for this is the 
increasing pressure felt by the older generation of doctors to conform to modem 
standards, although they did not indicate this as an important influence on their 
prescribing decisions previously. 
The conclusion reached from this analysis is that the younger doctors who 
are visited more often and for longer by the sales representatives are more open- 
minded with regards to the information received from pharmaceutical companies. 
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The older doctors already seem to have formulated very definite views about the 
industry, with many more either hating it or loving it. It could therefore be 
speculated that attitudes towards prescribing brand and generic products and 
attitudes towards the pharmaceutical companies change with time. 
9.4: Conclusion 
The conclusions that can be reached from these analyses can be summarised 
as follows. 'Me attitude of doctors towards pharmaceutical company promotional 
activity seems to change with the age of the doctor as do the actual prescribing 
habits of the doctors. The younger doctor prescribes less in general, undertakes a 
more active search for information, prefers bmnd-name products and is more open- 
minded when it comes to the pharmaceutical industry promotional activities. 'Me 
older doctors tend to prescribe more, although the proportion of generic 
prescriptions increases for the majority of drug products perhaps due to greater faith 
from increased experience. Older doctors also seem to have formulated much more 
definite views about the pharmaceutical industry promotional activities. - 
Attitudes and general prescribing patterns therefore change over time. 7bis 
change may be due to differences in education between the older and younger 
doctors of -today or due to the stage of life of the doctor and'the extent of 
experience. it is impossible to deten-nine which of these may be more relevant, but 
it is safe to say that there are significant differences between prescribing patterns 
and attitudes and the date of registration of the doctor taken as a proxy for age. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1: Problems Facing The Pharmaceutical Industry 
The problems which effect the pharmaceutical industry originate from two 
sources, those emanating from the very nature of the industry and those which have 
been created by external intervention in the industry. The first of these relates 
primarily to the problems associated with the continual undertaking of research and 
innovation, the key elements of the industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry thrives on the therapeutic innovations made by 
a small number of companies. While such innovations represent potentially huge 
profits for the pioneer during the period of patent protection, they also set in motion 
the forces of their own destruction. Once a patent expires, imitation of 
pharmaceuticals is easy and the price competition the pioneer may face is 
considerable. Furthermore, a major therapeutic innovation which proves profitable 
encourages continued research from the other innovative companies in the same 
field. These companies may find a product with the same therapeutic effect but 
with fewer side-effects, perhaps in a more convenient dosage form or other such 
variations which make their product different and better. This product could then 
be marketed without infringement of the patent rights of the original product. The 
possibilities of product competition, followed by- the rising incidence of price 
competition, have made the pharmaceutical industry a very unstable market place. 
The problems for the leading firms are therefore to ensure that they have a 
strong, potentially profitable R&D pipeline for future product introductions to the 
market. It has already been seen in Chapter 4 that for ten of the leading world 
pharmaceutical companies an average of 46.62% of their pharmaceutical profit is 
accounted for by only five products. If any of these five products where to come 
under intensive competition, whether product or price, the negative effect on the 
revenue of the innovative firm would be substantial. Such firms must ensure that 
they have a continual flow of drugs to introduce onto the market which are 
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therapeutically better than existing products, and can replace the revenue lost from 
the declining sales of older drug products. ' 
The establishment of this strong R&D pipeline is however becoming 
increasingly difficult and risky. Present medical knowledge has enabled the 
discovery and development of treatments and'cures for a vast range of diseases., 
however the diseases that attack the world population are themselves continually 
changing. As living standards rise the age-expectancy of the population increases 
and with it there is an increase in the incidence of chronic and degenerative diseases 
for which medical knowledge is still in its infancy. Such diseases as arthritis, 
Parkinson's and Alzheimer's are becon-dng major concerns in future health care 
analysis, as are the number of cases of cancer and heart disease associated with the 
changing styles of living etc. 
The W. H. O. 1990 estimated that arthritis affects one tenth of the world's 
inhabitants and was fast becoming one of the major causes of disability, resulting in 
substantial costs to society and to the individual. In the'UK it was estimated that in 
1989 the cost of arthritis to the NHS reached nearly E500m. This consisted of some 
E231m in hospital costs, E45m in 'general practice costs and f: 219m in 
pharmaceutical services. As the numbers of very elderly are expected to rise, such 
costs are expected to grow by approx. 14% by the year 2001. This cost is also an 
underestimate as it does not take into account the personal and indirect costs such as 
lost earnings. It is estimated that arthritis accounts for almost I I% of all working 
days lost. Taking such total costs into account the Arthritis Foundation'of the US 
estimated that the total cost of arthritis was $13.5bn in 1982 or E12,000m in 1990 
prices (Wyles 1992). 
Another major cost to future health care resources is the rising incidence of 
dementia. This is again mainly associated with the ageing of the population; 
however, the growing numbers of cases associated with HIV and AIDS infections is 
bringing about a change in importance for this disease. 
'Dementia is a condition whose causes are poorly understood, which can 
not be cured andfor which current treatments of symptoms have at best 
marginal effects. " (Justin Keen, Dementia; Office of Health Econon*s, 
London, September 1992) 
It is estimated that there are over half a million cases of dementia in the UK, 
having important implications for the health and social care resources required to 
support them. Researchers are only just beginning to unravel the causes of 
dementia. Once the causes have been isolated steps towards developing effective 
treatments and eventually even preventative measures will be possible. 
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Adding to this problem is theýresult of the -inappropriate use of many 
previous medical discoveries. Such widespread improper prescribing has led to an 
increasing incidence of drug resistance as diseases have evolved new strains. One 
of the most disturbing of these cases of drug resistance is the emergence of quinine- 
resistant malaria which surfaced in the 1960's just as malaria was starting to resurge 
in epidemic proportions. In Thailand it is estimated that 300,000 people per year 
suffer from malaria while the cure rate for the most powerful of the quinine-type 
drugs has fallen from 98% to approx. 70% over the past five years. With over 300m 
people world-wide contracting malaria every year, of which 2m die, the spread of 
quinine-resistant malaria is'proving to be one of the greatest public health menaces 
in the world (Bishop 1992). Drug resistance levels for a number of diseases in the 
developing and developed world are increasing at alarming rates and have placed 
the pharmaceutical innovators back at square one in the discovery and development 
of treatments for diseases which they previously believed they had beaten. 
These new diseases require increasingly sophisticated and costly technology 
to enable research and development to have any chance of success. The progress 
being made is slow as the underlying causes of these new illnesses must first be 
isolated before any realistic attempt can be made at finding a treatment or cure. 
Despite this, investment in R&D is continuing to increase as companies try to 
ensure a strong R&D pipeline for the future, the potential rewards from such 
developments compensating for the increasing difficulty and cost involved. 
The second source of problems for the pharmaceutical industry emanates 
from those created by external interventions on the operations of, the market. The 
economic and social importance of the pharmaceutical industry has been made clear 
in the preceding chapters. 'Me therapeutic advances made in the treatment and cure 
of a- vast range of diseases has helped reduce mortality and morbidity rates 
throughout the world. Such advances have also increased the productive capacity of 
the population. Furthermore, the industry is itself a major positive contributor to the 
global economy, with its profitability and employment factors, in addition to the 
savings it provides in health care provision. It is therefore an industry of prime 
interest and concern for the governments of most countries. Unfortunately for the 
industry, concern over its operations have highlighted certain characteristics which 
are not, seen as in -the interest of society. These characteristics relate to the 
potentially dangerous and inappropriate drugs that can be introduced onto the 
market, the high prices charged and the high profit rates levied, as well as the 
uncompetitive forces, which are often found present. The result has been 
widespread implementation of regulations covering all aspects of the industry's 
operations. These-many varied regulations have subsequently led to numerous 
problems for the industry throughout the world. 
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Looking firstly at the concerns over safety, there have been frequent cases of 
death and disability recorded as a result of drug usage. A lack of due care and 
attention during development can lead to various side-effects going undetected, 
whether by accident or from deliberate oversight. One, of the first major drug 
induced disasters occurred in the US when over 100 children died after a company 
tried to dissolve sulphanilan-dde using ethylene glycol or antifreeze. Subsequent 
regulatory requirements were imposed by the 1938 US Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act. This introduced the need for pre-market approval via a New Drug Application 
(NDA) which required proof of product safety before FDA approval allowed the 
product onto the market. The next stage in regulatory imposition resulted after a 
much worse disaster in the early 1960's. The Thalidomide disaster had resulted in 
the death of thousands of babies and the deformity of thousands more after the use 
of what was claimed to be the safest sleeping drug available. In the US although the 
drug had not yet been approved for marketing it was'distributed as part of the 
clinical trials. The anger which resulted lead to the imposition of a requirement of 
an Investigational New Drug (IND) application, to be approved before any potential 
drug product could enter human clinical trials. Furthermore, the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments of 1962 required that proof of safety before market approval was 
given, be accompanied by proof of efficacy. - --- ,Ix 
The effects of such regulatory- impositions on the'R&D process were 
considerable for the innovative company. - The necessity to prove, safety and 
efficacy required more tests than ever before, which in turn took longer to complete 
and cost more. The role of the regulatory body as a participant in the R&D process 
also added to the development time. Previously, this body merely approved the 
drug prior to marketing, but now it was involved in the process, ensuring the safety 
of clinical trials throughout. The increased number of requirements that needed 
approval meant an increased work load for the authorities, hence the approval times 
became longer. " Grabowski & Vernon (1983) noted that in 1963 FDA approval took 
only 14 months, but by 1979 this had risen to 35 months. 
The outcome of all these increased costs and lengthened development and 
approval time was a reduction in the potential return to the R&D investment. As the 
R&D process took longer, the effective period of patent protection was fast 
disappearing. In the 1940's it was estimated that it took only 2-3 years from the 
discovery of a NCE to marketing (Clymer 1970), while today it can take up to 12 
years (Ciba-Geigy 1991). This leaves less than ten years of patent protection in 
many cases. In the early 1980's effective patent life was estimated as only 8 years in 
the US and even less in the UK (Statman 1981). There was consequently less time 
to recover the rising costs of R&D and to ensure an adequate return with which to 
guarantee future research. 
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The industry reacted to this situation in a variety of ways. ', Firstly, some of 
the previously innovative companies simply could not afford to undertake the R&D 
process in its totality. While successful in discovering potential new drugs they had 
not the financial or technical backing to develop and market the drugs. Many more 
cases of licensing-out have therefore been recorded in recent years, where 
discoveries are licensed out to the larger companies to develop and market. ' The 
smaller innovative company'can therefore specialise in research alone, earning 
revenue from royalties etc. Secondly, it was recognised that the recovery of costs 
would need to be accelerated and one of the easiest ways to undertake this was by 
global marketing. Much more vigorous efforts are now made to introduce drug 
products into a much wider market area as quickly as possible. To aid this the 
actually R&D process has itself become more international. With the differing 
regulatory requirements throughout the world it is easier and faster to adapt research 
to each countries requirements by operating in that country. It also allows for the 
accumulation of revenue for a product in some countries, beginning the recovery of 
at least some of the R&D costs while the product is waiting approval in others. 
Associated with both of the above and the need to consolidate, there have 
been growing numbers of marketing agreements, joint ventures and mergers in 
recent years. Such measures have allowed companies with new products but no 
access to certain markets to negotiate with similarly interested parties in the desired 
market areas. It is therefore possible for them to consolidate their positions, one 
company, gaining access to a new market while the other gains access to new 
products and technology. This has been evident in the many marketing agreements 
made with Japanese companies when this market first opened up to foreign trade. 
In more recent years the pattern has been reversed with Japanese pharmaceutical 
companies seeking access to the US and European markets and technology. 
Another outcome of this increased regulatory burden has been the 
fundamental change in the approach to the R&D process. Previously this process 
was regarded as a game of molecular roulette, a game with both very high stakes 
and potential rewards. Many companies can no longer afford to accept such high 
R&D risks resulting in further concentration of the R&D process and an 
increasingly managed approach. While there is no way to guarantee the outcome of 
the R&D process it is possible to eliminate some of the risks involved. Companies 
decide exactly where they are going to find their compounds, whether internally or 
from access to outside discoveries. 71ey then must decide which therapeutic areas 
and compounds they should develop. Only those which continue to look attractive 
given the new costs and development times will be chosen. While making this 
choice the R&D manager must also take into consideration the economic climate of 
the market. It is increasingly common for products only to be approved for the 
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market or formularies if they can be proven not only safe and efficacious, but also 
cost-effective in relation to existing products on the market. Finally, the innovative 
company has to determine how to increase the efficiency of the R&D process by 
using resources and technology more productively. - It, has been estimated for a 
blockbuster compound that every day which it is delayed in reaching the market can 
cost a company $lm (Abrahams 1993c). It is therefore in the company's best 
interest to establish and maintain an efficient R&D process which can co-ordinate 
the launch 'of products over as widespread a market as possible in an attempt to 
recover the ever increasing costs of this process as quickly as possible. , 
These regulations imposed on the R&D process world-wide have 
consequently made the R&D environment increasingly aggressive and competitive. 
If the innovative firms cannot continue to produce new therapeutics they will be 
faced with a market of generic and me-too products characterised by vigorous price 
competition and much lower profit levels. 'i I 
This is not the only area -affected 'by the imposition of, regulations. 
Governments throughout the world have been increasingly concerned with their 
rising health care costs. Expenditure on pharmaceutical products has been the target 
for most governments in their attempt to cut back such costs, primarily because of 
the concerns over excessively high pricing, high profits and inappropriate marketing 
from the pharmaceutical industry. 
, Especially in recent months, the controversy over pharmaceutical pricing 
and profit rates has escalated due to the focus of attention it received during the 
Presidential election campaign in the US 1992 and afterwards the proposed health 
reforms of the new President, Bill Clinton., It is difficult to set a cut and dry figure 
on what price an innovative pharmaceutical -drug product should be especially 
considering the higher costs and risks undertaken in this industry compared to most 
others. It is recognised that such innovative products must provide their companies 
with an reasonable rate of return covering the costs and risks involved, otherwise 
future R&D would be in jeopardy. To provide this return the price of products may 
seem high, however such products have only a limited period of protection from 
competition to recover their costs. There is also the risk that a rival company may 
introduce a different product with a better therapeutic outcome during this period of 
patent protection, rendering the original product obsolete. The industry has argued 
that as the R&D process has become more difficult, lengthy and expensive, leaving 
less effective patent protection, prices have had to grow at an increasing rate to 
compensate. 
Such increased prices have therefore been the focus of attention for 
governments trying to contain their health care bills. They have continued to see a 
pharmaceutical industry which they consider to be consistently earning above 
204 
normal profits by charging high prices. ý This in turn forces up their health care 
budgets hence the growing use ý of price controls. Such controls have become 
increasingly obvious in Europe. In Germany the new health reforms restricted the 
budgets of doctors for their prescribing in an effort to keep bills down. This has 
resulted in manufacturers reporting a fall in sales of between 20 and 40% in January 
and February 1993. For some products this fall in sales has been reported as 70%- 
against the equivalent 1992 figures., as doctors hold back on their prescriptions 
because of the uncertainty over their allowed contingencies under the new 
regulations (PBN, 1993e). They have also been prescribing more cheaper generic 
drugs in an attempt to save their budgets with the national health insurance 
companies. The industry argues that these measures will lead to products being 
withdrawn from the market as they become unprofitable. Some companies have 
already begun to strean-dine their activities in the face of more barren times ahead. 
Bayer eliminated 6,000 jobs in 1992 and is expected to cut a further 3,000 in 1993 
as it tries to streamline its marketing organisation (PBN 1993e), while Merck who 
experienced a 20% drop in German sales in the first quarter of 1993 is also expected 
to cut back (PBN 1993j). I 
Similarly, in Britain regulations relating to prices and profits have restricted 
companies. While the PPRS does not directly regulate prices it has helped maintain 
price levels in Britain at a moderate level in comparison to such countries as 
Germany and the US. The government also encourages the use of generic products 
whenever possible with the implementation of the limited list restricting the drugs 
available on the NHS. The extension of this list to cover up to 20% of the NHS 
current prescriptions may have a significant negative impact on R&D in the UK, 
forcing innovative companies to move their operations elsewhere. ' Furthermore, 
there has been a cut in the prices paid by the UK government to drug companies of 
2.5% in a further attempt to curb costs (Abrahams 1993f). - 
In Italy reforms have also been implemented to try to cut the drugs bill by 
reducing the list prices of certain drug products. Those products priced between 
L15,000 and L50,000 are to be reduced by 2.5%, while those priced over L50,000 
will be reduced by 4.5%. It is hoped that the savings made from this will help 
extend the free entitlements for low-income groups. While this will have some 
benefit to the pharmaceutical industry by increasing the volume of prescriptions it is 
still argued that such price reductions will lead to the withdrawal of some products 
from the market as they no longer provide an adequate return. Even in Switzerland 
the government is drawing up a drug price capping system. 
, In the'US, one of the last remaining 'free' markets, high prices have been 
attributed to the price controls set in other countries. It has been argued that the US 
public is making up for this lost revenue by paying some of the highest prices in the 
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world for medicines. Senator Pryor, in a recent report, claimed the drug prices in 
the US had doubled, even quadrupled in recent years, while the profit rates of the 
industry remained substantially higher than for other high-technology industries. 
'Mere have therefore, been calls for price controls to be enforced on the industry. 
The structure of the forthcoming health reforms have been speculated to 
consist of new organisations known as Health Alliances (HAS), which are planned 
to represent consumers and negotiate attractive health packages with hospitals and 
insurers. These will be supervised by a new federal body, the National Health 
Board, with the long-term aim of managed competition to stem growing health care 
costs, which are currently increasing at 10% per year. If President Clinton then 
extends health coverage to the 36m uninsured in the US, health care costs will 
accelerate. He may have little choice but to raise taxes and impose price controls to 
cover this new expense, especially as the hoped for savings of the new organisations 
will not be apparent for a number of years (The Economist 1993d). This is proving 
to be a very tentative period for the pharmaceutical industry. Most companies have 
again promised voluntary price restraints and Merck has even gone so far as to 
propose holding down the prices of every individual product to the rate of inflation 
plus 1%. The industry will not have much longer to wait until the decision of the 
President is known for definite. If price controls are imposed the innovative 
company will have to rationalise its operations to remain competitive, especially in 
the face of stronger generic competition. 
As in other countries, the US government has been encouraging the use of 
cheaper generic equivalents. The 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act made the entry of 
generics onto the market easier, while the repeal of the remaining anti-substitution 
laws allowed for their increased use. The growing concern of the health insurers 
has also heightened competition, especially within the HMO's which are currently 
estimated to have 55% of Americans as members (PBN 1992b). 
Following on from the regulation of prices and subsequently profits, concern 
has also arisen over the marketing activities of the pharmaceutical industry. As 
price competition has in the past not been a major factor for the innovative 
company, the emphasis shifted to product competition through innovation and 
product differentiation through marketing. By extensive promotion of a brand name 
and the company trademark, companies hope to cultivate a strong following of 
prescribers. These prescribers would therefore continue to use this product even 
when- faced with an alternative which was equivalent but cheaper. Such brand 
loyalty was built by presenting the superior qualities of individual products and the 
high standards of production, safety and research maintained within the company. 
This extensive product differentiation has resulted in cases of inappropriate, 
sometimes dangerous prescribing. Often an expensive brand is prescribed when an 
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equally effective cheaper generic alternative is available. Furthermore, a product 
may be prescribed for the wrong indication or when it is not required at all. This 
not only wastes resources, but may expose the patient to unnecessary risks. A 
recent study by the International Advertisement Study Group proved highly critical 
of pharmaceutical advertising. It surveyed 6,710 advertisements in 23 leading 
national medical journals over a 12 month period in 18 countries. They found that 
the generic names of products were often printed much smaller than the brand name, 
warnings, precautions, side-effects, contraindications and price information were 
frequently omitted and for many, the pictures used were often irrelevant and could 
be misleading (Herxheimer et al. 1993). 
The empirical analysis conducted in the latter section of this thesis illustrates 
directly the strength such company promotional activity can have on prescribing., It 
was found that although generic penetration did occur after one year of generic 
availability, it accounted for only 39% of the market. This figure was not dissimilar 
to that found by Grabowski & Vernon (1992) which indicated generic penetration of 
35% after one year. While such penetration increased,, after three years of generic 
availability, the generic represented on average only 74.4% of the market in 
Camoustie. The strength of brand loyalty did not ensure its remaining dominance in 
the market, but it did delay its decline. 
Other studies have looked at the persuasive influence of pharmaceutical 
company activity on the attitudes of doctors towards certain drugs, prescribing and 
the pharmaceutical industry. Notably Avom et al. (1982) and Orlowski & Wateska 
(1992) found adverse effects of company activity on prescribing which was either 
not recognised or not realised by the doctor. A similar study was conducted by 
questionnaire and the results, as described in chapter 8, confirmed these findings. 
While the majority of doctors ranked pharmaceutical company promotional activity 
as of little use or influence for their prescribing decision, the indirect evidence of 
preferred brand prescribing by 36% of those surveyed suggested otherwise. 
Obviously what doctors believed to be their main considerations and sources of 
influence for prescribing were not necessarily what was indicated. -If doctors were 
made more aware of this and the consequences it might have on their prescribing it 
may increase the chances of mtional prescribing occurring in the future. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the approach of companies to promotion 
varies with the particular characteristics of the doctors. Such characteristics refer to 
the age of the doctor, known prescribing habits and attitudes, and the standing of the 
doctor in the medical community. By looking at information the company can 
determine how much and what type of promotional activity would be most 
effective. It could be speculated that the more experienced doctor would have a 
more definite opinion on prescribing, drugs and the industry. Unless they were the 
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opinion makers, there would be less opportunity for the pharmaceutical company to 
influence these doctors and less effort would therefore be targeted at this area. - 
To determine whether this speculation held, differences in the prescribing 
behaviour of doctors with varying registration dates, used as a proxy for age, were 
analysed. It was found that the more mature doctor generally prescribed more, 
although a higher proportion of this was generic. Similarly, the more experienced 
doctor saw fewer company sales representatives and those seen, were so ý for a 
shorter period of time than for the more recently registered doctors. A much more 
definite opinion of company activities was also demonstrated for these experienced 
doctors in comparison to the younger doctors. Obviously part of this variation may 
be due to the age and experience of the doctor, the location in which they are 
practising or the changing training methods used, however there are differences 
found in prescribing behaviour which does seem to affect the volume and success of 
pharmaceutical company promotional activity. 
All of these empirical studies found that company promotional activity did 
have an effect on prescribing. This effect was not necessarily the beneficial effect 
of providing relevant information to the doctor, but rather encouraging inappropriate 
and expensive prescribing which wasted resources and exposed patients to 
unnecessary risks. As a result increasingly more regulation has been directed at 
these company activities. Throughout the years various regulations have stipulated 
that all advertising must be submitted to a regulatory body, ý i. e. the FDA, before it is 
allowed to be published. This has provided a certain level of compliance as has the 
voluntary Code of Conduct employed, by members of the various industry 
associations, however there are certain activities which have proved extremely 
difficult to regulation. In particular the company sales representative and the 
company sponsored seminars and conferences have been cited. Recent regulations 
have come into practice to restrict the influence such activities have on prescribing. 
Doctors are no longer to receive free gifts of any value or which are not relevant to 
their patients or job. Cash compensations for the use of their time are no longer 
permitted, and any offers with strings attached are banned. Similarly while 
sponsorship of seminars and conferences remains acknowledged, the company is to 
have a much quieter role in the organisation and the presentation. Doctors must pay 
their own registration fees, accommodation, and entertainment outside that arranged 
by the conference. 
Such influences where also found in the developing world where the 
outcome could be more drastic. A recent announcement by the international 
children's aid organisation, Terre des Hommes, urged doctors not to receive the 
sales representatives of Asta Medica and E. Merck (PBN 1993f). These companies 
were noted as selling Metamizol-based combination drugs in the developing 
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countries, drugs which had been banned in Germany. Specifically, Merck sold 
Doloneurobion and Cintaverin compuesto-Metamizol combined with vitamins 
which have been banned in developed countries since 1987 due to their considerable 
risks of shock fever or changes in the blood count. Asta sold Dasten plus, Dualid, 
Avan-dgran, Avafortan and Doloadamon in Brazil which were seen as worthless and 
sometimes dangerous from a medical standpoint. Merck responded that the national 
import agencies requested these combinations. However it is likely that if these 
agencies did request such products the request will have been at least partially 
stimulated by inappropriate marketing of these products in these countries. Their 
provision may involve considerable risk and waste of already scarce resources in 
these poor countries. It is likely that more regulations with regards to- 
pharmaceutical company promotional activity will be implemented in these 
countries in the future as they attempt to get their house in order. 
Such regulations have hampered the effectiveness of much company 
promotional activity and will likely lead to a downsizing of the marketing divisions 
as certain sections -will no 
longer by productive. Recently Johnson & Johnson 
found that the more restrictive labelling requirements had resulted in reduced sales 
of Hismanal, its once-a-day antihistamine (Zagor 1993). 
All of these regulations imposed on the industry by governments throughout 
the world are making the pharmaceutical market much more competitive and 
restricted. - 
R&D must be more planned and consequently has become more costly 
and time-consuming, prices are being restricted with negative effects of profits, 
while the effectiveness of the promotional activities of companies is being 
increasingly hampered. In addition to these national regulations the industry is 
hampered by the variations in regulations across the globe. As each country 
imposes different requirements for drug approval, pricing, profits and promotional 
activities, it is necessary for companies to operate different policies in each country. 
This implies duplication of procedures in many instances and again a waste of 
resources and inefficiency. Looking at the industry in Europe the different 
regulations imposed within the EC have resulted in many companies operating 
facilities in all of the member states when ideally only one or two specialised 
facilities would be required to supply the entire market in this area. 
The pharmaceutical industry is therefore faced with a number of problems 
for the future. The industry itself faces the prospect of increasing difficulty in the 
R&D process with the changed market demand associated with the rise of new 
diseases. The industry is also faced with increasing regulation due to safety and 
efficacy concerns which require more time and money to satisfy. This reduces the 
period of effective patent protection, reducing the time left for the recovery of costs, 
which is accentuated by the increasing price and profit controls enforced by the 
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governments of many countries. The innovative race will also be accelerated by the 
rising strength of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. In an indirect way the 
rising Japanese threat can also be attributed to government intervention in the 
industry. From a protected market the Japanese government shifted their policies 
towards a more open economy and measures to contain their drugs bill. Where 
Japanese pharmaceutical companies had previously been able to survive within their 
domestic market they now faced foreign competition and price restraints. The result 
has been a gradual move towards globalisation from the major companies and 
although they presently pose little threat to the leading innovative firms, this is 
expected to change in the latter years of this decade. In addition the previous 
enormously successful promotional campaigns of the innovative companies are 
becoming increasingly hampered by new regulations and it is likely that their 
effectiveness will diminish. The industry is going to be faced with an increasingly 
competitive and aggressive environment. 
10.2: Prospects for the Pharmaceutical Industry into the 21st Century 
In the previous section the increasing set of problems thafface the 
pharmaceutical industry were determined and it was concluded that the environment 
for the industry will be increasingly competitive and aggressive. The prospects the 
companies can expect in this changing environment will now be analysed. 
The industry will most likely continue to be successful -provided it can 
continue to produce innovative products that the market needs. While research is 
proving more costly due to the increasing difficulties involved, the opportunities for 
success have not disappeared but are to be found in different areas. As technology 
progresses it is becoming possible to design drugs for specific purposes which 
increases the odds of success in the game of molecular roulette. ' Biotechnology and 
gene therapy are beginning to show the fruits of years of research and development. 
Clive Cookson (1993d) claims that biotechnology is coming of age with the market 
success of two of its first products. Epogen, launched in 1989 to stimulate red blood 
cell production and Neupogen, launched in 1991 to boost white blood cells, are 
expected to bring in revenues of over $500m in 1993 (Cookson 1993d). 
The future of such biotechnology has been recognised by many of the 
leading world companies and a variety of approaches adopted. Roche has, over 
recent years, undertaken a direct investment approach towards biotechnology. One 
of the largest investments made was in 1990 when they paid $2. lbn for a majority 
stake in Genentech. They also have n-dnor shareholdings in other biotechnology 
companies and collaborate with still more. Sandoz and Ciba have followed sin-dlar 
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strategies, while Glaxo has opted for a more separate approach, forging links with 
companies rather than direct investment in them. 
One specific area of biotechnology which is proving to be of particular 
interest to future research opportunities is genetic manipulations. It is expected that 
the development of drugs able to work directly on human genes rather than proteins 
in the body will transform research. As genetic knowledge expands and the genetic 
make-up of the human body becomes increasingly known, it is possible to identify 
the exact cause of problems. Genetic drugs may therefore be targeted at either the 
defective gene or at the infectious organisms, while their specificity would avoid the 
problems of side-effects associated with the current protein-based drugs. Such 
research therefore offers the potential for cures for diseases previously untreated. 
Until recently such gene research was not believed to be possible to such an 
extent and many of the leading pharmaceutical giants had not explored its potential. 
Academics and the biotechnology firms therefore undertook the bulk of research in 
this area. It is now the leading innovative companies who are scrambling to catch- 
up, starting their own research divisions or forming alliances with those already 
knowledgeable in the area. 
While the opportunities for future successes have by no means diminished, 
the innovative companies of today must restructure their organisations to ensure 
they will continue to be the innovative companies of tomorrow. With the increased 
costs due to the higher'degree of sophistication in the R&D process and the 
regulations imposed by the governments world-wide, it is necessary for the R&D 
process to become more efficient. Pfizer Europe estimated that medicinal R&D in 
the late 1980's was $400m. to bring a compound to market (Abrahams 1993c). This 
is significantly higher than previous estimates of $231m, however, they both 
illustrate the increasing costs of R&D. It is questionable whether the rate of 
increase of R&D expenditure is sustainable in the future competitive environment. 
Although the market pressure to find effective new drugs is increasing, the rewards 
are not likely to be as substantial as in past decades. 
, One possible way to curb this decline in future profit rates is for the 
company to make positive steps towards rationalising the actual R&D process. By 
utilising all the available resources in the most efficient manner available, it is 
hoped that the development times for new compounds will at worst remain the same 
but ideally fall. SmithKline Beecham has reduced the number of compounds under 
development from over 70 to 30 with the aim of bringing products into the market 2 
to 3 years earlier than before (Abrahams 1992). This choice of products was based 
on those which have shown the most potential for becoming financially successful 
once on the market. The ability to make this choice relies on a management 
revolution within the pharmaceutical company bringing the R&D and marketing 
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departments much closer. By aiming research at areas in which the -company has 
research strengths and which the marketing divisions considered potentially 
lucrative in financial terrns, it is hoped to increase the odds of success. To add to 
this, the companies are forming much stronger links with academia and the more 
specific research companies which have emerged in biotechnology. 
Despite the increasingly competitive environment there remain a number of 
options open to companies operating in the pharmaceutical industry. For those 
innovative companies that dominate the market the opportunities for future 
innovative success remain. The progress made in biotechnology and genetic drugs 
represent a vast pool of potentially untapped therapeutic advances in drug therapy 
which are likely to be successful because of the volume of demand which could be 
satisfied. Perhaps in the next decades treatments and cures will be found for 
cancers, heart diseases, degenerative disorders and AIDS. By running a more 
efficient research process and incorporating marketing aspects much earlier, it is 
hoped that research will continue to be successful. These companies have the 
resources to continue such research and to withstand the external pressures on their 
pricing and profits. - 
Alternatively there will be some innovative companies whose resources will 
not be substantial enough to permit them to compete in the 'big-league'. Obviously 
in the above therapeutic categories competition is fierce and any therapeutic gain 
requires extensive marketing to establish a product, which can take years. For 
smaller firms with innovative capacity but less resources for marketing 
opportunities can still be found in the 'niche' markets. A new therapeutic drug 
introduced into a less competitive niche market will require less marketing and may 
enable the company to remain profitable. Some of these smaller firms may not wish 
to undertake any marketing functions at all, in which case there is still a place for 
the purely innovative company. The majority of biotechnology companies do not 
have the resources to develop their compounds into marketable products, nor the 
resources to market them. By forrning alliances with the leading world companies it 
is possible for these smaller companies to earn sufficient returns to continue their 
research while the pharmaceutical giants gain access to new products and the profits 
from marketing them world-wide. 
Some members of the industry will not be able to continue in this 
increasingly competitive environment. When one considers that the leading world 
company, Merck. is currently experiencing a fall off in profitability, the chances of 
some companies withstanding the storm are slight. Merck is suffering from 
declining sales in Germany, fierce competition for its anti-c hole sterol drugs 
Meracor and Zocor from Bristol-Myers Squibb's cheaper Pravachol, heavy 
promotional costs for Proscar which has not met initial sales expectations and a less 
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robust R&D pipeline than in past years. To combat the expected decline in growth 
the company is expected to cut its world-wide work-force by 2.6% in 1993, while 
the top executives accept a salary cut of 10% and the middle management a cut of 
5% (PBN 1993e). They are also expanding their generic production through their 
West Pont Pharmaceuticals division. They have claimed that these measures are 
necessary as a result of the increasingly turbulent, competitive environment in the 
US, health care cost containment measures world wide, and the unfavourable effects 
of foreign currencies. If the leading world company is having to take such drastic 
measures, there will obviously be some, companies which will not survive. For 
these smaller companies the choice must therefore be made between withdrawing 
from the market completely or specialising, either in licensing-out, niche markets or 
in generics. Obviously as the governments throughout the world grow increasingly 
concerned over health care costs and encourage the use of generics, the market for 
such products will grow. Competition in this sector of the pharmaceutical industry 
will however be increasingly fierce and the potential profits will not be high. 
These choices with regards to the R&D process and management have also 
occurred in the marketing divisions. The growing pressure of the decision-makers 
to put price near the top of the factors influencing prescrib ing has changed attitudes 
and prescribing behaviour, with more generic prescribing than ever before taking 
place. Furthermore, the restrictions placed on promotional activity from the 
pharmaceutical companies will likely hamper their effectiveness. Considering these 
facts it does not make sense for these companies to continue to target such 
significant levels of financing to marketing. Obviously marketing, is still an 
essential element in the competitive process, providing information, to doctors of 
new products and their properties, however the effectiveness of such promotional 
activities in extending the market power of the brand product beyond the patent 
expiry will diminish. By cutting back on expenditure for these activities and 
ensuring the efficiency of those activities that remain, it is expected that most of the 
innovative companies will be able to absorb the costs of increased regulation and 
specifically price controls, without too much discomfort. 
Finally, while the rising costs of R&D and the longer development times 
have received considerable attention in this conclusion, it must also be noted that 
the majority of governments have acknowledged the potentially negative effects of 
the erosion of the effective patent period on research. As the pharmaceutical 
industry represents a powerful economic asset making positive contributions to the 
Balance of Payments and employment figures in the majority of developed 
countries, patent protection has been extended. In the US this was introduced under 
the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act, in Japan under the 1987 Patent Bill and most recently 
in the EC with the provision of the SPC from I January 1993, although it is still to 
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be seen whether this latest measure will succeed as the Spanish government have 
launched a European Court action against the regulation. Even in some of the 
developing countries the governments have recognised the positive contribution that 
the MN pharmaceutical companies can make, provided they are regulated. As a 
consequence a number are beginning to grant patent protection to encourage MN 
activity. Argentina is pushing to extend its patent protection to cover the 
international drug companies. The previous patent law dating from 1864 offered 15 
years protection for processes only and excluded pharmaceuticals. If the bill is not 
passed it is feared that the US drug industry will press US trade officials to begin a 
'Special 301' trade investigation, which could ultimately lead to trade sanctions 
(PBN 1993h). This demonstrates the power such MN's can still wield over the 
poorer developing countries. 
While these measures have helped the innovative companies, others are also 
under foot to ease operations in the future. In October 1993 in Orlando, the Second 
International Conference on Harmonisation of Drug Regulation is to take place 
(PBN 1993g). A number of major topics will be reviewed with the objective of 
reducing duplicative drug testing throughout the world. While many would see the 
progress made in the EC as marginal, recent measures with regards to registration 
and patent protection may yet prove to be successful for the harmonisation of 
activities. Continued attempts within the Community and the world to harmonise 
operations will hopefully lead to some progress, giving innovative companies the 
opportunity to rationalise R&D operations on a global basis. 
While the industry is facing an increasingly competitive environment in 
which its actions will be constantly under a microscope, there remain many 
opportunities for successful operations. For the multinational innovative firms 
continued successful R&D remains an option provided the whole organisation is 
rationalised to provide more efficient research and marketing departments which 
work more closely together. Demand for drug products will continue to rise and the 
technology to satisfy such demand is increasingly becoming available. 
For those smaller companies, their particular strengths and weaknesses will 
dictate their future. Those with a strong innovative capacity may be able to 
specialise in 'niche' markets or in licensing-out arrangements, while those with only 
productive capacity may find their future lies in the growing generic market. 
For all those which do successfully rationalise operations and survive, they 
will have to be much more careful about their actions. The industry does not have a 
good public image and it will have to work hard to overcome this. Government 
attention will remain focused on safety aspects and the pricing and profitability of 
the industry, however, the governments of the world do not want to see the decline 
of this industry either, as it is too important. While profits will never be as high as 
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they have been in previous years the industry is, to a degree, recession proof and is 
likely to remain one of the most profitable in the world economy. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX: 
SECTION 1: Prescribing in Carnoustie 1985 - 1989 
A: Total Prescribing Figures per Year for the Twelve Drugs Studied, 
Table 1: Indocid andomethacin) 
Year -- - TO Presc. Indocid % Indom. % 
1985 -547 152 27.79 395 72. 
1986"- 4-55 107 23.52 348- 76.48 
1987 TO 78 19.55 321 80.45 
1988 390 48 12.31 -342 
1989 399 49 12.28, 350 87.72 
Table 2: Penbritin (Ampicillin) 
Year -Ttl Presc. - 
Penbritin ý %- 
- - 
Ampicillin % -- 
-1985 63T 91 1479 542 85.62 
1986 769 6 
- 
0.78 763 
1987 963 F4 
- 
1.45 949 98.55 
1988, 1467 1 6 0.41 1461 99.59 
1989 1007 11 0.10 1006 99.91 
Table I Brufen (Ibut)rofen) 
Year - TO Presc. Brufen %-- lbuprofen I% 
1985 1337 85 
' - 
6.36 1252 -93.64 
1986 1527 To 1.96 1497 98.04 
1987 1575 20 1.27 1555 70= 
1988 1 1443 1 12 F, 0.83 1431 1 , 9917 
1989 1501 6 0.39 1495 1771 
Table 4. - Lasix (Fni-, eniide) 
Year TO Presc. Lasix % Frusemide % 
1985- 1178 24 2.04 
- 
1154 ' -9-7-. 93' 
1986 1060 24 2: 22 6 1036 97.74 
-1987 919 8 0.87 911 99.13 
1988 984 1 9 0.91 975 99.09 
1989 1036 1 
_5 
0.48 1031 99.5 
Table 5. - Midamor (Amiloride) 
Year TO Presc. Midamor % Amiloride % 
1985 25 3 12.0 22 88.0 
1986 27 8 29.6 19 70.4 
1987 2 5.7 33 
1988 70 1 1.43 69 9857 
1989 84 1 1.19 83 
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Table 6: Feldene (Piroxicam) 
Year TH Presc. Feldene % Piroxicam % 
198 795 789 
- 
99.25 6 0.75 
1986 650 13U 20.0 520 
1987 554 32 
- 
5.78 522 
1988 651 il 2.76 
- 
633 
19 9 736 13 r 1.77 723 98.23-1 
Table 7: Nai)rosvn (Naproxen) 
Year TH Presc. Naprosyn % 
- 
Naproxen % 
1985 690 163 2T6-1- 527 76.38 
1986 645 94 14.57 551 85.43 
1987 754 81 10.74 673 89.26 
1 1988 801 24 2.99 777 1 -7 T7 0-1 '*U 
1 1989 930 22 
_2.37 
908 
H 
: 9ý7ý 
Table 8: Ponstan (Mefenamic Acid) 
Year TH Presc. Ponstan 
- - 
% MeE Acid %- 
1985 
' 
4977 
- 
49 6 
-' 
99.79 1 --, 
1986 -- 524 : M4 77.09 -I-TG- 22.91 
1987 464 296 63.79 
- 
168 
1988 492 279 5 0 1-1 213 
1989 460 272 59.13 ,1 188 40.87 
Table 9: Ventolin Inhaler (Salbutamol Inhaler) 
Year TO Presc. Ventolin % Salbut. % 
1985 1902 1066 56.05- 836 
1986 2038 772 37.88- 1266 
1987 2066 364 17.62 1702 ' ---87.78' 
1988 2247 141 1 E. =2ý 2106 1 --gT-72 " 1989 2383 183 1 7.68 1 2200 1 92722 
d 
Table 10: Amoxil (Amoxycillin) 
Year TO Presc. Amoxil % i Amoxy. % 
1985 198 176 88.89 22 11.11 
1986 63 45 71.43 18 28.57 
1987 65 25 41.67 35 58.33 
1988 210 72 34.29 138 : Eý5.7 =1 
1989 227 61 26.87 166 73.13 
Table 11: Trasicor (Oxprenolol) 
Year TH Presc. Trasicor 
- - 
% Oxpren. % 
1985 158 1F 9 75.32 
- 
39 24.68 
1986 138 76 53 072- 
- 
- 62 44.93 
1987, 130 17 13 . 078- - 
113 86.92 
1988 75 3 T-O, 72 96.0 
1989 53 1 1.89 1 52 98.11 
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Table 12: Neo-Naclex K (Bendrofluazide + Potassium) 
Year TO Presc. N-N K % Bend. +P % 
1985- 190 188 98.95 2 1.05 
- - 1986 121 120 99.17 1 U. TT 
1987 106 89 83.96 17 16.04 
1988 8 108 24 1 22.22 1 84 1 77.7 
9 2 1ý 98 105 16 15.24 89 .7 
B: Regression Analysis Using Minitab 
Old Drug Products; 
Igtb old = logit of the proportion of generic prescriptions written for the 5 older 
drug products 
DI- D5 drug identification 
Avl old Number of years of generic availability for the older drug products 
Size old size of the market for the older drug products 
ds T= market size for drug i 
da T= number of years of generic availability for drug i. 
Determination of Slope: Regress'lgtb old' 12'DI old'-'D5 old"AvI old''Size 
old"dsl'-'ds5'. 
ds5 is highly correlated with other X variables 
ds5 has been removed from the equation 
* NOTE *DI old is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
* NOTE * D3 old is highly correlated with other. predictor variables 
* NOTE * D4 old is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
Size old is highly correlated with other X variables 
Size old has been removed from the equation 
" NOTE * D3 old is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
" NOTE * D4 old is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
" NOTE * ds3 is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
" NOTE * ds4 is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
The regression equation is 
Igtb old - 6.95 DI old - 4.64 D2 old - 2.36 D3 old - 2.51 D4 old 
- 2.63 D5 old + 0.686 Avl old + 0.00832 ds I+0.00 110 ds2 
+ 0.00 169 ds3 + 0.0027 8 ds4 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
DI old -6.949 3.089 -2.25 0.040 
D2 old -4.642 1.545 -3.01 0.009 
D3 old -2.363 5.738 -0.41 0.686 
D4 old -2.513 4.298 -0.58 0.567 
D5 old -2.625 1.045 -2.51 0.024 
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AvI old 0.6860 0.1246 5.51 0.000 
dsl 0.008317 0.005918 1.41 0.180 
ds2 0.001097 0.001199 0.91 0.375 
ds3 0.001692 0.003965 0.43 0.676 
ds4 0.002776 0.003856 0.72 0.483 
s=0.7057 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS 
Regression 10 373.754 
Error 15 7.470 
Total 25 381.224 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
DI old 1 11.187 
D2 old 1 108.160 
D3 old 1 90.336 
D4 old 1 100.237 
D5 old 1 40.977 
Avl old 1 20.861 
dsl 1 1.155 
ds2 1 0.470 
ds3 1 0.115 
ds4 1 0.258 
ms Fp 
37.375 75.05 0.000 
0.498 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. DI old Igtb old Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
6 0.00 1.784 2.912 0.498 -1.127 -2.26R 22 0.00 0.865 2.177 0.339 A. 312 -2.12R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
The probabilities dsI - ds4 were insignificant, therefore it was possible to 
assume a constant slope for all the drug products with regards market size. The 
size variable also proved to be insignificant and could be dropped from the 
equation. 
Regress'lgtb old' 12D 1 old'-'D5 old"AvI old"Size olcl"dal'-VaY. 
da5 is highly correlated with other X variables 
da5 has been removed from the equation 
NOTE * AvI old is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * da2 is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
The regession equation is 
lgtb old =-0.28 DI old - 8.65 D2 old + 0.70 D3 old + 2.53 D4 old 
- 3.74 D5 old + 0.827 AvI old - 0.00028 Size old - 0.556 dal 
+ 0.304 da2 - 0.167 da3 - 0.453 da4 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
D1 old -0.277 1.603 -0.17 0.865 
D2 old -8.652 2.493 -3.47 0.004 
D3 old 0.704 1.998 0.35 0.730 
D4 old 2.526 1.921 1.31 0.210 
D5 old -3.737 1.559 -2.40 0.031 
256 
AvI old 0.8267 0.1925 ' 4.30 0.001 
Size old -0.000278 0.001212 -0.23 0.822 dal -0.5561 0.2781 -2.00 0.065 da2 0.3044 0.3123 0.97 0.346 
da3 -0.1671 0.2710 -0.62 0.547 da4 - -0.4535 0.2780 -1.63 0.125 
s=0.6055 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 11 376.091 3 4.190 93.26 0.000 
Error 14 5.132 0.367 
Total 25 381.224 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
DI old 1 11.187 
D2 old 1 108.160 
D3 old 1 90.336 
D4 old 1 100.237 
D5 old 1 40.977 
AvI old 1 20.861 
Size old 1 1.474 
dal. 1 0.939 
da2 1 0.934 
da3 1 0.013 
da4 1 0.975 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. DI old Igtb old Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
7 0.00 4.845 3.575 0.338 1.270 2.53R. 
21 0.00 1.992 1.216 0.469 0.777 2.03R. 
22 0.00 0.865 2.042 0.332 -1.177 -2.32R, 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
The probabilities dal - da4 were insignificant, therefore it was possible to 
assume a constant slope for all the drug products with regards to the number of 
years of generic availability. The resulting regression analysis was: 
Regress'lgtb old'6'Dl old'-'D5 old''AvI old'. 
The regession equation is 
lgtb old 3.03 D1 old - 3.10 Mold + 0.375 D3 old + 0.602 D4 old 
2.30 D5old + 0.646 Avl old 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
DI old -3.0257 0.7668 -3.95 0.001 D2 old -3.100 1.239 -2.50 0.022 D3 old 0.3750 0.6770 0.55 0.586 
D4 old 0.6019 0.6770 0.89 0.385 
D5 old -2.3047 0.8587 -2.68 0.015 AvI old 0.64593 0.09983 6.47 0.000 
s=0.7059 
Analysis of Variance 
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SOURCE DF SS 
Regression 6 371.757 
Error 19 9.467 
Total 25 -381.224 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
DI old 1 11.187 
D2 old 1 108.160 
D3 old 1 90.336 
D4 old 1 100.237 
D5 old - 1 40.977 Avl old 1 20.861 
Unusual Observations 
ms Fp 
61.959 124.35 0.000 
0.498 
Obs. D1 old Igtb old Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
6 0.00 1.784 3.359 0.374 -1.575 -2.63R 22 0.00 0.865 2.217 0.331 -1.352 -2.17R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
New Drug Products; 
Definitions: Igtb new = logit of the proportion of generic prescriptions for the 
younger products 
Size new market size for the younger products 
AvI new number of years of generic availability for the younger products 
D6 new- D12 new = drug numbers six to twelve (the new drug products) 
da, T= number of years of generic drug availability for drug i 
ds; T= drug market size for drug i 
Detem-dnationof Slope: Regess'lgtb new' 16'D6 new'-'D12 new''Size new' 
'Avl new"da6-dal2'. 
NOTE * D9 new is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * Size new is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * Avl new is highly correlated with other, predictor variables 
The regression equation is 
Igtb new = 3.59 D6 new + 5.49 D7 new + 0.26 D8 new + 14.8 D9 new - 1.72 D 10 new - 0.77 DII new - 3.06 D12 new - 0.00886 Size new + 0.28 Avl 
new + 1.61 da6 + 0.96 da7 + 0.88 da8 + 1.52 da9 +, 0.67 dalO + 0.82 
dal I+1.86 dal2 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
D6 new 3.589 2.803 1.28 0.216 
D7 new 5.489 2.454 2.24 0.037 
D8 new 0.257 2.110 0.12 0.904 
D9 new 14.831 6.891 2.15 0.044 
DIO new -1.722 1.149 -1.50 0.150 D11 new -0.768 1.892 -0.41 0.689 D12 new -3.0573 0.8755 -3.49 0.002 Size new -0.008860 0.003831 -2.31 0.032 
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Avl new 0.284 1.207 0.24 0.816 
da6 1.609 1.274 1.26 0.222 
da7 0.959 1.154 0.83 0.416 
da8 0.884 1.272 0.69 0.496 
da9 1.520 1.107 1.37 0.186 
dalO 0.670 1.216 0.55 0.588 
dal 1 0.816 1.354' 0.60 0.554 
dal2 1.858 1.305 1.42 0.171 
s=1.045 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS 
Regression 16 221.338 
Error 19 20.733 
Total 35 242.070 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
D6 new 1 9.461 
D7 new 1 30.046 
D8 new 1 14.882 
D9 new 1 9.757 
D10 new 1 0.203 
D11 new 1 19.448 
D12 new 1 12.856 
Size new 1 0.137 
Avl new 1 112.436 
da6 1 2.440 
da7 1 0.257 
da8 1 0.520 
da9 1 2.480 
dalO 1 1.806 
dall. 1 2.400 
da12 1 2.210 
Unusual Observations 
ms Fp 
13.834 12.68 0.000 
1.091 
Obs. D6 new Igtb new Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
1 1.00 -4.879 -3.455 0.886 -1.424 -2.58R 11 0.00 -6.207 -4.146 0.810 -2.060 -3.13R 12 0.00 -1.214 -3.217 0.581 2.004 2.31R 
26 0.00 -1.116 -1.116 1.045 0.000 *X 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
The probabilities da6 - da12 were insignificant, therefore it was possible to 
assume a constant slope for all the drug products with regards to the number of 
years of generic availability. . 
Regess 'Igtb new' 16 D6 new'-'D 12 new''Size new"Avl new"ds6'-ds 12'. 
NOTE * D8 new is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * D9 new is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * Size new is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * ds6 is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * ds7 is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * ds8 is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
NOTE * ds9 is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
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The regression equation is 
Igtb new = 11.2 D6 new + 6.09 D7 new - 18.0 D8 new + 9.81 D9 new - 3.34 
DIO new - 3.41 DI 1 new - 0.62 D12 new - 0.0164 Size new + 1.48 Avl 
new - 0.00241 ds6 + 0.00586 ds7 + 0.0438 ds8 + 0.0104 ds9 + 0.00784 ds 10 + 0.0208 ds 11 - 0.0055 ds 12 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
D6 new 11.180 4.018 2.78 0.012 
D7 new 6.090 3.943 1.54 0.139 
D8 new -18.02 10.65 -1.69 0.107 D9 new 9.809 6.624 1.48 0.155 
DIO new -3.344 1.139 -2.94 0.008 
D11 new -3.414 1.990 -1.72 0.102 
D 12 new -0.620 2.052 -0.30 0.766 Size new -0.016443 0.006828 -2.41 0.026 Avl new 1.4824 0.1922 7.71 0.000 
ds6 -0.002414 0.009049 -0.27 0.793 ds7 0.005859 0.008366 0.70 0.492 
ds8 0.04380 0.02300 1.90 0.072 
ds9 0.010397 0.007294 1.43 0.170 
dslO 0.007838 0.009284 0.84 0.409 
dsll 0.02080 0.01765 1.18 0.253 
ds12 -0.00548 0.01700 -0.32 0.751 
s=1.062 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS 
Regression 16 220.658 
Error 19 21.413 
Total 35 242.070 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
D6 new 1 9.461 
D7 new 1 30.046 
D8 new 1 14.882 
D9 new 1 9.757 
DIO new 1 0.203 
D11 new 1 19.448 
D12 new 1 12.856 
Size new 1 0.137 
Avl new 1 112.436 
ds6 1 4.004 
ds7 1 0.260 
ds8 1 3.032 
ds9 1 1.474 
dslO 1 0.581 
dsll 1 1.966 
ds12 1 0.117 
ms Fp 
13.791 12.24 0.000 
1.127 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. D6 new Igtb new Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
11 0.00 -6.207 -4.427 0.601 -1.779 -2.03R 
13 0.00 -0.566 -2.365 0.693 1.799 2.24R 
26 0.00 -1.116 -1.116 1.062 0.000 *X 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
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X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
The probabilities ds6 - ds12 were insignificant, therefore it was possible to 
assume a constant slope for all the drug products with regards market size. 
Regression Analysis: Regress'lgtb new'9'D6 new'-'D12 new"Size new''Avl 
new'. 
* NOTE * Size new is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
The regression equation is ,i Igtb new, = 4.61 D6 new + 5.01 D7 new - 0.22 D8 new + 16.3 D9 new - 3.19 D 10 
new - 1.99 DI I new - 2.21 D12 new - 0.00906 Size new + 1.45 Avl new 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
D6 new 4.605 1.527 3.01 0.006 
D7 new 5.013 1.685 2.98 0.006 
D8 new -0.216 1.141 -0.19 0.851 
D9 new 16.315 4.687 3.48 0.002 
D10 new -3.1902 0.6783 -4.70 0.000 
D11 new -1.9876 0.7499 -2.65 0.014 D 12 new -2.2066 0.5719 -3.86 0.001 Size new -0.009064 0.002267. 4.00 0.000 Avl new 1.4543 0.1541 9.43 0.000 
s=1.124 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS 
Regression 9 209.225 
Error 26 32.845 
Total 35 242.070 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
D6 new 1 9.461 
D7 new 1 30.046 
D8 new 1 14.882 
D9 new 1 9.757 
D10 new 1 0.203 
D11 new 1 19.448 
D12 new 1 12.856 
Size new 1 0.137 
Avl new 1 112.436 
ms Fp 
23.247 18.40 0.000 
1.263 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. D6 new Igtb new Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
1 1.00 -4.879 -2.601 0.695 -2.278 -2.58R 12 0.00 -1.214 -3.511 0.542 2.297 2.33R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
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All Drug Products; 
Igtb all = logit of the proportion of generic prescriptions for all the drug 
products 
Size all = Market size of all the drug products analysed 
Avail = number of years of generic availability for all the products 
old = size of the market for the older drug products 
new = size of the market for the younger products 
aold = number of years of generic availability for the older products 
anew = number of years of generic availability for the younger products 
GLM'Igtb all' =Drug No. "Size all'Avail; 
SUBC> Covariates'Size all"Avail'. 
Factor Levels Values 
Drug ý 12 123456789 10 11 12 
Analysis of Variance for Igtb all 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS 
Drug 11 256.712 113-562 
Size 1 2.500 1.820 
Avail 1 114.957 114.957 
Error 46 65.866 65.866 
Total 59 440.034 
Adj MS F P 
10.324 7.21 0.000 
1.820 1.27 0.265 
114.957 80.28 0.000 
1.432 
Term Coeff , Stdev , t-value pý 
Constant -1.950 1.010 -1.93 0.060 Size -0.001604 0.001423 -1.13 0.265 Avail ý- 1.0297 0.1149 8.96 0.000 
Unusual Observations for Igtb all 
Obs. Igtb all Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
26 -4.87901 -0.87290 0.62286 -4.00611 -3.92R 
-36 -6.20658 -3.80008 0.58401 -2.40649 -2.30R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
Size was not a significant variable as a whole however it was necessary to 
determine whether there should be a significant relationship once size was 
separated into old and young components. A further ANOVA test was 
conducted on the separate groups. 
GLM'Igtb all'=Drug No. 'old new aold anew; 
SUBC> Covariates'old''new"aold''anew'. 
Factor Levels Values 
Drug 12 123456789 10 11 12 
Analysis of Variance for Igtb all 
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Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F p 
Drug 11 256.712 86.889 7.899 8.71 0.000 
old 1 4.934 1.474 1.474 1.63 0.209 
new 1 0.121 15.666 15.666 17.28 0.000 
aold 1 17.401 17.401 17.401 19.19 0.000 
anew 1 120.974 120.974 120.974 133.43 0.000 
Error 44 39.893 39.893 0.907 
Total 59 440.034 
Term Coeff Stdev t-value p 
Constant 0.1468 0.8955 0.16 0.871 
old 0.001775 0 . 001392 1.27 0.209 new -0.008095 0 . 001947 -4.16 0.000 aold 0.6058 0.1383 4.38 0.000 
anew 1.4256 0.1234 11.55 0.000 
Unusual Observations for Igtb all 
Obs. Igtb all Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
26 -4.87901 -2.42920 0.57641 -2.44981 -3.23R 37 -1.21392 -3.44710 0.45546 2.23317 2.67R 40 -0.36936 1.34774 0.50378 1.71710 -2.13R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
Only the size variable for the old drug products was insignificant therefore it 
was not included in the final regression analysis. 
Rcgress'lgtb all' 15 'Drug F-'Drug 12''new"aold'-'ancw'. 
* NOTE * new is highly correlated with other predictor variables 
The regression equation is 
Igtb all 3.03 Drug I-3.10 Drug 2+0.375 Drug 3+0.602 Drug 4 
2.30 Drug 5+4.01 Drug 6+4.36 Drug 7-0.63 Drug 8 
+ 14.3 Drug 9-3.25 Drug 10 - 1.84 Drug 11 - 2.29 Drug 12 
- 0.00809 new + 0.646 aold + 1.43 anew 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Drug 1 -3.026 1.041 -2.91 0.006 Drug 2 -3.100 1.683 -1.84 0.072 Drug 3 0.3750 0.9196 0.41 0.685 
Drug 4 0.6019 0.9196 0.65 0.516 
Drug 5 -2.305 1.166 -1.98 0.054 
Drug 6 4.006 1.338 2.99 0.004 
Drug 7 4.359 1.483 2.94 0.005 
Drug 8 -0.631 1.001 -0.63 0.532 Drug 9 14.340 4.086 3.51 0.001 
Drug 10 -3.2511 0.5814 -5.59 0.000 Drug 11 -1.8390 0.5627 -3.27 0.002 
Drug 12 -2.2942 0.4928 -4.66 0.000 
new -0.008095 0.001961 -4.13 0.000 
aold 0.6459 0.1356 4.76 0.000 
anew 1.4256 0.1243 11.47 0.000 
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s=0.9588 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 15 581.928 38.795 42.20 0.000 
Error 45 41.366 0.919 
Total 60 623.294 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
Drug 1 1 11.187 
Drug 2 1 108.160 
Drug 3 1 90.336 
Drug 4 1 100.237 
Drug 5 1 40.977 
Drug 6 1 9.461 
Drug 7 1 30.046 
Drug 8 1 14.882 
Drug 9 1 9.757 
Drug 10 1 0.203 
Drug 11 1 11.871 
Drug 12 1 12.856 
new 1 0.121 
aold 1 20.861 
anew 1 120.974 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Drug 1 Igtb all Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
26 0.00 -4.879 -2.429, 0.580 -2.450 -3.21R 37 0.00 -1.214 -3.447 0.459 2.233 2.65R 40 0.00 -0.369 1.348 0.507 -1.717 -2.11R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
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SECTION 2: Questionnaire 
Date of medical registration: ......................................................... 
Number of years at present practice: ................................................. 
.................................................................................. Please circle or tick the appropriate answers (in some instances more than 
one answer may be appropriate therefore tick as many responses as 
required). 
In general do You prefer to prescribe br'and-name products 
yes/no 
2. If you answered yes to the above the reason(s) for this preference is 
because; (tick as many responses as required) 
- the drug company is known and trusted 
- the quality is better 
- the efficacy is better 
- the safety is better 
- it is preferred by the patient 
- it is easier to distinguish by name 
Any other reasons: ....................................................... 
If the answer was no please state the reason(s) ................... 
3. Do you think a brand-name suggests "an implicit guarantee of quality"? 
(Reekie 1979) yes/no 
4. Does the complicated generic spelling of drugs deter prescribing in an 
everyday clinic situation? yes/no 
5. Are you aware of when the patent expires on brand-name drug? 
yes/ho/sometimes 
Are you aware of when generic equivalents enter the market? 
yes/no/sometimes 
7. Do you make a decisive effort to prescribe all drugs by their generic name 
irrespective of their generic availability? 
yes/no/sometimes 
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8. What factors listed below influence your general prescribing and how 
important do you consider them to be on a scale of I-5 as indicated below 
(please rank all the responses as appropriate ) 
I Of no importance/ influence 
2 Interesting but of no direct use 
3 Useful but not an important influence 
4 Quite important 
5 Very important 
- Previous personal experience of a product 
- Previous colleague experience of a product 
- Quality of a product 
- Efficacy of a product 
- Patient preference for a product 
- Price of a product 
- Spelling of a product name 
- Quick recall of the product name 
- Promotional information from drug companies 
- External pressure - local health board 
- academic seminars and conferences 
- information read in medical journals 
- formularies of the practice or local hospital 
- Others: .................................................................. 
9. Do you think visits by pharmaceutical company medical sales 
representatives serve their purpose as spreading relevant information on drugs? 
yes/no/sometimes 
10. How often are you visited by a pharmaceutical company sales 
representative? 
- Once a week 
- Once a month 
- Other ................................................ 
How long do these visits tend to last? 
-5 minutes 
- 10 minutes 
- 30 minutes 
- Other ................................................ 
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11. Are there certain therapeutic drugs which are promoted more aggressively 
thin others by the pharmaceutical companies yes/no 
Suggestion&: - Cardiovascular 
- Anti-deprcssant 
- Anti-ulcer 
- Central nervous system 
- Respiratory system 
- Anabacterials 
- Dcm=logicals 
- Nfusculoskdall 
- Genito-udnary/hormones 
- Anticancers 
- Others --- ------------------- 
12. Are them any pharmaceutical companies who are significantly more 
aggressive in promoting th& products than others yes/no 
Suggestions: - Memk 
- Glaxo 
- Bayer Hoechst 
- SmithKline Beecham 
- Wellcome 
- Hoechst 
- LCL Roche 
Ully 
13. Using the mnking system (1-5) from Question 7 how important would you 
sa( such company promodonal activity is as a source of information for the fo lowing: 
- learning about new products 
- reminders of existing products 
- learning of new dos3ps. formulations &- indications 
- learning of advances nude in R&D for future reference 
14. Usin; the same rankin; system as before circle the most appropriate 
number below to indicate the importance you place on the following sources of information on products 
- plunnxcutical company advertising in journals 12345 
- phunwcutical company dircýt mailing 12345 
ph-uTnaccuticif company seminars &- conferences 12345 
- phamuccuticil company medical sales representatives 12345 
Academic seminars & conferences 12345 
- independent scientiricjoumals 12345 
- local drug infonnadon services/hospital 12345 
- puticrit feedback on products 12345 
- Colleague experiences %%ith products 12345 
- formuLvies. in Iccil pr2ctice/hospiml 12345 
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15. From the follo%%ing how would you categorise pharmaceutical company 
promotional activities: (tick as appropriate) 
- an extramly usdul, and csxntW source of information 
-a vcry usdul source of information but not the main one 
- int=sting and of some use but mainly rely on training 
- of no use and mainly a nuisance, a u-aste of resources 
- other. 
Any other general conunents would be much appreciated on any of the above 
questions or on other points you feel to be relevant. 
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Questionnaire Answers: Number of Responses (Percentages): 
1. Yes 52(35.86%) 
No 91(62.76%) 
2A. Company better known and trusted 31 
Quality better 29 
Efficacy better 20 
Safety better 14 
Preferred by patient 25 
Easier to distinguish by name 28 
Habits of prescribing 2 
Consistency of product 9 
Supporting R&D 3 
Doubt over generic supply 1 
Increased availability of delivery methods I 
Additional educational information via brands 1 
Product liability rules advantageous 1 
No reason given 1 
2B. Cost 56 
Brands confuse prescribing 4 
Trained to prescribe generics 8 
Generics more scientific 3 
Non-approval of firm marketing 3 
Generics are equivalent 21 
Generics are simpler/more familiar 5 
Outside pressure i. e. government 3 
Practice policy 8 
Drug directory mainly generic 3 
Gives the chemist a choice and is easier 2 
No reason given 12 
Generic refers to the drug content 4 
3. Yes 71(48.97%) 
No 71(48.97%) 
Sometimes 2(l. 38%) 
No Answer l(O. 69%) 
4. Yes 63(43.45%) 
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No 76(52.41%) 
1 Sometimes 6(4.14%) 
5. Yes 9(6.21%) 
No 45(31.03%) 
Sometimes 89(61.38%) 
No Answer 20.38%) 
6. Yes 10(6.89%) 
No 49(33.79%) 
Sometimes 84(57.93%) 
No Answer 2(l. 38%) 
7. Yes 54(37.24%) 
No 69(47.59%) 
Sometimes 22(15.17%) 
8. 
Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
- 
order 
- 
None 
Previous experience - 1 4 45 3- 
95 66T 
- 
7 - 
Colleague experience 3 
- 
12 
- 
48 
- - 
95 
- 
15 
- - 
507 
' - - 
7- 1 
Quality 1 77 1 9 To Y5 3 8W 1 7-- 5 
Efficacy -I - 21 28 115 693 11 - 
Patient preference 51 17 - 
52 56 15 
- - 
494 18 
Price 11 8 49 
- 
-67- 2-6 
, 
532 5 
ýin ýe dlýi n 72 22 - 
T5 
- - 
12 4 
- - 
M9 
- - - - 
13 - 
_ Quick recall 1 -4 -TO 5iT 72- 1 = 4 2 5 10 1 
Promotional informati-on -31 53--- 52 9 - 329 11 - 
External pressure 
__ 
58 37 31 15 4 
' 
305 
- 
12 - 
Academic seminars etc. 3 9 44 75 14 52T 6 
Medical journals 3 9 31 87 15 537 4 
Formularies 20 1 T-1 -377 77- 24 475 7- 
9. Yes 48(33.10%) 
No 10(6.89%) 
Sometimes 68(59.31%) 
No Answer 1(0.69%) 
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IOA. 
Visits by Reps. No. of doctors 
overl/week 45 
I/week 66 
I/fortnight 7 
I/month 8 
2-3/ year 8 
nothing regular 3 
never 7 
no answer I 
TOTAL 145 
IOB. 
Length of visit No. of doctors, 
5 mins. 14 
10 ntins. 100 
15 mins. 7 
20 mins. 5 
30 mins. 6 
Over 30 mins. 2 
N/A 8 
Over lunch 3 
TOTAL 145 
11. Yes -, 121 (83.45%) 
No 17(11.72%) 
No Answer 7 (4.83%) 
Total Order 
Cardiovascular 110 
7 - - 
1 
- WntT-depressant 7 6 4 
Ulcer 85 2 
CNS 12 9 
Respiratory 38 6 
Antibacterials 79 
- 
3 
- Dermatologicals 19 8 
Musculoskeletal 61 5 
Genito-urinary/hormones 21 7 
Anticancers - - 
NSAID 2 10= 
ACE inhibitors I ll= 
Migraine 1 11= 
New expensive drugs 12 10= 
Lipi lowering drugs 12 10= 
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12. Yes 57(N. 31%) 
., No 62(42.76%) 
No Answer 26 (17.93%) 
-Company Total Order 
Merck -10 4-- Glaxo 44 1 
Bayer 14 3 
Hoechst 5 7 
SB 18 2 
Wellcome 5= 
I. C. I. 7 6= 
Roche 10 4= 
Lilly 7 6= 
Astra 3 8-- 
May & Baker 2 9= 
Bencard 2 9-- 
Schering 2 9= 
Janssen 2 9= 
Thomas Morson 8= 
Pfizer 1 10= 
Boots 16= 
13. 
14. 
1 2 3 
- 
4 5 Total' 
New products 9 12 
- - 
: FI 
- - 
67 
- - 
12 
7 - 
487 
- Reminders 11 78 
- 
7 7 9 37 4=1 
New dosages etc. 6 19 3 -1 9 -4 63- 
R&D advances 1 22 42 1 43 27 1 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Com any Journal ads. 55 
- 
45 
- - 
37 6 
- 
-2 290 
Corn2anX direct mail 67 
- 
75 
- 
= 5 2 -7737 
Co any seminars etc. W 3 -2 --6 -1 -Tl- --T- -4T4- 
Company sales reps. 14 22 61 43 
- 
5 -- 438 
Ac, qdemic seminars etc. 1 8 24 - 7 6 -77 _7577- 
Scientific journals 5 6 = 567 
Local drug information 8 19 32 56 30-- 516 
Patient feedback 1 14 31 71 28 
- 
54 P 
Colleague expenence 
1 
2 19 40 64 To- 51 
Formularies 17 1 21 22 470 
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15. 
No. of 
doctors 
Essential 9 
Very useful 56 
Interestaing 67 
Nuisance E 13 
TOTA 145 
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SECTION 3: Datw, and Regression Analysis of the Prescribing by 
Carnoustie Doctors 1985 - 1989 
Table 1: % Generic Prescribing per Physician 1985 - 1989 
Drug G. P. 1 G. P. 2 
- 
G. P. 3 
-- '- 
G. P. 4 - 
-- - - - 
G. P. 5 
-- 
G. P. 6 
- - 
- G. P. 7 
- - Indocid 76.00 F3 . 55 
91 
. 25 7 l 
T5 9 =. 7 70 5 1 93 74 
- Penbrit. 98.33 --76"UT- -'77-. -73- -7 =. 97.61 
-" 
-MOMU 
Brufen --T9-. 7-3- - 99.01 --979-9- -7777- 99.53 T =. 7 99.62 
Lasix. 98.73 99.21 
- 
98.65 98-85 
- 
99.35 98.28 - 
-- -" 
99.65 
Mid-a-mor 100.00 -9575 
- 
87.50 
- - 
3T7-5 
- - 
96.00 75 U(T- 
-- " - 
-1= 
Feldene 5 9. -8 -6 6 2= 7 T. TG - 7 72! 8 58.95 79 . 
74 97.65 
Naprosyn 90.91 94.22 92.72 77.44 93.50 79.79 85.62 
Ponstan --24.00 17.92 56.82- 12.79- 
- - - 
10.53 
5 - 
=. I 
-- 
-25.0 
-- - Ventolin 68.92 67.97 83.41 77 5 .7 
7; - T9 
.1 5 7T77 
92 75 
TM-Roxill 9.84 -60.00 17.14 37.84 38.71 21.28 
- - 
59.09 
- - - Tr-as-'i-cor 63.16 62.50 65.12 33.33 58.23 74 77- - fl . 2T N-N-K 10.53 18.00 31-95 18.27- 
- Tenonn. 1 44.09 36.45 45.67 44.05 30.96 4 5. T9 
Table 2: Prescriptions (%) per Physician 1985 - 1989 
Drug 
Total 
Pres G. P. 2 
- 
G. P. 3 G. P. 4 G. P. 5 G. P. 6 G. P. 7 
- - Indocid ' 7560 -148 1 27.69 24.62 
- - 
14.29 
- - 
13.91 
- - "- - 
2F 68 
Penbrit ' -77--51 17.38 11 -1 2.8 3 1 6-83 2 7 .. 
T4 14.50 
Brufen 5228 17441 23.56 19.95 16.24 18.09 - 5.05 
'- Lasix 3569 17.79 18.66 
- - 
19.50 21.43 
- - - 
14.65 
-- - 
7.96 
Mida. 1-53- -1-5 O-T- -- 2 CT1 4- -1 U -46'- -F2 . 
68 7 . 
Tf - 7.84 
Feldene -732-2 223-9 16.15 16.93 21.40 15.80 7.32 
Napros. 1 2603 17.29 25.85 12.60 18.33 14.44 11.49 
Ponstan 1512 11.44 26.65 22.75 17.99 6.08 
Ventol. -T7-96 17.58 23.71 17.48 16.53 17.42 
-1 7 ' - 
7.28 
Amoxil 249 16.06 14.06 29.72 12.45 1 8 ý 8 8.84 
Trasic. 350 9.71 12.29 1 10.29 9.71 
N-N-K 437 11.44 22.19 1 18.76 4.12 
Tenor. 6657 16.07 24.99 1 753-39 16.21 1 19.56 7.3 8 
, Table 3: GP. Dates of Registration 
GP 
Date of 
Registration 
1 1949 
G. P. 2 1971 
G. P. 3 1972 
G. P. 4 1975 
G. P. 5 1977 
G. P. 6 1979 
G. P. 7 1985 
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Regression Analysis using Minitab: 
A. Regression Analysis of Generic Prescribing and the Registration dates of all 
Seven Doctors in the Camoustie Health Practice: 
Ig/b A'= the logit of the proportion of generic prescribing 1985 - 1989 
'Reg'= date of registration of the doctor 
Regress Ig/b A' I 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 1'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=0.0594 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor - 
Coef 
'Stdev 
t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.05944 ' 0.02164 2.75 0.033 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 9.428 9.428 7.55 0.033 
Error 6 7.498 1.250 
Total, 7 16.926 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. IgIb A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
1 40.0 1.153 2.377 0.866 -1.225 -1.73 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress Ig/b A' 1 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 2'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=0.168 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor' Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.16794 0.05216 3.22 0.018 
Analysis of Vanance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 75.273 75.273 10.37 0.018 
Error 6 43.564 7.261 
Total 7 118.837 
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Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. IgIb A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
8 40.0 4.19 6.72 2.09 -2.53 -1.48 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress Ig/b A' I 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 3'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=0.104 Reg. 
8 cases used 83 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.10446 0.05103 2.05 0.080 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 46.58 46.58 4.19 0.080 
Error 7 77.81 11.12 
Total 8 124.40 
Regress 'lg/b A' I 'Reg.; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 4'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=0.195 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev 't-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.19481 0.05742 3.39 0.015 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS NIS Fp 
Regression 1 101.29 101.29 11.51 0.015 
Error 6 52.80 8.80 
Total 7 154.09 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. Ig/b A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
22 40.0 4.36 7.79 2.30 -3.44 -1.83 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress 'lg/b A' I 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 5'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=0.103 Reg. 
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7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.10250 0.03054 3.36 0.015 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 28.043 28.043 11.26 0.015 
Error 6 14.941 2.490 
Total 7 42.984 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. IgIb A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
29 , 40.0 , 2.197 
4.100 1.222 -1.903 -1.91 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress IgIb A' 1 'Reg. I; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 6'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=0.0302 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-mtio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.03024 0.03078 0.98 0.364 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF Ss- ms F-p 
Regression 1 2.440 2.440 0.97 0.364 
Error 6 15.168 2.528 
Total 7 17.608 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. IgIb A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
36 40.0 0.276 1.209 1.231 -0.933 -0.93 X 
42 4.0 ý 3.726 0.121 0.123 3.605 2.27R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress 'Iglb A" I 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug T. 
The regression equation is 
IgIb A=0.0958 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
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Predictor -- Coef Stdev t-ratio p Noconstant 
Reg. 0.09582 0.02339 4.10 0.006 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression -1 24.504 24.504 16.78 0.006 Error 6 8.763 1.461 
Total 7 33.267 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. IgIb A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
43 40.0 2.303 3.833 0.936 -1.530 -2. OORX 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress Ig/b A' 1 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 8'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=-0.0506 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev - t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. -0.05061 0.02123 -2.38 0.055 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 6.836 6.836 5.68 0.055 
Error 6, -7.219 1.203 Total 7 14.055 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. Ig/b A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual StResid 
50 40.0 -1.153 -2.024 0.849 0.872 1.26 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress Ig/b A' I 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 9'. 
The regression equation is 
IgIb A=0.0433 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.04329 0.01645 2.63 0.039 
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Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 5.0019 5.0019 6.92 0.039 
Error 6 4.3359 0.7226 
Total 7 9.3377 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. IgIb A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
57 40.0 0.796 1.732 0.658 -0.935 -1.74 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress Ig/b A' I 'Reg.; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 10'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A 0.0495, Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. -0.04953 0.01438 -3.44 0.014 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE , DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 6.5467 6.5467,11.85 0.014 
Error 6 3.3134 0.5522 
Total 7 9.8601 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. Ig/b A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
64 40.0 -2.216 -' -1.981 0.575 -0.235 -0.50 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress Ig/b A' I 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 11'. 
The regression equation is 
IgIb A=0.0121 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.01207 0.02018 0.60 0.572 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 0.389 0.389 0.36 0.572 
Error 6 6.522 1.087 
Total 7 6.911 
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Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. Ig/b A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
71 40.0 0.539 0.483 0.807 0.056 0.09 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress 'lg/b A' 1 'Reg.; 
SUBC> WeightsDrug 12'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A=0.0625 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 0.062548 0.009082 6.89 0.000 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 10.442 10.442 47.43 0.000 
Error 6 1.321 0.220 
Total 7 11.763 
Unusual Obs ervations 
Obs. Reg. Ig/b A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
78 40.0 2.140 2.502 0.363 -0.362 -1.22 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
Regress Ig/b A' 1 'Reg. '; 
SUBC> Weights'Drug 13'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b A 0.0 144 Reg. 
7 cases used 84 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor - 
Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. -0.014361 0.006375 -2.25 0.065 
Analysis of Variance - 
SOURCE DF SS Ms Fp 
Regression 1 0.5504 0.5504 5.07 0.065 
Error 6 0.6508 0.1085 
Total 7 1.2012 
Unusual Observations , Obs. Reg. - Ig/b A Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
85 40.0 -0.237 -0.574 0.255 0.337 1.62 X 
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence. 
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B. Regression of Generic Prescribing and Registration Dates of Six of the 
Doctors in Camoustie: 
'lg/b B' = logit of the proportion of generic prescribing 1985 - 1989 for all 
doctors excluding the eldest (Doctor 1). 
'Reg. 6'= registration dates of the six remaining doctors. 
Dg I- Dg 13 = drugs 
Regress 'lg/b/B' 1 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg V. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.105 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.10526 0.02650 3.97 0.011 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 11.845 11.845 15.78 0.011 
Error 5 3.753 0.751 
Total 6 15.597 
Regress 'lg/b/B' I 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 2'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.263 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.26251 0.07184 3.65 0.015 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS Ms Fp 
Regression 1 73.668 73.668 13.35 0.015 
Error 5 27.585 5.517 
Total 6 101.254 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. 6 Ig/b/B Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
12 4.0 5.986 1.050 0.287 4.936 2.12R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
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Regress'lglb/B' 1 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 3'. 
The regression equation is, 
lgttWB = 0.293 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.29293 0.07066 4.15 0.009 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 91.728 91.728 17.19 0.009 
Error 5 26.683 5.337 
Total 6 118.411 
Regress 'lg/[VB' I 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 4'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.323 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.32335 0.06603 4.90 0.004 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms F p 
Regression 1 111-77 111.77 23.98 0.004 
Error 5 23.31 4.66 
Total 6 135.07 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. 6 Ig/b/B Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
24 4.0 5.642 1.293 0.264 4.349 2.03R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
Regess'lg/b/B' I 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 5'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.173 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor -, Coef Stdev t-ratio Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.17338 0.03236 5.36 0.003 
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Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF Ss ms Fp 
Regression 1 32.136 32.136 28.72 0.003 
Error 5 5.596 1.119 
Total 6 37.732 
Regress 'lg/b/B' I 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 6'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.0652 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.06516 0.04930 1.32 0.244 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 4.538 4.538 1.75 0.244 
Error 5 12.993 2.599 
Total 6 17.532 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Reg. 6 lglbVB Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid 
36 4.0 3.726 0.261 0.197 3.465 2.17R 
Wdenotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
Regress'lg/b/B' I 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 7. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.153 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.15307 0.02337 6.55 0.001 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 25.047 25.047 42.92 0.001 
Error 5 2.918 0.584 
Total 6 27.965 
Regress'lgfb/B' 1 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 8'. 
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The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B =-0.0832 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 -0.08322 0.03156 -2.64 0.046 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 7.404 7.404 6.96 0.046 
Error 5 5.323 1.065 
Total 6 12.727 
Regress 'lg/WB' I 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 9'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.0783 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.07829 0.02006 3.90 0.011 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 6.5517 6.5517 15.22 0.011 
Error 5 2.1519 0.4304 
Total 6 8.7036 
Rcgress'lg/[VB' I 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 10'. 
The regression equation is 
lgj" =-0.0408 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 -0.04075 0.02438 -1.67 0.155 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS MS Fp 
Regression 1 1.7752 1.7752 2.79 0.155 
Error 5 3.1761 0.6352 
Total 6' 4.9513 
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Regress 'Iglb/B' 1 'Reg. 6; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 11'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.0 100 Reg. 6, 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.00997 0.03491 0.29 0.787 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF Ss MS Fp 
Regression 1 0.106 0.106 0.08 0.787 
Error 5 6.514 1.303 
Total 6 6.620 , 
Regress'lg/b/B' 1 'Reg. 6'; 
SUBC> WeightsDg 12'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B = 0.0761 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 0.07609 0.01364 5.58 0.003 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF SS ms Fp 
Regression 1 6.1888 6.1888 31.13 0.003 
Error 5 0.9940 0.1988 
Total 6 7.1829 
Regress'lglb/B' I 'Reg. 6; 
SUBC> Weights'Dg 13'. 
The regression equation is 
Ig/b/B =-0.0270 Reg. 6 
6 cases used 72 cases contain missing values or had zero weight 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Noconstant 
Reg. 6 -0.026982 0.008283 -3.26 0.023 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE DF Ss NIS Fp 
Regression 1 0.77825 0.77825 10.61 0.023 
Error 5 0.36675 0.07335 
Total 6 1.14500 
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C Regression Analysis of Total Prescribing of the Six Doctors and the Date of 
Registration 
TtI Pr 6" = Total prescribing of the doctors 1985 - 1989. 
Dg 1- Dg 13'= drugs. 
'Reg 6' = registration dates of the doctors 
Regress Ttl Pr 6' 14 'Dg I-'Dg 13"Reg. 6'. 
The regression equation is 
Ttl Pr 6=4.2 Dg 1+ 203 Dg 2+ 616 Dg 3+ 339 Dg 4- 230 Dg 5+ 131 Dg 6 
+ 178 Dg 7-3.8 Dg 8+ 960 Dg 9- 214 Dg 10 - 197 Dg 11 
- 183 Dg 12 + 854 Dg 13 + 20.5 Reg. 6 
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p 
Nocons=t 
Dg 1 4.23 87.28 0.05 0.961 
Dg 2 202.73 87.28 2.32 0.023 
Dg 3 615.57 87.28 7.05 0.000 
Dg 4 339.07 87.28 3.88 0.000 
Dg 5 -230.27 87.28 -2.64 0.010 Dg 6 131.23 87.28 1.50 0.138 
Dg 7 178.07 87.28 2.04 0.045 
Dg 8 -3.77 87.28 -0.04 0.966 Dg 9 960.23 87.28 11.00 0.000 
Dg 10 -214.27 87.28 -2.45 0.017 Dg 11 -197.43 87.28 -2.26 0.027 Dg 12 -182.93 87.28 -2.10 0.040 Dg 13 853.73 87.28 9.78 0.000 
Reg. 6 20.461 4.156 4.92 0.000 
s= 171.8 
Analysis of 
SOURCE 
Regression 
Error 
Total 
Variance 
DF ss 
14 27794192 
64 1889356 
78 29683548 
SOURCE DF SEQ SS 
Dg 1 1 405600 
Dg 2 1 1261334 
Dg 3 1 4555331 
Dg 4 1 2122960 
Dg 5 1 3902 
Dg 6 1 898614 
Dg 7 1 1129268 
Dg 8 1 381024 
Dg 9 1 8871936 
Dg 10 1 10333 
Dg 11 1 20417 
Dg 12 1 31828 
Dg 13 1 7385942 
Reg. 6 1 715704 
ms Fp 
1985299 67.25 0.000 
29521 
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Unusual Observations 
Obs. Dg I Ttl Pr 6 Fit Stdev. Fit 
11 0.00 752.0 407.3 70.9 
18 0.00 264.0 697.4 78.5 
50 0.00 1730.0 1308.1 72.6 
54 0.00 531.0 1042.1 78.5 
74 0.00 1664.0 1201.6 72.6 
78 0.00 491.0 935.6 78.5 
Residual St. Resid 
344.7 2.20R 
-433.4 -2.84R 421.9 2.71R 
-511.1 -3.34R 462.4 2.97R 
-444.6 -2.91R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
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D. Questionnaire Answers: Number of Responses For'Doctors Registered 
before 1980 and those Registered in 1980 and afterwards (Percentages): 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 32(34.78%) 20(40%) 
No 58(63.04%) 30(60%) 
Sometimes 2(2.17%) - 
Total 92 50 
Expected Values using Chi-square (Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 33.43 18.57 
No 56.57 31.43 
Chi-square 0.061 + 0.110 
0.0.036 + 0.065 = 0.272 Not significant 
2A. <1980 >1980 
Company better known and trusted 20 11 
Quality better 20 9 
Efficacy better 13 7 
Safety better 8 6 
Preferred by patient 15 10 
Easier to distinguish by name 20 8 
Habits of prescribing 2 - 
Consistency of product 6 3 
Supporting R&D 2 1 
Doubt over generic supply 1 - 
Increased availability of delivery methods - 1 
Additional educational information given - 1 
Product liability rules advantageous - 1 
No reason given I - 
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2B. 
3. 
<1980 >1980 
Cost 39 15 
Brands confuse prescribing 1 3 
Trained to prescribe generics 2 4 
Generics more scientific 2 1 
Non-approval of firm marketing 2 1 
Generics are equivalent 13 8 
Generics are simpler/more familiar 1 4 
Outside pressure i. e. government 1 2 
Practice policy 5 3 
Drug directory mainly generic 3 - 
Gives the chemist a choice and is easier I I 
No reason given 10 3 
Generic refers to the drug content I I 
Yes 
No 
Sometimes 
No Answer 
<1980 
48(52.17%) 
41(44.57%) 
2(2.17%) 
1(1.09%) 
>1980 
22(44%) 
28(56%) 
Expected Values using Chi-square (Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 44.82 25.18 
No 44.18 24.82 
Chi-square 0.226 + 0.402 
0.229 + 0.407 
4. <1980 
Yes 41(44.57%) 
No 47(51.09%) 
Sometimes 4(4.35%) 
1.263 Not significant 
>1980 
20(40%) 
28(56%) 
2(4%) 
Expected Values using Chi-square (Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 39.47 21.53 
No 48.53 26.47 
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-Chi-square 0.059 + 0.109, 
0.048 + 0.088 = 0.304 Not significant 
5. <1980 >1980 
Yes 7(7.61%) 2(4%) 
No 27(29.35%) 15(30%) 
Sometimes 56(60.87%) 33(60%) 
No Answer 2(2.17%) 
Expected Values usi ng Chi-square comp aring the answers for 'sometimes' with 
those for no (Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 : ý1980 
Yes 26.61 15.39 
No ý ------ - 56.39 32.61 
Chi-square 0.006 + 0.010 - 
0.003 + 0.005-= 0.023 Not significant 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 6 (6.52%) 4(8%) 
No 36(39.13%) 10(20%) 
Sometimes 48(52.17%) 36(72%) 
No Answer 2(2.17%) 
Expected Values using Chi-square comparing the answers for 'sometimes' with 
those for no (Degrees of freedom 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 29.72 16.28 
No 54.28 29.72 
Chi-square 1.326 + 2.421 
0.726 + 1.326 = 5.798 Significantly Different 
7. <1980 >1980 
Yes 36(39.13%) 18(36%) 
No 42(45.65%) 24(48%) 
Sometimes 14(15.22%) 8(16%) 
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Expected Values using Chi-square (Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 35.10 18.90 
No 42.90 23.10 
Chi-square 0.023 + 0.043 
0.0 19 + 0.035 = 0.120 Not significant 
8. 
< 1980 Registration Rank 
1 2 3 4 is Total ' order 
Previous experience - 1 3 30 58 42 1 --- -T- 
Colleague experience 3 
- 
7- 
- 
77- 40 6 73-15 7- 
Vuality T 7 -1 -5 '34- -3T- 777- 3 
Efficacy - - 2 18 72 438 1 
Patient preference 
- 
1 15 
- 
31 -TI 13 314 8 
FFc e 1 
- 
2 
- - 
30 --4T- -1 -1 --TJT- -T- 
Spelling 41 IW 21 9 4 7I= 12 
Quick recall 16 15 1 37 17 7 260 : 10 Promotional infonnation 19 37 
- 
31 5 : -- -TOT- 11 
External pressure 38 75 -19- -ý- -T- TST- -1 S- 
Academic seminars etc. 1 7 2T- 47 9 332 7- 
Medical journals 1 21 7 -211 5) 44 1 FI 'M 5 
Formularies I ll 1 12 1 22 1 18 1 307 
> 1980 Registration Rank 
1 2 3 4 S Total order 
Previous experience - - 1 14 35 1234 2 
Colleague experience - 5 12 =3 9 183 5 
Quality 1 3 - RT 192 3 
Efficacy 
- , 
10 TO- 240 1 
nt preference T 2 21 22- 2 TMF 7 
Price 18 7 176 6 
Spelling 28 6 13 3 - 91 13 
Quick recall 7 4 19 1 15 4 133 10 
Promotional informatio 12 15 20 1 3 - 114 11 External pressure T9- T2- 11 7 1 log ' = 
Academic seminars etc. 2 2 16 27 3 161 8 
Medical journals 
1 
1 2 10 TI- T- = ? 4 
Formularies 91 31 F7-1 16 5 155 1 9 
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9. <1980 >1980 
Ye's 29(31.52%) 19(38%) 
No 9(9.78%) 1(2%) 
Sometimes 53(57.61%) 30(60%) 
No Answer l(1.09%) 
Expected Values usin g Chi-square (Degrees of freedom 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Yes 31.45 16.55 
No 6.55 3.45 
IOA. 
IOB. 
ii. 
Chi-square 0.191 + 0.0362 
0.915 + 1.738 = 3.206 Not significant at 95% level 
Number of Doctors 
--Visits b <1980 >1980 
overl/week 24 19 
l/week 39 27 
I/fortnight 4 3 
I/month 7 1 
2-3/ year 8 - 
nothing regular 2 
never 7 
no answe I - 
TOTAL 92 50 
Number of Doctors 
Length of visit <1980 >1980 
5 mins. 8 5 
10 mins. 60 38 
15 mins. 6 1 
20 mins. 5 - 
30 mins. 2 4 
Over 30 m`m-s 1 1 
N/A 8 - 
Over lunch - 
TGTAL 92 50 
This answers to this question were irrelevant for the comparison analysis 
12. This answers to this question were irrelevant for the comparison analysis 
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13. 
<1980 Registration 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
New products 8 --275- 38 10 303 
Reminders -1 -T7- -T- =7 
New dosages etc. 32 --T- 299 
R&D advances 
>1980 Registration. 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
New products 1 -1-7 
Reminders 13 -T2- -17- -l -T4-7 
New dosages etc. F 17 1 155 
R&D advances 15 1 18 67 
A. Company Information important for learning of new products 
Expected Values using Chi-square comparing 'Quite important' with others 
combined (Degrees of freedom = 1) -- 
<1980 >1980 
Others 47.27,25.73 
Quite important 42.73 23.27 
- Chi-square 0.474+0.871 
0.524 + 0.963 2.832 Not significant at 95% level 
B. Company Information important as a reminder of existing products 
Expected Values using Chi-square comparing 'Quite important' with others 
combined (Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Others 50.58 28.42 
Quite important 38.42 21.58 
Chi-square 0.003+ 0.006 
0.5005 + 0.008 = 0.022 Not significant 
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14. 
< 1980 Registration 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Company journal ads. 37 29- 7FO- 4 2 181 
Company direct mail 43 = 20 1 2 169, - 
Co any seminars etc. 5 1-6 41 27 -7- =2 
CompanX sales reps. 12 -17 37 23 -73- , 264 
Academic seminars etc. 1 
- - 
5 
-- 
10 50 = 71 
Scientific journals T g, - -I-r 46- -21- 352 
Local drug information 7 1-1 -IT'- = 1-7 -= 
Patient feedback -T7- 334 
Colleague experience 
j 
2 1E: = 42 -T- -TI-6- 
FormuMes 12 13 1 20 1 33 -1 TT-I ' 300 
> 1980 Registration 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Company joumal ads. 17 
- 
14 
- 
17 2 - 104 
Company direct mail fo 17 lo -7- -9-6'- 
Company seminars etc. 2 19- 19 13 147 
Companý sales reps. 2 4 23 19 2 165 
Academic seminars etc. 
-" - - 
3 13 24 lu- 771- 
umal s Sc ie ntiFi c jro 2 - 6 28 T-4 202 Tocal drug information 1 8 11 18 1-2 182 
Patient feedback - 1 7 32 10 1 
Colleague experience - 3 2 14 22 - 
191 
Formularies 5 8 17 13 7 15D7 
15. 
Number of Doctors 
< T-985 > 1980 
Essential F 1 
Very useful 32 23 
Interesting 41 24 
Nuisance 11 1 2 
TOTAL 92 1 so 
A. Company Information is a nuisance 
Expected Values using Chi-square comparing 'Nuisance' with others combined 
(Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Others 83.58 45.42 
Quite important 8.42 4.58 
Chi-square 0.079+ 0.145 
0.789 + 1.451 = 2.466 Not significant at 95% lcvcl 
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B. Company Information very useful 
Expected Values using Chi-square comparing 'Very Useful' with others 
combined (Degrees of freedom = 1) 
<1980 >1980 
Others 56.37 30.63 
Quite important 35.63 19.37 
Chi-square 0.234+0.431 
0.371 + 0.682 = 1.718 Not significant 
